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Foreword
ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES VARIES SHARPLY AROUND THE WORLD. 
In many developing countries, less than half the population has an 
account with a fi nancial institution, and in most of Africa less than 
one in fi ve households do. Recent development theory sees the lack of 
access to fi nance as a critical mechanism for generating persistent income 
inequality, as well as slower growth. Without inclusive fi nancial systems, 
poor individuals and small enterprises need to rely on their own limited 
savings and earnings to invest in their education, become entrepreneurs, 
or take advantage of promising growth opportunities. Financial sector 
policies that encourage competition, provide the right incentives to 
individuals, and help overcome access barriers are thus central not only 
to stability but also to growth, poverty reduction, and more equitable 
distribution of resources and capacities.
The World Bank Group has long recognized that well-functioning 
fi nancial systems are essential for economic development. The work of 
its fi nancial sector has, over the years, emphasized the importance of 
fi nancial stability and effi ciency. Promoting broader access to fi nancial 
services, however, has received much less attention despite the emphasis it 
has received in theory. The access dimension of fi nancial development has 
often been overlooked, mostly because of serious data gaps in this area. 
Empirical evidence that links access to fi nancial services to development 
outcomes has been quite limited, providing at best tentative guidance 
for public policy initiatives. The increasing emphasis by policy circles in 
recent years on building more inclusive fi nancial systems thus highlights 
the need for better data and analysis. 
Measuring access to fi nance, its determinants, and its impact has 
been the focus of a major research effort at the Bank in recent years. 
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This research has included case-study analyses of specifi c policies and 
interventions, as well as systematic analyses of extensive cross-country 
and micro data sets. Finance for All? presents fi rst efforts at developing 
indicators illustrating that fi nancial access is quite limited around the 
world and identifi es barriers that may be preventing small fi rms and 
poor households from using fi nancial services. Based on this research, 
the report derives principles for effective government policy on broad-
ening access. 
The report’s conclusions confi rm some traditional views and chal-
lenge others. For example, recent research provides additional evidence 
to support the widely-held belief that fi nancial development promotes 
growth and illustrates the role of access in this process. Improved 
access to fi nance creates an environment conducive to new fi rm entry, 
innovation, and growth. However, research also shows that small fi rms 
benefi t the most from fi nancial development and greater access—both 
in terms of entry and seeing their growth constraints relaxed. Hence, 
inclusive fi nancial systems also have consequences for the composition 
and competition in the enterprise sector.
The evidence also suggests that besides the direct benefi ts of access 
to fi nancial services, small fi rms and poor households can also benefi t 
indirectly from the effects of fi nancial development. For example, the 
poor may benefi t from having jobs and higher wages, as better developed 
fi nancial systems improve overall effi ciency and promote growth and 
employment. Similarly, small fi rms may see their business opportuni-
ties expand with fi nancial development, even if the fi nancial sector still 
mostly serves the large fi rms. Hence, pro-poor fi nancial sector policy 
requires a broader focus of attention than access for the poor: improving 
access by the excluded nonpoor micro and small entrepreneurs can have 
a strongly favorable indirect effect on the poor. 
Expanding access to fi nancial services remains an important policy 
challenge in many countries, with much for governments to do. However, 
not all government action is equally effective, and some policies can 
be counterproductive. Policy makers need to have realistic goals. For 
instance, while access to formal payment and savings services can 
approach universality as economies develop, not everyone will or should 
qualify for credit. There are instances where national welfare has been 
reduced by overly relaxed credit policies.
Government policies in the fi nancial sector should focus on reforming 
institutions, developing infrastructures to take advantage of technologi-
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cal advances, encouraging competition, and providing the right incen-
tives through prudential regulations. The report discusses experience and 
evidence of different government interventions—such as those through 
taxes, subsidies, and direct ownership of institutions—illustrating how 
they sometimes tend to be politicized, poorly structured, and benefi cial 
mainly those who do not need the subsidy. In the absence of thorough 
economic evaluations of most schemes, their net effect in cost-benefi t 
terms also remains unclear. 
Despite best efforts, it seems likely that provision of some fi nancial 
services to the very poor may require subsidies. Generally speaking, the 
use of subsidies in microcredit can dull the incentive for innovative new 
technologies in expanding access, with counterproductive long-term 
repercussions for the poor. Besides, evidence suggests that for poor house-
holds credit is not the only—or in many cases, the principal—fi nancial 
service they need. For example, in order to participate in the modern 
market economy even the poor need—but often cannot access—reliable, 
inexpensive, and suitable savings and payments products. Subsidies may 
sometimes be better spent on establishing savings and payment products 
appropriate to the poor. 
This report reviews and synthesizes a large body of research, and 
provides the basis for sound policy advice in the area of fi nancial access. 
We hope that it will contribute to the policy debate on how to achieve 
fi nancial inclusion. While much work has been done, much more 
remains to be learned. The fi ndings in this report also underline the 
importance of investing in data collection: continued work on measuring 
and evaluating the impact of access requires detailed micro data both at 
the household and enterprise level. 
The World Bank Group is committed to continuing work in the area 
of building inclusive fi nancial systems, helping member countries design 
fi nancial system policies that are fi rmly based on empirical evidence. 
François Bourguignon
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist
World Bank
Michael Klein
Vice President, Financial and 
Private Sector Development, World Bank
Chief Economist, IFC
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Overview and Summary
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS EXIST TO MITIGATE THE 
effects of information asymmetries and transaction costs that prevent 
the direct pooling and investment of society’s savings. Financial institu-
tions help mobilize savings and provide payments services that facilitate 
the exchange of goods and services. In addition, they produce and 
process information about investors and investment projects to enable 
effi cient allocation of funds; to monitor investments and exert corpo-
rate governance after those funds are allocated; and to help diversify, 
transform, and manage risk. When they work well, fi nancial institutions 
and markets provide opportunities for all market participants to take 
advantage of the best investments by channeling funds to their most 
productive uses, hence boosting growth, improving income distribution, 
and reducing poverty. When they do not work well, opportunities for 
growth are missed, inequalities persist, and in the extreme cases, costly 
crises follow. 
Much attention has focused on the depth and effi ciency of fi nancial 
systems—and for good reason: well-functioning fi nancial systems are 
by defi nition effi cient, allocating funds to their most productive uses. 
Well-functioning fi nancial systems serve other vital purposes as well, 
including offering savings, payments, and risk-management products to 
as large a set of participants as possible, and seeking out and fi nancing 
good growth opportunities wherever they may be. Without inclusive 
fi nancial systems, poor individuals and small enterprises need to rely on 
their personal wealth or internal resources to invest in their education, 
become entrepreneurs, or take advantage of promising growth opportuni-
ties. Modern development theories increasingly emphasize the key role of 
Finance is an essential part of 
the development process— 
—and a well-functioning 
system needs broad access, 
as well as depth
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access to fi nance: lack of fi nance is often the critical element underlying 
persistent income inequality, as well as slower growth.
Earlier theories of development postulated that a rise in short-term 
inequality was an inevitable consequence of the early stages of develop-
ment. However, it is increasingly recognized that inequality can adversely 
affect growth prospects—which implies that wealth redistribution can 
spur development. Despite the emphasis that fi nancial market imper-
fections now receive in theory, development economists have tended 
to advocate the adoption of redistributive public policies to improve 
wealth distribution and to foster growth. However, since fi nancial 
market imperfections that limit access to fi nance play an important 
role in perpetuating inequalities, fi nancial sector reforms that promote 
broader access to fi nancial services need to be at the core of the devel-
opment agenda. Indeed, if fi nancial market frictions are not addressed, 
redistribution may have to be endlessly repeated, which could result in 
damaging disincentives to work and save. In contrast, building inclusive 
fi nancial systems focuses on equalizing opportunities. Hence, addressing 
fi nancial market imperfections that expand individual opportunities 
creates positive, not negative, incentive effects. While theory highlights 
the risk that selectively increased access could worsen inequality, both 
cross-country data and evidence from specifi c policy experiments suggest 
that more-developed fi nancial systems are associated with lower inequal-
ity. Hence, though still far from conclusive, the bulk of the evidence 
suggests that developing the fi nancial sector and improving access to 
fi nance are likely not only to accelerate economic growth, but also to 
reduce income inequality and poverty.
Access to fi nancial services—fi nancial inclusion—implies an absence 
of obstacles to the use of these services, whether the obstacles are price 
or nonprice barriers to fi nance. It is important to distinguish between 
access to—the possibility to use—and actual use of fi nancial services. 
Exclusion can be voluntary, where a person or business has access to 
services but no need to use them, or involuntary, where price barriers or 
discrimination, for example, bar access. Failure to make this distinction 
can complicate efforts to defi ne and measure access. Financial market 
imperfections, such as information asymmetries and transaction costs, 
are likely to be especially binding on the talented poor and on micro- and 
small enterprises that lack collateral, credit histories, and connections. 
Without inclusive fi nancial systems, these individuals and enterprises 
with promising opportunities are limited to their own savings and 
Thus, access to fi nance helps 
to equalize opportunities and 
reduce inequalities—
—but the access dimension 
of fi nancial development has 
often been overlooked
3
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earnings. This access dimension of fi nancial development has often 
been overlooked, mostly because of serious data gaps on who has access 
to which fi nancial services and a lack of systematic information on the 
barriers to broader access. 
This report is a broad-ranging review of research work, completed or 
in progress, focusing on access to fi nance. The report presents indicators 
to measure fi nancial access, analyzes its determinants, and evaluates the 
impact of access on growth, equity, and poverty reduction, drawing on 
research that uses data both at the fi rm and household level. The report 
also discusses the role of government in advancing fi nancial inclusion, 
and these policy recommendations are stressed throughout the report. 
Although much remains to be learned, a signifi cant amount of empirical 
analysis has been conducted on these issues over the past years. As with 
any review, taking stock of all this research also allows us to identify the 
many gaps in our knowledge and helps chart the way for a new genera-
tion of research in this area. 
The report pays particular attention to the following themes:
• Measuring access. How well does the fi nancial system in different 
countries directly serve poor households and small enterprises? 
Just how limited is fi nancial access? Who has access to which 
fi nancial services (such as deposit, credit, payments, insurance)? 
What are the chief obstacles and policy barriers to broader access? 
• Evaluating the impact of access. How important is access to 
fi nance as a constraint to the growth of fi rms? What are the 
channels through which improved access affects fi rm growth? 
What is the impact of access to fi nance on households and 
microenterprises? What aspects of fi nancial sector development 
matter for broadening access to different types of fi nancial ser-
vices? What techniques are most effective in ensuring sustainable 
provision of credit and other fi nancial services on a small scale? 
• Adopting policies to broaden access. What is the government’s role 
in building inclusive fi nancial systems? Given that fi nancial 
systems in many developing countries serve only a small part of 
the population, expanding access remains an important chal-
lenge across the world, leaving much for governments to do. Not 
all government actions are equally effective, however, and some 
policies can be counterproductive. The report sets out principles 
for effective government policy on broadening access, drawing 
on the available evidence and illustrating with examples. 
This report presents access 
indicators, evaluates impact, 
and provides policy advice
F I N A N C E  F O R  A L L ?  P O L I C I E S  A N D  P I T F A L L S  I N  E X P A N D I N G  A C C E S S
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While data on the fi nancial sector are often considered to be readily 
available, systematic indicators of access to different fi nancial services 
are not. Indeed, access is not easy to measure, and empirical evidence 
linking access to development outcomes has been quite limited because of 
lack of data. Existing evidence on the causal relations between fi nancial 
development, growth, and poverty is consistent with theory. However, 
most of the evidence comes either from highly aggregated indicators that 
use fi nancial depth measures instead of access or from micro studies that 
use fi nancial or real wealth to proxy for credit constraints. 
One of the key problems in assessing fi nancial inclusion is that—
unlike indicators of fi nancial depth—an analysis of aggregated data sets 
THIS OVERVIEW INTRODUCES THE MAIN MESSAGES 
of the report, pulling together theory, data, and 
analysis. It then presents the key policy implications 
of this material and highlights some of the challenges 
in the implementation of these recommendations. It 
concludes with directions for future research. 
Chapter 1 starts with analyses of the theoreti-
cal models that illustrate the crucial role access to 
fi nance plays in the development process, particu-
larly its infl uence on both growth and income dis-
tribution. Then the chapter examines various data 
sets to assess the ability of both fi rms and households 
to access fi nancial services, to identify barriers to 
access, and to provide an empirical foundation to 
better understand the welfare impacts of broader 
fi nancial access. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the ability of fi rms, par-
ticularly small fi rms, to access fi nancial services. It 
investigates not only the implications for growth and 
productivity for individual fi rms, and the economy 
at large, but also the impact that restrictive fi nancial 
access can have on the structure of the economy. The 
chapter also explores which aspects of fi nancial sector 
development matter for access to external fi nance—
looking at banks, markets, and nonbank fi nance, and 
focusing especially on the role of foreign banks. 
Attention turns to households and microentre-
preneurs in chapter 3, which examines whether 
an emphasis on fi nancial sector development as a 
driver of economic growth is consistent with a pro-
poor approach to development. After reviewing the 
theory, empirical evidence at both the micro and 
macro levels is presented. The chapter then analyzes 
the barriers to access and how they can be overcome, 
with particular consideration given to the promise 
and limitations of microfi nance. 
An analysis of the government’s role in facilitating 
access to fi nancial services is presented in chapter 4. 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the important 
role that institution-building must play in improving 
access in particular and fi nancial development in 
general. It then turns to measures to boost market 
capacity, improve competition and effi ciency, and 
regulate against exploitative and imprudent prac-
tices. This is followed by a discussion of the impact 
that governments can have by owning or subsidizing 
fi nancial service providers; as an example, the case 
of government-backed credit guarantee schemes is 
looked at in some depth. Before concluding, the 
chapter considers key issues in the political economy 
of access. 
Outline of this report
The fi rst step to improving 
access is measuring it—
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has limited value. Simply knowing how many deposit accounts there 
are, for example, does not reveal much. Some individuals or fi rms may 
have multiple accounts, while others have none; moreover, regulatory 
authorities generally do not collect data on individual account holders. 
Therefore the best data would be generated by census or survey, which 
would allow researchers to measure fi nancial access across subgroups. 
Few such surveys exist for households, however, and the data sets that 
are available are often not compatible from one country to the next. 
In the absence of comprehensive micro data, researchers have sought 
to create synthetic headline indicators, combining more readily available 
macro data with the results of existing surveys. These headline indica-
tors indicate that households around the world have limited access to 
and use of fi nancial services: in most developing countries less than half 
the population has an account with a fi nancial institution, and in many 
countries less than one in fi ve households does (fi gure 1).
Survey data on the access of fi rms to fi nance are more plentiful—
although there are concerns about the representativeness of the surveys, 
particularly with regard to the inclusion of the informal sector (which is 
larger than the formal sector in many countries). Survey data indicate that 
less than 20 percent of small fi rms use external fi nance, about half the rate 
of large fi rms. And in three regions, at least 40 percent of fi rms report that 
access to and cost of fi nance is an obstacle to their growth (fi gure 2).
Figure 1 Proportion of households with an account in a fi nancial institution
Source: Honohan (2006).
Note: Figure shows the highest and lowest national percentages, as well as the median and 
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Why do large proportions of the populations in many developing coun-
tries not use fi nancial services? Identifying the barriers that prevent small 
fi rms and poor households in developing countries from using fi nancial 
services not only helps researchers understand the reasons for fi nancial 
exclusion but also provides hints as to which policies could be helpful 
in removing these barriers and broadening access. One major constraint 
is geography, or physical access. While some fi nancial institutions allow 
clients to access services over the phone or via the Internet, some require 
clients to visit a branch or use an automated teller machine (ATM). While 
an ideal measure would indicate the average distance from household to 
branch (or ATM), the density of branches per square kilometer, or per 
capita, provides an initial, albeit crude, indicator. For example, Spain has 
96 branches per 100,000 people and 790 branches per 10,000 square 
kilometers, while Ethiopia has less than 1 branch per 100,000 people 
and Botswana has 1 branch per 10,000 square kilometers. 
Another barrier is the lack of proper documentation. Financial institu-
tions usually require one or more documents for identifi cation purposes, 
but in many low-income countries, most people—especially those not 
employed in the formal sector (who are usually poor)—lack such papers. 
Figure 2 Percentage of fi rms reporting fi nance as a problem 
Source: Investment Climate Survey (ICS) responses by enterprises in 76 countries, grouped 
by region. 
Note: Figure shows the percentage of fi rms reporting access to fi nance or cost of fi nance as a 
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Finally, many institutions have minimum account-balance requirements 
or fees that are out of the reach of many potential users. For example, it 
is not unusual for banks to require a person opening a checking account 
to make a minimum deposit equivalent to 50 percent of that country’s 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP). 
While barriers to access vary signifi cantly across countries, lower 
barriers tend to be associated with more open and competitive banking 
systems. Such systems are characterized by private ownership of banks, 
including foreign ownership; strong legal, information, and physical 
infrastructures (such as telecommunication and road networks); regula-
tory and supervisory approaches that rely heavily on market discipline; 
and substantial transparency and media freedom.
However, access indicators are just that—indicators. While they are 
linked to policy, they are not policy variables. Thus, creating indicators 
is only the beginning of the effort. Analytical work collecting and using 
in-depth household and enterprise information on access to and use 
of fi nancial services is necessary to understand the impact of fi nancial 
access and to design better policy interventions. Better data and analysis 
will help researchers assess which fi nancial services—savings, credit, 
payments, insurance—are most important in achieving development 
outcomes for both households and fi rms, and will inform efforts to nar-
row down which cross-country indicators to track over time. 
Evaluating the impact of access to fi nance for fi rms
One of the important channels through which fi nance promotes growth 
is the provision of credit to the most promising fi rms (fi gure 3). Many 
fi rms, particularly small ones, often complain about lack of access to 
fi nance. Recent research using detailed fi rm-level data and survey infor-
mation provides direct evidence suggesting that such complaints are valid 
in that limited access stunts fi rms’ growth. This fi nding is supported by 
studies based on census data and individual case studies using detailed 
loan information. 
Access to fi nance, and the institutional underpinnings associated with 
better fi nancial access, favorably affects fi rm performance along a number 
of different channels. Improvements in the functioning of the formal 
fi nancial sector can reduce fi nancing constraints for small fi rms and oth-
ers who have diffi culty in self-fi nancing or in fi nding private or informal 
sources of funding. Research indicates that access to fi nance promotes 
Barriers to access vary 
signifi cantly across countries
Access to fi nance can 
promote new-fi rm entry, 
growth, innovation, optimum 
size, and risk reduction—
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more start-ups: it is smaller fi rms that are often the most dynamic and 
innovative. Countries that strangle this potential with fi nancial barri-
ers not only lose the growth potential of these enterprises but also risk 
missing opportunities to diversify into new areas of hitherto unrevealed 
comparative advantage. Financial inclusion also enables incumbent fi rms 
to reach a larger equilibrium size by enabling them to exploit growth 
and investment opportunities. Furthermore, greater fi nancial inclusion 
allows fi rms the choice of more effi cient asset portfolios as well as more 
effi cient organizational forms, such as incorporation. 
If stronger fi nancial systems can promote entry of new fi rms, enterprise 
growth, innovation, larger equilibrium size, and risk reduction, then it is 
almost inescapable that stronger fi nancial systems will improve aggregate 
economic performance. Improved fi nance does not raise aggregate fi rm 
Figure 3 Finance helps fi rms grow faster
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998).
Note: The graph plots the proportion of fi rms that are able to grow faster than they would 
if they had no access to external fi nance against fi nancial development as measured by private 
credit/GDP. 
Private credit as a share of GDP
Proportion of 
firms that grow 
at rates requiring 
external finance
20





—to the benefi t of the 
economy in general
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performance uniformly, however, but rather transforms the structure of 
the economy by affecting different types of fi rms in different ways. At any 
given level of fi nancial development, smaller fi rms have more diffi culty 
accessing external fi nance than do larger companies. But with fi nancial 
development and greater availability of external fi nance, fi rms that were 
formerly excluded are given opportunities. Research shows that small 
fi rms benefi t the most from fi nancial development—both in terms of 
being able to enter the marketplace and of seeing their growth constraints 
relaxed. Hence, inclusive fi nancial sectors also have consequences for the 
composition of and competition in the enterprise sector. 
Firms fi nance their investments and operations in many different 
ways, depending on a wide range of factors both internal and external to 
the individual fi rm. The availability of external fi nancing depends not 
only on a fi rm’s own situation, but on the wider policy and institutional 
environment supporting the enforceability and liquidity of the contracts 
that are involved in fi nancing fi rms. And it also depends on the existence 
and effectiveness of a variety of intermediaries and ancillary fi nancial 
fi rms that help bring providers and users of funds together in the market. 
Bank fi nance is typically the major source of external fi nance for fi rms of 
all sizes. Modern trends in transactional lending suggest that improve-
ments in information availability (for example, through development of 
credit registries) and technological advances in analysis of this improved 
data (for example, through use of automated credit appraisal) are likely 
to improve access of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to fi nance. 
Provided that the relevant laws are in place, asset-based lending such as 
factoring, fi xed-asset lending, and leasing are other technologies that can 
release sizable fi nancing fl ows even for small and nontransparent fi rms.
However, relationship lending (which relies on personal interaction 
between borrower and lender and is based on an understanding of the 
borrower’s business and not just on collateral or mechanical credit scor-
ing systems) will remain important in environments with weak fi nancial 
infrastructures and strong informal economic activity. Because relation-
ship lending is costly for the lender, it requires either high spreads or 
large volumes to be viable. If the customer’s creditworthiness is hard 
to evaluate, then there may be no alternative to relationship lending. 
Indeed, limited access to credit in some diffi cult environments may be 
attributable to the reluctance of existing intermediaries to do relation-
ship lending on a small scale. 
Use of modern transactional 
lending by banks helps reach 
more fi rms
—but relationship lending will 
remain important for informal 
economic activity
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The role of foreign banks in improving access has always been 
 controversial, partly for political reasons. The growing market share of 
 foreign-owned banks in developing and transition economies has resulted 
from a number of forces, including the privatization of long-established 
state-owned banks and the sale of distressed banks in the aftermath of 
banking crises (often after being fi nancially restructured at the expense 
of the host country government). Foreign owners bring capital, technol-
ogy, know-how, and independence from the local business and political 
elites, but debate continues over whether they have improved access. 
Most foreign banks are relatively large and do not concentrate on SME 
lending, sticking mostly to the banking needs of large fi rms and high-
net-worth individuals. However, the increased competition for large 
customers can drive local banks to focus more on providing profi table 
services to segments they had once neglected. The balance of a large 
body of evidence suggests that a country that allows foreign banks to 
operate within its borders is likely, over time, to improve fi nancial access 
for SMEs, even if the foreign banks confi ne their lending to large fi rms 
and government. In contrast, the performance of state-owned banks in 
this dimension has tended to be poor.
Nonbank fi nance remains much less important than bank fi nance 
in most developing countries, but it can play an important role in 
improving the price and availability of longer-term fi nance to smaller 
borrowers. Bond fi nance, for example, can provide a useful alternative 
to bank fi nance. The emergence of a large market in external equity 
requires strong investor rights; where these are present, opening to foreign 
capital infl ows can greatly improve access and lower the cost of capital, 
with spillover effects for smaller fi rms. This is true for portfolio equity 
investments, foreign direct investment (FDI), and private equity, all of 
which are likely to become increasingly important in the future.
Evaluating impact of access to fi nance for households
Over the long term, economic growth helps reduce poverty and can be 
expected to lift the welfare of most households. Evidence suggests not 
only that fi nance is pro-growth but that it reduces income inequality 
(fi gure 4) and is pro-poor. How important in this process is the direct 
provision of fi nancial services to poor households and individuals? 
Existing evidence suggests that indirect, second-round effects through 
Foreign banks are likely to 
increase access for SMEs—
—and the role of nonbank 
fi nance is likely to increase 
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more effi cient product and labor markets might have a greater impact 
on the poor than direct access to fi nance. First, aggregate regressions 
yield more robust results of a dampening effect of fi nance on inequal-
ity and poverty, while micro studies, which do not consider spillover 
effects, provide a more tenuous picture. Similarly, calibrated general 
equilibrium models that take into account labor market effects suggest 
that the main impact of fi nance on income inequality comes through 
inclusion of a larger share of the population in the formal economy and 
higher wages. Hence, the evidence so far seems to suggest that direct 
provision of fi nancial services to the poor may not be the most important 
channel through which fi nance reduces poverty and income inequality. 
Therefore, fostering more effi cient capital allocation through competitive 
and open fi nancial markets should remain an important policy goal, 
Figure 4 Finance and income inequality
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007).
Note: The fi gure is a partial scatterplot of growth of Gini coeffi cient vs. private credit/GDP, 
controlling for initial levels of Gini. 
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and it is as relevant for reduction of poverty and inequality as it is for 
overall economic growth. 
In many countries, however, access to fi nancial services is limited to only 
20–50 percent of the population, excluding many nonpoor individuals and 
SMEs. That being the case, improving the quality of the services provided 
and the effi ciency with which they are provided without broadening access 
is not enough: it would leave large segments of the population and their 
talents and innovative capacity untapped. The provision of better fi nancial 
access to these excluded nonpoor micro- and small entrepreneurs can have 
an especially favorable indirect effect on the poor. Hence, to promote pro-
poor growth, it is important to improve access not only to the poor but to 
all who are currently excluded. That is not to say that improvements in 
direct access for the poor should be neglected. The benefi ts here may be 
more modest in the long run, but they can be immediate.
There are many reasons for the limited access to fi nancial services, 
especially in the case of the poor. The poor may not have anybody in 
their social network who understands the various services that are avail-
able to them. Lack of education may make it diffi cult for them to fi ll out 
loan applications, and the small number of transactions they are likely 
to undertake may make loan offi cers think it is not worthwhile to help 
them. As fi nancial institutions are likely to be located in rich neighbor-
hoods, physical distance may also matter—banks simply may not be 
near the poor. Even if fi nancial service providers are nearby, some poor 
clients may encounter prejudice—being refused admission to banking 
offi ces, for example. The poor face two signifi cant problems in obtain-
ing access to credit services. First, they typically have no collateral and 
cannot borrow against their future income because they tend not to have 
steady jobs or income streams that creditors can track. Second, dealing 
with small transactions is costly for the fi nancial institutions.
The new wave of specialized microfi nance institutions serving the poor 
has tried to overcome these problems in innovative ways. Loan offi cers 
come from similar backgrounds and go to the poor, instead of waiting 
for the poor to come to them. Group-lending schemes improve repay-
ment incentives and monitoring through peer pressure, and they also 
build support networks and educate borrowers. Increasing loan sizes as 
customers demonstrate their ability to borrow and repay reduces default 
rates. The effectiveness of these innovations in different settings is still 
being debated, but over the past few decades, microfi nance institutions 
have managed to reach millions of clients and have achieved impressive 
—but there are barriers to 
increasing access
Joint lending and dynamic 
incentives may increase 
inclusion—
Financial exclusion extends 
beyond the poor in many 
countries—
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repayment rates. Even though subsidies are often involved, researchers 
are reconsidering whether it might be possible to make profi ts while 
providing fi nancial services to some of the world’s poorest. Indeed, 
mainstream banks have begun to adopt some of the techniques used by 
the microfi nance institutions and to enter some of the same markets. 
For many, however, the most exciting promise of microfi nance is that it 
could reduce poverty without requiring continuous subsidies. 
Has microfi nance been able to meet its promise? While many heart-
ening case studies are cited—from contexts as diverse as the slums of 
Dhaka to villages of Thailand to rural Peru—it is still unclear how big 
an impact microfi nance has had on poverty overall. Methodological 
diffi culties in evaluating impact, such as selection bias, make it diffi cult 
to reach any solid conclusion. So far, the evidence from microeconomic 
studies, taken together, does not unambiguously show a reduction in 
poverty. Additional research—ideally using more fi eld experiments—is 
needed to convince the skeptics.
One of the most controversial questions about microfi nance is the 
extent of subsidy required to provide access. Although group lending 
and other techniques are employed to overcome the obstacles involved in 
delivering services to the poor, these mechanisms are nevertheless costly, 
and the high repayment rates have not always translated into profi ts. 
Overall, much of the microfi nance sector—especially the segment that 
serves the very poor—still remains heavily dependent on grants and 
subsidies. Recent research confi rms that there is a trade-off between 
profi tability and serving the very poor.
Microfi nance has traditionally focused on the provision of credit 
for very poor entrepreneurs, and enthusiasts often emphasize how 
microfi nance will unleash the productive potential of these borrowers, 
leading to productivity increases and growth. Yet much of microcredit 
is not used for investment. Instead, a sizable fraction of it goes to meet 
important consumption needs. These are not a secondary concern. For 
poor households, credit is not the only, or in many cases the priority, 
fi nancial service they need: good savings and payments (domestic as well 
as international) services and insurance may rank higher. For example, 
one reason why the poor may not put any savings in fi nancial assets may 
be the lack of appropriate savings products. 
The question, then, has two parts: Should fi nance for the very poor 
be subsidized, and if so, is microfi nance the best way to provide those 
subsidies? The answer requires comparing costs and benefi ts of subsidies 
—but the welfare impact of 
microfi nance is not clear—
—and much of the 
microfi nance sector relies on 
grants and subsidies 
The poor need other services 
in addition to credit—
—and the very poor will require 
subsidies to access fi nancial 
services
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in the fi nancial sector with those in other areas, such as education and 
infrastructure. The clear need for the latter set a high threshold if scarce 
public funds are to be diverted to subsidizing access. Within the fi nancial 
sector, the case for subsidizing savings and payments services, which can 
be seen as basic services necessary for participation in a modern market 
economy, seems stronger than that for credit. In the case of credit, inter-
est rate subsidies in particular do not seem to be the way to go, given 
their negative incentive effects on repayment, the likelihood that much 
of the subsidy will in practice be diverted away from the target group, 
and the chilling effect on unsubsidized service providers just starting 
to provide small-scale credit. Instead, policies that encourage entry in 
general are more promising, as are policies that promote the adoption 
of novel techniques (such as those that take advantage of the already 
wide and increasing availability of mobile phones). Once in place, such 
techniques lower the unit cost of service delivery to the poor. 
Policies to broaden access
Perhaps more important, improving fi nancial access in a way that benefi ts 
the poor to the greatest extent requires a strategy for inclusion that goes 
well beyond credit for poor households. Since expanding access remains 
an important challenge even in developed economies, it is not enough to 
say that the market will provide. Market failures related to information 
gaps, the need for coordination on collective action, and concentrations 
of power mean that governments everywhere have an important role to 
play in building inclusive fi nancial systems. Not all government action 
is equally effective, however, and some policies can be counterproduc-
tive. Direct government interventions to support access require careful 
evaluation, something that is often missing. Our discussion is selective, 
setting out principles for effective government policy, drawing on and 
generalizing lessons from specifi c examples that illustrate how other 
issues can be approached.
Even the most effi cient fi nancial system supported by a strong contrac-
tual and information infrastructure faces limitations. Not all would-be bor-
rowers are creditworthy, and there are numerous examples where national 
welfare has been reduced by overly relaxed credit policies. Access to formal 
payment and savings services can approach universality as economies 
develop. However, not everyone will—or should—qualify for credit. 
It is important to have 
realistic goals 
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Deep institutional reform ensuring, above all, security of prop-
erty rights against expropriation by the state is an underlying, albeit 
often long-term, prerequisite for well-functioning fi nancial systems. 
Prioritizing some institutional reforms over others, however, would help 
focus reform efforts and have a positive impact on access in the short to 
medium term. Recent evidence suggests that information infrastructures 
matter most in low-income countries, while enforcement of creditor 
rights is more important in high-income countries. Another fi nding is 
that in relatively underdeveloped institutional environments, procedures 
that enable individual lenders to recover on debt contracts (for example, 
those related to collateral) are more important in boosting bank lend-
ing compared with those procedures mainly concerned with resolving 
confl icts between multiple claimants (for example, bankruptcy codes). 
Given that it is potentially easier to build credit registries and reform 
procedures related to collateral compared with making lasting improve-
ments in the enforcement of creditor rights and bankruptcy codes, these 
are important fi ndings for prioritizing reform efforts. 
Encouraging the development of specifi c infrastructures (particularly 
in information and debt recovery) and of fi nancial market activities that 
can use technology to bring down transaction costs will produce results 
sooner than long-term institution building. Specifi c activities include 
establishing credit registries or issuing individual identifi cation numbers 
to help establish and track credit histories; reducing costs of registering 
or repossessing collateral; and introducing specifi c legislation to underpin 
modern fi nancial technology—including leasing and factoring, electronic 
fi nance, and mobile fi nance.
Encouraging openness and competition is also an essential part of 
broadening access, because they spur incumbent institutions to seek 
profi table ways of providing services to previously excluded segments 
of the population and increase the speed with which access-improving 
new technologies are adopted. Foreign banks have an important role to 
play in expanding access, as discussed above. 
In this process, providing the private sector with the right incentives 
is key; hence good prudential regulations are a necessity. Competition 
that helps foster access can also result in reckless or improper expansion 
if not accompanied by the proper regulatory and supervisory framework. 
As increasingly complex international regulations—such as those envis-
aged in the advanced versions of the Basel II system—are imposed on 
banks to help minimize the risk of costly bank failures, it is important 
Reforming institutions—
—developing fi nancial 
infrastructures to take 
advantage of technological 
advances—
—encouraging competition— 
—and providing the right 
incentives
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to ensure that these arrangements do not inadvertently penalize small 
borrowers. That can happen if banks are not able to make full allowance 
for the potential risk-pooling advantages of including SME loans in their 
overall loan portfolio. Research suggests that while banks making small 
loans have to set aside larger provisions against the higher expected loan 
losses from small loans—and therefore they need to charge higher rates of 
interest to cover these provisions—they should need relatively less capital 
to cover the risk that they will lose more than they have anticipated. 
A variety of other regulatory measures is needed to support wider 
access. Sometimes the most effective measure is not the most obvious one. 
For example, interest ceilings fail to provide adequate consumer protec-
tion against abusive lending. Increased transparency and formalization 
and enforced lender responsibility are more coherent approaches, along 
with support for the overborrowed (such as assistance in fi nding a viable 
workout plan or formalized personal bankruptcy schemes). However, 
delivering all of this is can be administratively demanding. 
The scope for direct government interventions in improving access is 
more limited than often believed. A large body of evidence suggests that 
efforts by government-owned subsidiaries to provide credit have generally 
not been successful. Direct intervention through taxes and subsidies can 
be effective in certain circumstances, but experience suggests that they 
are more likely to have large unintended consequences in fi nance than 
in other sectors. For example, with direct and directed lending programs 
discredited in recent years, partial credit guarantees have been the direct 
intervention mechanism of choice pushed by SME credit activists. 
However, these are often poorly structured, embody hidden subsidies, 
and benefi t mainly those who do not need the subsidy. In the absence 
of thorough economic evaluations of most of these guarantee schemes, 
their net effect in cost-benefi t terms also remains unclear. 
In nonlending services, the experience has been mixed. A few gov-
ernment fi nancial institutions have moved away from providing credit 
and evolved into providers of more complex fi nancial services, entering 
into public-private partnerships to help overcome coordination failures, 
fi rst-mover disincentives, and obstacles to risk sharing and distribution 
that impede outreach to SMEs by banks. Ultimately, these successful 
initiatives could have been undertaken by private capital, but the state 
had a useful role in jump-starting these services.
A comprehensive approach to fi nancial sector reform aiming at better 
access must take political realities into account. If the interest of power-
ful incumbents is threatened by the emergence of new entrants fi nanced 
The role for direct government 
intervention is limited
Political economy concerns 
are key in implementing 
policies to expand access
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by a system that has improved access and outreach, lobbying by those 
incumbents can block the needed reforms. Given that challenges of fi nan-
cial inclusion and benefi ts from broader access go well beyond ensuring 
fi nancial services for the poor, defi ning the access agenda more broadly to 
expand access for all, would include the middle classes and help mobilize 
greater political support for advancing the agenda around the world. 
Directions for future research
While this report reviews and highlights a large body of research, it 
also identifi es many gaps in our knowledge. Much more research is 
FINANCIAL MARKET IMPERFECTIONS THAT LIMIT 
access to fi nance are key in most development theories. 
Lack of access to fi nance is often the critical mecha-
nism behind both persistent income inequality and 
slow economic growth. Hence fi nancial sector reforms 
that promote broader access to fi nancial services should 
be at the core of the development agenda.
Access is not easy to measure, and empirical evi-
dence linking access to development outcomes has 
been quite scarce due to lack of data. Initial efforts 
indicate that fi nancial access is quite limited around 
the world and that barriers to access are common. 
Further research to assess the impact of access on 
outcomes such as growth and poverty reduction will 
require better micro data, particularly data derived 
from household and enterprise surveys. 
Empirical evidence suggests that improved access 
to fi nance is not only pro-growth but also pro-poor, 
reducing income inequality and poverty. Hence 
fi nancial development that includes small fi rms and 
the poor disproportionately benefi ts those groups. 
Providing better fi nancial access to the nonpoor 
micro- and small entrepreneurs can have a strongly 
favorable indirect effect on the poor. Spillover effects 
of fi nancial development are likely to be signifi cant. 
Hence, to promote pro-poor growth, it is important 
to broaden the focus of attention from fi nance for the 
poor to improving access for all who are excluded.
Provision of fi nancial services to the very poor 
will require subsidies. If subsidies for credit dam-
age the ability and incentives of the microfi nance 
industry and the fi nancial sector more generally to 
make use of innovative new technologies in provid-
ing access for the nonpoor, their effect on the poor 
could be counterproductive. 
However, for poor households, credit is not the 
only—or in many cases, the principal—fi nancial 
service they need. Subsidies may be better spent on 
savings and payment systems because those services 
are necessary for participation in a modern market 
economy.
Government policies should focus on building 
sound fi nancial institutions, encouraging compe-
tition (including foreign entry), and establishing 
sound prudential regulation to provide the private 
sector with appropriate incentive structures and 
broaden access. Governments can facilitate the 
development of an enabling fi nancial infrastructure 
and encourage adoption of new technologies, but 
attempts at direct intervention (through subsidies, 
for example, or ownership of fi nancial institutions) 
are more likely than not to be counterproductive. 
Main messages of this report 
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needed to measure and track access to fi nancial services, to evaluate its 
impact on development outcomes, and to design and evaluate policy 
interventions. 
New development models link the dynamics of income distribution 
and aggregate growth in unifi ed models. There are good conceptual 
reasons for believing that fi nancial market frictions play an important 
role in the persistence of income inequalities, but there is too little theory 
that examines how reducing these frictions may affect the opportunities 
faced by individuals and the evolution of relative income levels. Future 
theoretical work could usefully study the impact of fi nancial sector 
policies on growth and income distribution within the context of these 
models and provide new insights.
Lack of systematic information on access is one of the reasons why 
empirical research on access has been limited. The efforts described 
above in developing cross-country indicators of access are only fi rst steps 
in this direction. This work should be continued and expanded, both 
in terms of country coverage and coverage of institutions and different 
services available. Building data sets that benchmark countries annually 
would help focus policymaker attention and allow better tracking and 
evaluation of reform efforts to broaden access.
Furthermore, while cross-country indicators of access are useful for 
benchmarking, any assessment of the impact of access on outcomes 
such as growth and poverty reduction requires data at the household 
and enterprise level. Few household surveys focus on fi nancial services. 
Efforts to collect this data systematically around the world are important 
in improving the understanding of access. Indeed, household surveys 
are often the only way to get detailed information on who uses which 
fi nancial services from which types of institutions, including informal 
ones.
Emerging evidence suggests that fi nancial development reduces income 
inequality and poverty, yet researchers are still far from understanding 
the channels through which this effect operates. The fi nance-growth 
channel is better understood: fi rms’ access to fi nance has been shown to 
have signifi cant payoffs in many areas, from promoting entrepreneurship 
and innovation to better asset allocation and fi rm growth. But how does 
fi nance infl uence income distribution? How important is direct provi-
sion of fi nance for the poor? Which is more important: improving the 
functioning of the fi nancial system so that it expands access to existing 
—and more comprehensive 
and consistent data
A better understanding of the 
impact of fi nance
More theory work—
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customers, or broadening access to the underserved (including the non-
poor who are often excluded in many developing countries)?
Results of general equilibrium models and evidence at the aggregate 
level hint that a narrow focus on giving just the poor better direct access 
is not the best policy. Instead, the poor will benefi t most by policies that 
broaden access in general; moreover, spillover effects of fi nancial develop-
ment are likely to be important for the poor by improving employment 
opportunities and wages. However, simply improving competition and 
the available services for those already served by the fi nancial system is 
not likely to be enough either. In many countries improving effi ciency 
will require that access be broadened beyond concentrated incumbents, 
since a large proportion of the nonpoor as well as the poor are currently 
excluded. Hence the effi ciency and access dimensions of fi nance are 
likely to be closely linked, but more research is needed to sort out the 
relative importance of these effects on growth and poverty. 
In evaluating impact, randomized fi eld experiments are promising. 
These experiments operate by varying the treatments of randomly 
selected subsamples of the surveyed households or microentrepreneurs. 
For instance, they could be offered different fi nancial products, or dif-
ferent terms and conditions, or different amounts of training in fi nancial 
literacy. Such random variation allows the researchers to make reliable 
inferences about how removing barriers and improving access will affect 
growth and household welfare. While this report discusses some of this 
research, more experiments need to be conducted in different country 
contexts, focusing on different dimensions of access. Ultimately, it is this 
welfare impact that should determine which access indicators should be 
tracked and how policy should be designed. 
Policies to broaden access can take many forms, from improvements 
in the functioning of mainstream fi nancial products to innovations in 
microfi nance. Lack of careful evaluation of different interventions makes 
it diffi cult to assess their impact and draw broader lessons. Careful 
research in this area would also help improve design of policy interven-
tions to build more inclusive fi nancial systems. 
Randomized fi eld experiments 




C H A P T E R  O N E
Access to Finance and Development: 
Theory and Measurement
FINANCE IS AT THE CORE OF THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. BACKED 
by solid empirical evidence, development practitioners are becoming 
increasingly convinced that effi cient, well-functioning fi nancial systems 
are crucial in channeling funds to the most productive uses and in allo-
cating risks to those who can best bear them, thus boosting economic 
growth, improving opportunities and income distribution, and reducing 
poverty.1 Conversely, to the extent that access to fi nance and the avail-
able range of services are limited, the benefi t of fi nancial development 
is likely to elude many individuals and enterprises, leaving much of 
the population in absolute poverty. This access dimension of fi nancial 
development is the focus of this report.
Improving access and building inclusive fi nancial systems is a goal 
that is relevant to economies at all levels of development. The challenge 
of better access means making fi nancial services available to all, thereby 
spreading equality of opportunity and tapping the full potential in an 
economy. The challenge is greater than ensuring that as many people 
as possible have access to basic fi nancial services. It is just as much 
about enhancing the quality and reach of credit, savings, payments, 
insurance, and other risk management products in order to facilitate 
sustained growth and productivity, especially for small and medium-
scale enterprises. Although the formal fi nancial sector in a few countries 
has achieved essentially universal coverage of the population, at least for 
basic services, some fi nancial exclusion persists even in many high-income 
countries (and, because they fi nd it diffi cult to participate fully in those 
sophisticated economies, fi nancial exclusion can be an even more serious 
handicap for those affected). 
Well-functioning fi nancial 
systems can boost growth and 
reduce poverty
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Theoreticians have long reasoned that fi nancial market frictions can 
be the critical mechanism for generating persistent income inequality 
or poverty traps. Without inclusive fi nancial systems, poor individuals 
and small enterprises need to rely on their personal wealth or internal 
resources to invest in their education, become entrepreneurs, or take 
advantage of promising growth opportunities. Financial market imper-
fections, such as information asymmetries and transactions costs, are 
likely to be especially binding on the talented poor and the micro- and 
small enterprises that lack collateral, credit histories, and connections, 
thus limiting their opportunities and leading to persistent inequality and 
slower growth. However, this access dimension of fi nancial development 
has often been overlooked, mostly because of serious gaps in the data 
about who has access to which fi nancial services and about the barriers 
to broader access.
Despite the emphasis fi nancial access has received in theory, empirical 
evidence that links broader access to development outcomes has been very 
limited, providing at best tentative guidance for public policy initiatives 
in this area. Financial inclusion, or broad access to fi nancial services, 
implies an absence of price and nonprice barriers in the use of fi nancial 
services; it is diffi cult to defi ne and measure because access has many 
dimensions. Services need to be available when and where desired, and 
products need to be tailored to specifi c needs. Services need to be afford-
able, taking into account the indirect costs incurred by the user, such 
as having to travel a long distance to a bank branch. Efforts to improve 
inclusion should also make business sense, translate into profi ts for the 
providers of these services, and therefore have a lasting effect. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it briefl y reviews the 
theoretical models that incorporate capital market imperfections to illus-
trate how improved access to fi nance is likely to reduce inequality as well 
as promote growth and, through both channels, lead to a reduction in 
poverty. Many types of policy measures aimed at reducing poverty and 
inequality through redistributive measures such as land reform can have 
adverse side-effects on incentives. If the underlying causes of inequal-
ity are not removed, the effect of such redistributive measures may be 
only temporary and require repetition. A complementary development 
strategy would directly address the underlying causes, including capital 
market imperfections (in addition to redistributive policies). Financial 
sector reforms to achieve this goal can represent a fi rst-best policy to 
promote growth and poverty reduction and would also make redistribu-
tion more effective and sustainable.
Financial market frictions can 
generate poverty traps
Measuring access 
can be diffi cult
This chapter reviews the 
theoretical models—
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Second, the chapter presents indicators of access to and use of fi nancial 
services that households and small fi rms are likely to need. Developing 
better indicators of access to fi nance is essential to strengthen the link 
between theory and empirical evidence and to investigate the channels 
through which a more developed fi nancial system promotes develop-
ment, both in terms of growth and poverty reduction. Indeed, the 
extent of direct access to fi nancial services by households and small 
enterprises varies sharply around the world, with very limited access in 
many countries. 
Theory: The Crucial Role of Access to Finance
Modern development theory studies the evolution of growth, relative 
income inequalities, and their persistence in unifi ed models. In many of 
these models, fi nancial market imperfections play a central role, infl uenc-
ing key decisions regarding human and physical capital accumulation and 
occupational choices. For example, in theories stressing capital accumula-
tion, fi nancial market imperfections determine the extent to which the 
poor can borrow to invest in schooling or physical capital. In theories 
stressing entrepreneurship, fi nancial market imperfections determine the 
extent to which talented but poor individuals can raise external funds to 
initiate projects. Thus, the evolution of fi nancial development, growth, 
and intergenerational income dynamics are closely intertwined. Finance 
infl uences not only the effi ciency of resource allocation throughout the 
economy but also the comparative economic opportunities of individuals 
from relatively rich or poor households.
This crucial focus on the fi nancial sector in economic modeling has 
been strengthened with the historical development of views on the links 
between economic growth and income inequality. It was long believed 
that the early stages of economic development would inevitably be 
accompanied by inequality and concentrations of wealth. Pointing to the 
fact that rich people’s marginal propensity to save is higher than that of 
the poor, theoreticians argued that the need to fi nance large, indivisible 
investment projects in the process of development implied that rapid 
growth would need wealth concentration, leading to a fundamental 
trade-off between growth and social justice. More generally, Kuznets 
(1955, 1963) reasoned that this trade-off meant that inequality would 
increase in the early stages of development until the benefi ts of growth 
spread throughout the economy. Some of the earlier empirical evidence 
—and presents access 
indicators for households 
and small fi rms
Empirical evidence suggests 
that the link between growth 
and inequality is ambiguous
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from the United States and other developed countries supported the 
Kuznets hypothesis. But evidence from developing countries was not 
so supportive.2 
The importance of providing incentives to reward the productive 
effi ciency of enterprise and investment might seem to imply that growth 
and inequality must be positively linked, but empirical studies suggest 
that this is not always so. In particular, while very low inequality is indeed 
empirically associated with rapid subsequent growth, the highest rates 
of growth are associated with moderate inequality. Furthermore, high 
levels of inequality seem to reduce subsequent growth.3 
Helping to explain these fi ndings, more subtle theories have explored 
precise mechanisms whereby inequality might adversely affect growth. 
Financial market imperfections are often at the core of this line of 
thought because inequalities persist because of these imperfections.4 
For example, in the model of Galor and Zeira (1993), it is because 
of fi nancial market frictions that poor people cannot invest in their 
education despite their high marginal productivity of investment. In 
Banerjee and Newman’s model (1993), individuals’ occupational choices 
are limited by their initial endowments. The structure of occupational 
choices—whether people can become entrepreneurs or have to remain 
wage earners—in turn determines how much they can save and what 
risks they can bear, with long-run implications for growth and income 
distribution.5 Hence, these models show that lack of access to fi nance 
can be the critical mechanism for generating persistent income inequality 
or poverty traps, as well as lower growth.
One implication of these modern development theories is that redis-
tribution of wealth can foster growth. Indeed, this has been the main 
policy conclusion drawn by many readers of these theories. This think-
ing rationalizes a focus on redistributive public policies such as land or 
education reform. However, if it is the capital market imperfections that 
lead to these relationships and necessitate redistribution, why neglect 
policies that might remove capital market imperfections? Nevertheless, 
some theories take credit constraints or other frictions as exogenous. 
In others, static information and transaction costs endogenously yield 
adverse selection and moral hazard frictions that impede the operation 
of fi nancial markets. In either case, researchers take capital market 
imperfections as given and suggest different redistributive policies to 
promote growth, focusing on schooling, saving, or fertility changes. 
This is true even though the literature also notes that if fi nancial market 
Modern development theory 
highlights the role of fi nance
Wealth redistribution and 
fi nancial development
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imperfections continue to exist, absence of a virtuous circle a la Kuznets 
may also necessitate permanent redistribution policies.6 
A more effective and sustainable development approach would directly 
address fi nancial market imperfections, without causing adverse incen-
tive effects. Most redistributive policies create disincentives to work and 
save, although the economic magnitudes of these disincentive effects are 
a subject of intense debate (Aghion and Bolton 1997). As Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (2007) argue, these tensions vanish when focusing on 
fi nancial sector reforms. Reducing fi nancial market imperfections to 
expand individual opportunities creates positive, not negative, incen-
tive effects. Hence these arguments are very consistent with modern 
development theories yet emphasize putting fi nancial sector reforms 
that promote fi nancial inclusion at the core of the development agenda. 
Addressing fi nancial sector imperfections can also appeal to a wider range 
of philosophical perspectives than can redistributive policies inasmuch 
as the latter are directly linked with equalizing outcomes, whereas better 
functioning fi nancial systems serve to equalize opportunities. 
Extensive empirical evidence suggests a signifi cant and robust relation-
ship between fi nancial depth and growth. More recent micro evidence 
using fi rm-level data sets suggests that better-developed fi nancial systems 
ease fi nancial constraints facing fi rms. This fi nding illuminates one 
mechanism through which fi nancial development infl uences economic 
growth. Furthermore, researchers recently have shown that fi nancial 
depth reduces income inequality and poverty and is thus particularly 
benefi cial for the poor.7 This evidence is reviewed in detail in the com-
ing chapters. Although these results are encouraging, the link between 
theoretical models and empirical evidence has not been very close because 
of a lack of data on access to fi nancial services. While theory focuses 
on the importance of broader access and greater opportunities (that is, 
fi nancial inclusion), relatively little empirical evidence links access to 
fi nance to development outcomes, and there is little guidance for policies 
on how best to promote access.
Financial depth, or development more generally, can have direct and 
indirect effects on small fi rms and poor households. Greater depth is 
likely to be associated with greater access for both fi rms and households, 
which will make them better able to take advantage of investment oppor-
tunities, smooth their consumption, and insure themselves. However, 
even if fi nancial development does not improve direct access for small 
fi rms or poor households, its indirect effects may also be signifi cant. 
Financial sector reforms can 
improve incentive structures
Empirical evidence on 
fi nancial access is limited
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For example, the poor may benefi t from having jobs and higher wages, 
as better-developed fi nancial systems improve the effi ciency of product 
and labor markets and promote growth. Similarly, small fi rms may see 
their business opportunities expand with fi nancial development, even 
if the fi nancial sector still mostly serves the large fi rms.
Only now are many questions about access beginning to be answered. 
Just how limited is fi nancial access around the world? What are the chief 
obstacles and policy barriers to broader access? How important is access 
to fi nance as a constraint to growth or poverty alleviation? Which matters 
more: access by households, or access by fi rms? Is it more important to 
improve the quality and range of services available to those fi rms and 
households who might already have access (intensive margin), or to 
provide basic services to those who are completely excluded (extensive 
margin)? How important is direct access to fi nance for the poor and small 
fi rms compared with economywide spillover effects of greater fi nancial 
development through more effi cient product and labor markets? The 
development of indicators of access to fi nancial services is the fi rst step 
in answering all these questions. Before we can improve access, or decide 
whether and how to do it, we need to measure it.
Measurement: Indicators of Access to Finance
The fi nancial sector is often thought of as being particularly well 
documented by statistical data. In advanced securities markets, data on 
transactions and prices are often available on a minute-by-minute basis. 
Across countries, indicators of the depth of banking systems, capital 
markets, and insurance sectors are widely available. Indicators such as 
the total value of bank claims on an economy’s private sector expressed 
relative to gross domestic product, the turnover of shares (relative to total 
stock market capitalization), and the spread between lending and deposit 
interest rates have become standard measures of fi nancial sector develop-
ment. These indicators are also the basis for a large literature assessing 
the impact of fi nancial depth and effi ciency on outcomes in the real 
sector, such as per capita GDP growth, and exploring the determinants 
of fi nancial sector development.
Much less is known about how inclusive fi nancial systems are and who 
has access to which fi nancial services. How many borrowers are behind 
the total value of outstanding loans of a country’s banking system? How 
Before access can be 
improved, it has to be 
measured
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many depositors are represented by the statistic on total deposits? Or 
taking the perspective from the demand side, what share of the popula-
tion uses deposit accounts? What share of the population has taken out 
a loan? Unlike data on fi nancial depth, these statistics are not readily 
available. Until recently, there has been little systematic information 
on who is served by the fi nancial sector in developing countries, which 
fi nancial institutions or services are the most effective at supporting 
access for poor households and small enterprises, or what practical and 
policy barriers there may be to the expansion of access. Better data are 
needed to advance research on fi nancial inclusion, and signifi cant efforts 
have recently been made in this direction.
Unlike measures of fi nancial depth—where data from individual 
institutions (or trades in the case of the capital market) can be aggregated 
relatively simply to obtain consolidated fi gures8— data on fi nancial use 
cannot easily be constructed in this way. For instance, the total number of 
all bank accounts far exceeds the number of customers served, as house-
holds and enterprises may have business with several banks (or multiple 
accounts with a single bank). Further, regulatory entities traditionally do 
not collect data on individual accounts or account holders (unless they 
are large ones), because this information has not been considered useful 
for macroeconomic stability analysis. Researchers have therefore used a 
variety of different data sources and methodologies to infer the actual 
share of households or enterprises that use fi nancial services. Many of 
these data collection efforts are recent, and researchers have just started 
to relate them to real sector outcomes. As more data become available 
and more systematic data collection efforts get under way, one can expect 
more and better analysis. 
Financial inclusion, or broad access to fi nancial services, is defi ned here 
as an absence of price or nonprice barriers in the use of fi nancial services. Of 
course this does not mean that all households and fi rms should be able to 
borrow unlimited amounts at prime lending rates or transmit funds across 
the world instantaneously for a fraction of 1 percent of the amount. Even 
if service providers are keenly competitive and employ the best fi nancial 
technology, prices and interest rates charged and the size of loans and 
insurance coverage on offer in a market economy will necessarily depend 
on the creditworthiness of the customer. As discussed in later chapters of 
this report, subsidies and regulation can infl uence this outcome to some 
extent. But the application of modern techniques in information and 
communications technology is more important in improving the prices, 
Aggregate data can 
be misleading
What does access mean?
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terms, and conditions on which fi nancial services are available—regardless 
of whether services are provided at home or abroad. 
Improving access, then, means improving the degree to which fi nan-
cial services are available to all at a fair price. It is easier to measure the 
use of fi nancial services since use can be observed, but use is not always 
the same as access. Access essentially refers to the supply of services, 
whereas use is determined by demand as well as supply.
To illustrate the differences between access and use, remember that 
even wealthy customers in advanced fi nancial systems will choose not 
to use some fi nancial services. Some moderately prosperous customers, 
especially older individuals or households, may not have any wish to 
borrow money, even if offered a loan at a favorable interest rate. Still, 
almost all households need to use some fi nancial services, such as pay-
ments services, to participate in a modern market economy, and in a 
few of the most advanced economies, use of at least some basic services 
from the formal fi nancial sector is essentially universal.
Moreover, some specifi c fi nancial products are not attractive to 
some customers on ethical or religious grounds; nonusage in this case 
cannot be attributed to lack of access—although access might be an 
issue here if acceptable alternatives are not being offered. The case of 
Sharia- compliant fi nancial products can be relevant here, a topic that 
is discussed in chapter 4.
For specifi c classes of fi nancial services, the distinction between access 
and use can be signifi cant (box 1.1). The challenge is to distinguish 
between voluntary and involuntary exclusion and, among those that 
are excluded involuntarily, between those that are rejected due to high 
risk or poor project quality and those that are rejected because of dis-
crimination or high prices, which makes fi nancial services or products 
unaffordable. While rejection due to high risk and poor project quality 
is not necessarily worrisome, rejection due to discrimination and high 
prices is, particularly if equilibrium prices are too high, excluding large 
portions of the population. In addition, even if the underlying cost 
structures are the same in different countries, a given price would lead 
to greater exclusion in poorer countries.
Poor people could be involuntarily excluded due to lack of appropri-
ate products or services; they may need simple transaction accounts 
rather than checking accounts that entail the risk of incurring severe 
overdraft charges when the timing of payments and receipts goes wrong. 
Microentrepreneurs might be reluctant to take out loans that require 
Distinguishing between 
voluntary and involuntary 
exclusion
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WHAT DISTINGUISHES USE OF FINANCIAL SERVICES 
from access to fi nancial services? To what extent is 
lack of use a problem? The fi gure below illustrates the 
difference between access to and use of fi nancial ser-
vices.a Users of fi nancial services can be distinguished 
from nonusers, and there are important distinctions 
among nonusers. On the one hand are those who 
do not use fi nancial services for cultural or religious 
reasons or because they do not see any need. These 
nonusers include households who prefer to deal in 
cash and enterprises without any promising invest-
ment projects. These nonusers have access, but they 
choose not to use fi nancial services. From a policy 
maker’s viewpoint, nonusers do not really constitute 
a problem because their lack of demand drives their 
nonuse of fi nancial services. On the other hand are 
the involuntarily excluded who, despite demanding 
fi nancial services, do not have access to them. There 
are several different groups among the involuntarily 
excluded. First, there is a group of households and 
enterprises that are considered unbankable by com-
mercial fi nancial institutions and markets because 
they do not have enough income or present too high 
a lending risk. Second, there might be discrimination 
against certain population groups based on social, 
religious, or ethnic grounds (red-lining). Third, the 
contractual and informational framework might 
prevent fi nancial institutions from reaching out to 
certain population groups because the outreach is too 
costly to be commercially viable. Finally, the price of 
fi nancial services may be too high or the product fea-
tures might not be appropriate for certain population 
groups. While the fi rst group of involuntarily excluded 
cannot be a target of fi nancial sector policy, the other 
three groups demand different responses from policy 
makers—a topic that is discussed in chapter 4.








Cultural / religious reasons










Access to financial services
No access to financial services
Distinguishing between access to fi nance and use
a. For alternative classifi cations of the reasons for exclusion, see Claessens (2006) and Kempson and others (2000).
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them to pledge their personal assets as collateral, a common practice 
in most developing countries. In contrast, voluntary exclusion could 
result from lack of awareness of products if fi nancial institutions do 
not target their marketing toward certain groups. Also, individuals can 
access services indirectly, for example, by using an account that belongs 
to somebody else in the household. And fi nally voluntary exclusion 
could also result from lack of fi nancial literacy. Defi ning the “access 
problem” is challenging (box 1.2). It also requires a wealth of different 
data sources that researchers are just starting to collect. In the remain-
der of this chapter, we discuss some of these initial efforts and point to 
ongoing and future work.
Recent data compilation efforts have made progress toward better 
measurement of both access to and use of fi nancial services. Consider fi rst 
the measurement of the use of fi nancial services. Ideally, one would like 
to have census data on the number and characteristics of households that 
have a bank account or an account with a bank-like fi nancial institution. 
In the absence of census data, one would at least like to have survey-based 
measures that are representative of the whole population and of important 
subgroups, again collecting information about the types of fi nancial 
services they are consuming, in what quantities, and at what price, as 
well as complementary data on other characteristics of the household 
that might affect or be affected by their fi nancial service use. 
To date, however, survey-based data are quite limited both in terms 
of the number of countries that are covered and the amount of informa-
tion collected about the respondents. The data are often not comparable 
across countries because the surveys use different defi nitions. Only a 
handful of the large and long-established Living Standard Measurement 
Surveys (LSMS) surveys sponsored by the World Bank cover fi nancial 
services, and even these provide limited fi nancial information. However, 
a number of specialized household surveys designed to assess fi nancial 
access have been conducted in developing countries. Among these are 
surveys prepared by or for the World Bank in India, Brazil, Colombia, 
and Mexico (box 1.3), though even these are not always representative 
of the whole country and are not consistent across different countries. 
An ambitious multicountry effort to measure access of individuals to a 
wide range of fi nancial services was launched by Finmark Trust in South 
Africa and four neighboring countries in 2002 and has since been rolled 
out to several other African countries. Some data come as incidental by-
products of surveys designed for other purposes; this is the case for the 
Measuring access to, and use 
of, fi nancial services
Research is hampered by 
limited survey data—
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WHY DOES ONE OFTEN HEAR ABOUT AN ACCESS 
problem in credit markets but not about an access 
problem, say, for toothpaste? One of the basic rules 
of economics is that prices adjust so that at market 
equilibrium, supply equals demand. Hence, if 
demand for toothpaste exceeds the supply for it, 
the price of toothpaste will rise until demand and 
supply are equated at the new equilibrium price. 
If this price is too high for some, they will not use 
toothpaste. But all who are willing to pay the price 
will be able to use it. So if prices do their job, there 
should be no access problem.
In a famous paper, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) pro-
vide a compelling explanation for why credit markets 
are different.a They show that information problems 
can lead to credit rationing even in equilibrium. 
That is because banks making loans are concerned 
not only about the interest rate they charge on the 
loan but also about the riskiness of the loan. And 
the interest rate a bank charges may itself affect the 
riskiness of the pool of loans, either by attracting 
high-risk borrowers (adverse selection effect) or by 
adversely affecting the actions and incentives of 
borrowers (moral hazard effect). Both effects exist 
because even after evaluating loan applications, the 
banks do not have complete information on their 
borrowers. When the interest rate (price) affects the 
nature of transaction, market equilibrium may not 
occur where demand equals supply.
The adverse selection aspect of interest rates is a 
consequence of different borrowers having different 
probabilities of repaying their loan. The expected 
return to the bank obviously depends on the prob-
ability of repayment, so the bank would like to be able 
to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay. It 
is diffi cult to identify good borrowers, which is why 
a bank uses a variety of screening devices, including 
the interest rate. Those who are willing to pay high 
interest rates may, on average, be worse risks; they are 
willing to take higher risks to gain higher returns if 
successful, but such high returns are generally associ-
ated with a higher probability of failure, making it 
less likely that the loans will be repaid. As the interest 
rate rises, the average “riskiness” of those who borrow 
increases, possibly reducing the bank’s profi ts. 
Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of 
the contract, such as collateral requirements, change, 
the behavior of the borrower is likely to change. 
Stiglitz and Weiss show that higher interest rates 
lead to moral hazard, that is, they induce fi rms to 
undertake riskier projects with lower probability of 
success but higher payoffs when successful.
In a world with imperfect and costly information 
that leads to adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems, the expected rate of return to the bank 
will increase less rapidly than the interest rate and, 
beyond a point, may actually decrease, as shown in 
fi gure A. The interest rate at which the expected 
return to the bank is maximized, r*, is the “bank-
optimal” rate. The bank will not want to raise the 
interest rate above this rate, even though demand 
may still exceed the funds available for lending. 
This also suggests that the supply of loans will be 
backward-bending, at interest rates above r*.

















Note: D = demand, S = supply; r = interest rate.
(continued)
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Clearly, it is conceivable that at r*, the demand 
for funds (D*) exceeds the supply of funds (S*) 
as shown in fi gure B. In the absence of rationing, 
with excess demand for loans, unsatisfi ed borrowers 
would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the bank, 
bidding up the interest rate until demand equals sup-
ply at rM. Although supply does not equal demand 
at rate r*, it is the equilibrium interest rate. Since it 
is not profi table to raise the interest rate when the 
bank faces excess demand for credit, the bank will 
deny loans to borrowers who are observationally 
indistinguishable from those who receive loans. The 
rejected applicants would not receive a loan even if 
they offered to pay a higher rate. Hence they are 
denied access. Determining empirically whether an 
individual or fi rm has access to fi nance but chose 
not to use it or was rationed out is complex, and the 
effects of adverse selection and moral hazard are 
diffi cult to separate (see chapter 3).
What about other financial services, such as 
deposit or payment services, which do not suffer 
from information problems? Why do these areas 
of fi nance suffer from access problems? For those 
types of fi nancial services, nonprice barriers become 
important. For example, some individuals will have 
no access to fi nancial services because there are no 
fi nancial institutions in their area, as is the case in 
many remote rural areas. Or the small transactions 
the poor demand may involve high fi xed transaction 
costs, which makes them too costly to be offered: it 
costs as much for the bank to accept a $1 deposit as 
it does to accept a $1,000 deposit. Poorly designed 
regulatory requirements may also exclude those who 
do not meet the documentation requirements of open-
ing an account, such as not having a formal address or 
formal sector employment. Some would-be customers 
may be discriminated against for some reason. For all 
those individuals the supply curve is vertical at the 
origin, and the supply and demand for services do 
not intersect, again leading to an access problem (as 
shown by S0 in fi gure C). Of course, credit markets 
can also suffer from these nonprice barriers in addition 
to the type of rationing discussed above. 
Price can also be a barrier. Even when nonprice 
barriers are overcome and the supply (S´) and 
demand do intersect, the equilibrium price for these 
services (including the fees, minimum requirements, 
and so forth) may be very high, making them unaf-
fordable for a large proportion of the population. 

















Note: D = demand, S = supply; r = interest rate.
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European Commission’s Eurobarometer, which covers all member states 
of the European Union (European Commission 2005).9 Different surveys 
have different primary objectives: the questions in the South African 
survey refl ect the original motivation for doing the survey, which was 
to assess the political and commercial climate for expanding access to 
fi nance, rather than to underpin research designed to build a compre-
hensive picture of economic and fi nancial decision making. Findings 
based on surveys of individuals cannot easily be compared directly with 
those from surveys of households.10 Different survey methodologies and 
their impact on the quality of information gathered are the subjects of 
an ongoing research effort at the World Bank.
Thus, despite some interesting insights from individual household 
surveys that focus on fi nancial services, lack of cross-country compara-
bility between survey instruments still prevents documentation of cross-
country differences and thus analyses of supply and demand constraints. 
Altogether, household or individual survey data providing substantial 
fi nancial services information currently exist for fewer than 40 develop-
ing countries and are inconsistent across countries in representativeness, 
measurement, and defi nition of fi nancial services and products.11 
Lack of consistent cross-country, micro data on use of fi nancial services 
has led researchers to consider the information contained in more easily 
collected indicators such as the number of loan or deposit accounts in a 
country. Of course the total number of accounts is not the total number of 
users: people might have several accounts with one institution or accounts 
with several institutions. Further, a number of accounts might be dormant, 
a particularly common occurrence in many postal savings banks with 
since there is no rationing, but it still represents a 
policy problem because the high price often refl ects 
lack of competition or underdeveloped physical or 
institutional infrastructures, leading to fi nancial 
exclusion. These are matters that may call for 
public policy interventions to increase competition 
among providers and build relevant institutional and 
physical infrastructures, hence shifting the supply 
curve to the right (S˝), reducing prices, and making 
fi nancial services affordable for a larger part of the 
population. These government policies are discussed 
in chapter 4.
Box 1.2 (continued)
a. For other explanations, see, for example, Keeton (1979) and Williamson (1987).
—and a lack of cross-country 
consistency
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free pass-book savings accounts and ineffi cient documentation systems. 
Nevertheless, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007b) and 
Honohan (2006) show that nonlinear combinations of such aggregate 
indicators of loan and deposit accounts are suffi ciently highly correlated 
with the actual proportion of households using fi nancial services in coun-
tries for which this information is available from household surveys.
EXISTING HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS FOCUSING ON 
fi nancial services in India, Brazil, Colombia, and 
Mexico give some insights into the information 
that can be obtained from such survey instru-
ments beyond simple measures of use of fi nancial 
services. Indeed, household surveys are necessary 
to obtain detailed information on who uses which 
fi nancial services from which types of institutions, 
including informal ones. These surveys include 
questions on why people do not use fi nancial ser-
vices, which help researchers distinguish between 
use and access issues and between demand and 
supply factors. 
For example, in the United States, 87 percent of 
the adult population has a bank account, compared 
with 48 percent in rural Upper Pradesh and Andhra 
Pradesh, India; 43 percent in 11 urban areas in Brazil; 
41 percent in Bogota, Colombia; and 25 percent in 
Mexico City (48 percent when compulsory savings 
for borrowers are included). A comparison of U.S. and 
Mexican households reveals interesting differences 
about why some do not have bank accounts:
Box 1.3 Measuring access through household surveys
Although these fi gures are not strictly comparable 
because multiple reasons were allowed in the U.S. 
survey but not in the Mexican one, voluntary exclu-
sion reasons—such as no need or an unwillingness 
to use banks—appear to be much higher in the 
United States compared with Mexico City. Survey 
Main reasons for not having a bank account
Reason United States (%) Mexico (%)
Do not need account/no savings 53 7
Want to keep records private 22 2
Not comfortable with banks/don’t trust 18 16
Fees and minimum balance too high 45 70
Inconvenience-location and hours 10 2
Lack of documentation 10 3
responses also suggest that involuntary exclusion 
because of affordability is a more important deterrent 
in Mexico, with 70 percent of those without accounts 
citing high fees and minimum balances. These fi g-
ures also indicate that supply factors in Mexico play 
a more important role in limiting access. 
Sources: Caskey, Ruiz Duran, and Solo (2006); Kumar (2005); World Bank (2004).
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Indeed, in the absence of micro data that are more accurate but costly 
to collect, combining these indicators allows estimates to be made of the 
share of the population with accounts at formal or semiformal fi nancial 
intermediaries for most countries (box 1.4). Figure 1.1 maps the main 
cross-country variations in this synthetic “headline” indicator. More 
than 80 percent of households in most of Western Europe and North 
America have an account with a fi nancial institution, while the share is 
below 20 percent in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Russian 
Federation and many other countries of the former Soviet Union show 
usage ratios between 60 and 80 percent, a legacy of the state-run savings 
bank from communist time. Latin America exhibits a high variation in 
usage, ranging from less than 20 percent in Nicaragua to more than 60 
percent in Chile. Usage across Asian countries varies much less and is 
mostly in the 40 to 60 percent range. 
These headline indicators show that access to fi nance or, more 
precisely, use of fi nancial services is positively, but not very closely, cor-
related with economic development and fi nancial depth. Take fi rst the 
correlation with economic development. The proportion of households 
with an account in a fi nancial institution is higher in more developed 
Figure 1.1 Fraction of households with an account in a fi nancial institution
Sources: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007b); Christen, Jayadeva, and Rosenberg (2004); Peachey and Roe (2006); and 








Creating synthetic headline 
indicators from surveys and 
aggregate data
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A N E X ACT STATISTIC ON THE NUMBER OF 
households that use formal fi nancial services can 
be inferred only from household surveys. However, 
only around 34 countries have household surveys 
containing this information, and researchers have 
therefore turned to proxy indicators to estimate the 
share of the population using fi nancial services (For 
estimates by country, see appendix table A.1).
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 
(2007b) compile loan and deposit account data 
through surveys of bank regulators for a cross-sec-
tion of countries and document the large variation in 
these indicators across countries (see appendix table 
A.2). In Austria there are three deposit accounts for 
every inhabitant; in Madagascar, there are only 14 
for every 1,000 inhabitants. In Greece there is almost 
one loan account for every inhabitant; in Albania, 
there are just four for every 1,000 inhabitants. 
The ratio of deposit and loan accounts per capita 
increases with income, although the average deposit 
or loan account balance relative to income per capita 
decreases with income, indicating that poor people 
and smaller enterprises are better able to make use of 
these services in more developed countries (fi gures A 
and B). Still there is great variation among develop-
ing countries. For example in Bolivia, the average 
loan amount is 28 times GDP per capita, while 
it is only a third of GDP per capita in Poland. In 
Madagascar, the average deposit account balance is 
nine times GDP per capita, while it is only 4 percent 
of GDP per capita in Iran. 
These aggregate indicators are not only inter-
esting measures in their own right, but when no 
household surveys are available, they also can be used 
to predict the proportion of households using bank 
accounts. Regressing the share of households with 
deposit accounts obtained from household surveys 
on their aggregate indicators of deposit accounts 
and branch penetration, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Martinez Peria (2007b) show that the predicted 
share of households with deposit accounts resulting 
from this regression provides a reasonably accurate 
estimate of the actual share of households with 
deposit accounts obtained from household surveys 
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Figure A. Number of loans and deposits per 
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Figure B. Loan and deposit size/GDP per capita, 
by income quintile of countries
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(fi gure C). Hence it is also possible to obtain from 
aggregate indicators out-of-sample estimates of the 
proportion of households using a bank account, 
although the fi t is likely to be poorer.
In parallel efforts, Christen, Jayadeva, and 
Rosenberg (2004) collected information on indi-
vidual institutions that are considered socially 
oriented or alternative fi nancial institutions, that is, 
institutions that target low-income clients and are not 
profi t maximizers, such as microfi nance institutions, 
postal savings banks, credit unions, and state-owned 
agricultural and development banks, while Peachey 
and Roe (2006) collected information on the member 
institutions of the World Savings Bank Association. 
These different efforts give a first indication of 
fi nancial services provided by different providers. 
Honohan (2006) combines data from all three sources 
to estimate a headline indicator of access. Using data 
on number of accounts in fi nancial institutions as a 
proportion of population and an average account size 
as a proportion of GDP per capita (or estimated values 
where they do not exist) as regressors, he estimates a 
nonlinear regression relationship between these vari-
ables and the actual share of households with a fi nan-
cial account obtained from survey data. Where there 
is no survey data, a “predicted” share of households 
is obtained using the regressors and regression coef-
fi cients. Hence, the headline indicator pieces together 
the values of households using fi nancial accounts from 
surveys when available, and this predicted value when 
survey data are not available. This indicator can then 
be used to map the share of the adult population with 
use of fi nancial accounts for most of the world, as 








































Figure C. Actual vs. fi tted values of share of households with deposit accounts
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countries, approaching 100 percent for some of the richest (fi gure 1.2). 
Use of fi nancial services increases steeply as per capita GDP approaches 
$10,000, and converges to near universal use at income levels above 
$20,000. However, countries show signifi cant differences at similar levels 
of economic development. On the one hand, countries in Western Europe 
have typically higher rates of usage than does the United Kingdom or 
the United States, despite similar levels of GDP per capita. On the other 
hand, a higher proportion of households holds accounts in fi nancial 
institutions in low-income countries in South Asia than in low-income 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Similarly, indicators of fi nancial use show a positive but imperfect 
correlation with indicators of fi nancial depth, such as credit to the private 
sector divided by GDP (fi gure 1.3). This correlation shows that access 
really is a distinct dimension: fi nancial systems can become deep with-
out delivering access to all. Take Colombia and Lithuania as examples. 
Both countries have similar levels of private credit to GDP at around 
20 percent, but 70 percent of households in Lithuania have accounts, 
compared with 40 percent in Colombia. Similarly, over 85 percent of 
Figure 1.2 Economic development and use of fi nancial services
Sources: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007b); Christen, Jayadeva, and Rosenberg 































The correlation between 
fi nancial access and 
economic development is 
weak, albeit positive
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households have accounts in Estonia and Switzerland, but while Estonia’s 
fi nancial depth is around 20 percent, Switzerland’s is over 160 percent. 
The positive but imperfect correlations of fi nancial services usage with 
economic development and fi nancial depth raise questions regarding 
the drivers of cross-country differences in fi nancial use and access. The 
correlations also suggest that there might be room for policy reforms 
to increase the level of fi nancial inclusion—an issue that is addressed 
throughout this report.
It is important to understand not only the actual use of fi nancial 
services, but also access across its different dimensions. Collecting indi-
cators of and barriers to access and comparing them to usage and other 
country characteristics will enable researchers and policy makers to better 
understand the reasons for low access and to design policies to close the 
gaps (box 1.5). It is also important to assess the quality of access as well as 
quantity. For example, services may be available but may not be custom-
ized to different needs, or points of delivery may be too few, or delivery 
may take a very long time. The following discusses several dimensions of 
access and the indicators that have been collected to proxy for them. 
Figure 1.3 Financial depth vs. use
Sources: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007b); Christen, Jayadeva, and Rosenberg 
(2004); Peachey and Roe (2006); Honohan (2006); and updated version of Beck, Demirgüç-































Identifying barriers to access
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Consider fi rst geographic access. Branches have been the traditional 
bank outlet. Hence geographic distance to the nearest branch, or the 
density of branches relative to the population, can provide a fi rst crude 
indication of geographic access or lack of physical barriers to access 
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 2007b). As in the case of 
usage, geographic access varies greatly across countries. Low-income 
Ethiopia has fewer than one branch per 100,000 people, while Spain 
has nearly one for every 1,000 people. Similarly, Spain has 79 branches 
for every 1,000 square kilometers, while sparsely populated Botswana 
has one branch for every 10,000 square kilometers. ATM penetration, 
rather than branch penetration, shows an even wider dispersion in 
geographic access (fi gure 1.4). These indicators are only crude proxies 
for geographic access, however, since branches and ATMs are never 
distributed equally across a country but are clustered in cities and some 
large towns. A better measure would be the average distance from the 
FINANCIAL SERVICES AR E PROVIDED IN THE 
informal and the formal sector by banks, postal 
savings banks, credit unions, fi nance companies, 
microfi nance institutions, and a whole range of 
other formal and quasi-formal nonbank institutions. 
Given the dearth of data on access, however, the 
initial data collection effort has focused on com-
mercial banks, which are the dominant institutions 
in the formal fi nancial sector. (Furthermore, policy 
implications regarding improving access are also 
more relevant for the formal fi nancial sector given 
that the ability of informal fi nance to scale up and 
meet the fi nancing needs of a growing economy is 
not clear; see box 3.5 in chapter 3). Conducting a 
survey of up to fi ve large banks in each of more than 
80 countries, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez 
Peria (2007a) developed indicators of access for 
three types of banking services—deposits, loans, 
and payments—across three dimensions—physical 
access, affordability, and eligibility (for breakdowns 
by country, see appendix tables A.4–A.7).
Barriers such as availability of locations, minimum 
account and loan balances, account fees, fees associ-
ated with payments, documentation requirements, 
and processing times are found to vary signifi cantly 
both across banks and across countries. Indicators of 
access barriers are also found to be negatively corre-
lated with actual use of fi nancial services, confi rming 
that these barriers can exclude individuals from using 
bank services. The correlations of these indicators 
with country characteristics also have important 
policy implications for broadening access.
This is a fi rst effort in documenting access barri-
ers around the world. Next steps include broadening 
the study’s coverage of both countries and banks 
and documenting the barriers imposed by nonbank 
fi nancial intermediaries. Finally, urban-rural differ-
ences, as well as the role of customer characteristics, 
such as differences in gender and age, are important 
areas where further work will focus. The World Bank 
Group plans to expand and update these indicators 
within the context of its Getting Finance indicators.
Box 1.5 Creating indicators of access barriers to deposit, payments, 
and loan services 
Physical access barriers can 
be overcome by technology
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household to the branch or ATM, but these data are available for very 
few countries. Nevertheless, the branch and ATM density fi gures are 
highly correlated with aggregate loan and deposit accounts per popula-
tion and the synthetic headline indicator introduced above, suggesting 
that they do contain access-relevant information (for branch and ATM 
penetration by country, see appendix table A.3).
A focus on branches and ATMs ignores other delivery channels that 
have gained importance over the past decades. Among these are non-
branch outlets, such as correspondent banking agreements, where bank 
services are sold by nonfi nancial corporations on behalf of the banks, 
and mobile branches, where trucks drive through remote areas providing 
fi nancial services at a scheduled frequency. Phone fi nance allows clients 
to do fi nancial transactions such as payments or even loan applications 
over the phone. Electronic fi nance (e-fi nance) allows clients to access 
services through the Internet. While correspondent bank agreements and 
mobile branches have helped extend geographic outreach of fi nancial 
institutions in many countries, phone and e-fi nance have been introduced 
primarily to reduce transaction costs for already existing customers and 
to make service delivery more effective for fi nancial institutions. Any 
of these delivery channels, however, can reduce the costs of access and 
thus potentially increase the use of fi nancial services. 
While no cross-country data are available on the importance of these 
different alternative delivery channels, a recent bank-level survey, dis-
cussed in box 1.5, sheds some light on their use. Asking banks whether 
they accept loan applications in nonbranch bank outlets, over the phone, 
Figure 1.4 Branch and ATM penetration by income quintile of countries
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or over the Internet, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007a) 
fi nd a large variation across countries. According to this survey, bank 
customers in Australia, Chile, Denmark, Greece, South Africa, and Spain 
can submit their loan applications in nonbranch outlets, over the phone, 
or over the Internet. At the other extreme, loan applicants in Armenia, 
Ethiopia, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Thailand, Uganda, and Zambia have to 
travel to bank headquarters or a branch to submit their loan application. 
While this measure is of course not the only or even the most important 
determinant of access, it is notable that Chile, for example, has 418 loan 
accounts per 1,000 people, while Thailand has only 248. 
Limited geographic or physical access to a bank is only one type of bar-
rier that potential customers face. By limiting eligibility, documentation 
requirements can be another important barrier to access. For example, 
banks in Albania, the Czech Republic, Mozambique, Spain, and Sweden 
demand on average only one document to open a bank account, whereas 
banks in Bangladesh, Cameroon, Chile, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Uganda, and Zambia require at least four documents, 
including an identity card or passport, recommendation letter, wage slip, 
and proof of domicile (fi gure 1.5). Given the high degree of informality 
in many developing countries, only a small proportion of the popula-
tion can produce these documents. Sixty percent of the population in 
Cameroon works in the informal sector and is thus unable to produce 
a wage slip. People in rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa—61 percent 
of the overall population—are often unable to provide a formal proof 
of domicile. Limiting banking services to customers within the formal 
Lack of documentation can 
create eligibility barriers
Figure 1.5 Number of documents required to open a checking account
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economy or formal society thus automatically excludes a large share, if 
not the majority, of people in many low-income countries. Improvements 
on this dimension would not require great sophistication or cost. 
Perhaps even more important than barriers of physical access and 
documentation are barriers of affordability. Standard bank account charges 
seem absurdly high when related to average national per capita GDP. To 
open a checking (transactions) account in Cameroon, a person needs more 
than $700, an amount higher than the per capita GDP of the country. On 
average, in 10 percent of the countries sampled, an amount equal to at least 
50 percent of per capita GDP is necessary to open a checking account. 
Likewise, the cost to the customer of maintaining these accounts 
varies widely as a percentage of average per capita GDP. In Uganda the 
fi gure is 30 percent, whereas customers in Bangladesh pay no annual fees. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there are 229 deposit accounts for every 1,000 
people in Bangladesh, but only 47 for every 1,000 people in Uganda. 
Obviously, much of the cross-country variation here refl ects the fact 
that bank charges do not vary as much across countries as income does, 
imposing a much greater burden on individuals in poor countries and 
making access more diffi cult. High minimum balances to open and 
maintain bank accounts and high annual fees can constitute high bar-
riers for large parts of the population in the developing world. Checking 
accounts also often come as expensive packages with costly overdraft 
facilities that can easily be incurred accidentally by those with low and 
volatile incomes, resulting in great risks. 
Assuming, somewhat arbitrarily, that poor people cannot afford to 
spend more than 2 percent of their annual income on fi nancial services, 
just the fees on checking accounts can exclude more than 50 percent of 
the population in some African countries such as Kenya, Malawi, and 
Uganda from having a bank account (fi gure 1.6).12 
Payments services—for paying bills and sending domestic or interna-
tional money transfers—are an important service for many low-income 
households, but again these services are too costly in many countries. For 
example, the cost of transferring $250 internationally—a typical amount 
of remittance—is 5–10 percent of this amount for half of the sampled 
countries and varies from 30 cents in Belgium to $50 in the Dominican 
Republic (fi gure 1.7). The fees associated with ATM transactions (for a 
relatively small transaction of $100) are also above 40 cents in Pakistan 
and Nigeria, and average 10 cents across countries, while the use of 
ATMs is free in 50 percent of the sample countries.
Affordability barriers: fees and 
minimum balances
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Lack of appropriate products and services for low-income households 
and microenterprises is another important barrier to access fi nancial ser-
vices. Availability and affordability of consumer and mortgage loans vary 
quite a bit around the world. Banks in Nepal reported that the minimum 
amount a consumer can borrow is 12 times per capita GDP, whereas in 
richer countries it is possible to borrow amounts smaller than 10 percent 
of per capita GDP. Mortgage loans, where they exist, can also be subject 
to high fees and high minimums. Furthermore, it can take more than 10 
days to process a credit card application in the Philippines, more than 20 
Figure 1.6 Share of the population unable to afford checking account fees















Figure 1.7 Cost of transferring funds abroad as a percentage of $250









A lack of appropriate 
products and services
FFA_021-054_ch01.indd   44 10/26/07   12:30:21 PM
45
A C C E S S  T O  F I N A N C E  A N D  D E V E L O P M E N T :  T H E O R Y  A N D  M E A S U R E M E N T
days to process a consumer loan application in Pakistan, and more than 
two months to process a mortgage loan application in Chile. 
Surveys of fi rms over the past 10 years have greatly expanded the 
information available about fi nancing patterns of and access constraints 
on small fi rms and even microenterprises across countries. These sources 
include the Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) 
studies for Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s; Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) for the transition economies; 
the World Business Environment Survey (WBES), conducted across 80 
countries in 1999–2000; and the Investment Climate Surveys (ICS), 
conducted since 2002 and available for almost 100 countries. These 
surveys include micro-, small, and medium enterprises that are not cap-
tured in data sets based on published fi nancial statements. In addition 
to specifi c fi rm information, these surveys contain an array of questions 
on the business environment in which the fi rm operates, information 
that allows in-depth analysis of the relationships between fi rm invest-
ment, productivity, growth, and fi nancial and institutional obstacles. 
Doubts have been raised about how well these surveys actually represent 
the population of fi rms for a specifi c country, a concern that could be 
fully allayed only by using census data, which are unavailable for most 
developing countries. Even census data that are available mostly cover 
only formal sector fi rms, representing, in many developing countries, a 
small fraction of the total number of fi rms, formal and informal.13 
These surveys ask fi rm managers to what extent access to and cost of 
external fi nance constitute obstacles to their operation and growth, with 
higher numbers indicating higher obstacles. In general, small fi rms in both 
the WBES and ICS report fi nancing constraints to be among the most 
important business constraints they face (fi gure 1.8). The geographic varia-
tion is large. Firms in East Asian and European countries rate fi nancing as 
a minor constraint on average, while in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, fi nancing constraints are much more severe. Variation is also wide 
within regions, particularly in Latin America, the Middle East, and South 
Asia. For example, the average Chilean fi rm reports that neither access 
to fi nance nor its cost are important constraints to growth, whereas the 
average Brazilian fi rm reports both as important growth constraints. 
These surveys show that more than 40 percent of large fi rms, but just 
over 20 percent of small fi rms, use external fi nance for new investment 
(fi gure 1.9). While large fi rms fi nance about 30 percent of their new invest-
ment by external fi nance, small fi rms only fi nance 15 percent externally. 
Looking at fi rms’ use of and 
access to fi nance—
—managers’ perceptions of 
fi nancial exclusion vary widely
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Figure 1.8 Financing and other constraints faced by small fi rms
Source: WBES and ICS. 
Note: WBES covers small fi rms in 80 countries; ICS covers those in 71 countries. The fi gures show the mean response of fi rms rating obstacles 
on a scale from 1–4 in WBES (1 = no obstacle; 4 = major obstacle) and 0–4 in ICS. In WBES, a fi rm is defi ned to be small if it has 5–50 
















































































































































































































































Figure 1.9 Percentage of fi rms using external fi nance, by fi rm size
Source: ICS. 
Note: ICS covers 71 developing countries. Small fi rms are those with 20 or fewer employees; 
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Looking across regions, use of external fi nance by fi rms varies consid-
erably. For example, some fi rms in East Asia fi nance almost 60 percent 
of their new investments with external fi nance. Within regions, there 
are big differences here too—while the average fi rm in the Philippines 
fi nances less than 8 percent of its new investment externally, this fi gure is 
77 percent for the average Thai fi rm. Out of all fi nancing sources, bank 
fi nance is the most common, for fi rms of all sizes (fi gure 1.10). 
Firm-level surveys suggest that the share of small fi rms with bank 
credit varies from less than 1 percent in Pakistan to almost 50 percent 
in Thailand. Analyzing WBES data on fi nancing patterns, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2008) fi nd that small fi rms and fi rms 
in countries with poor institutions use less external fi nance, especially 
bank fi nance. Small fi rms do not use disproportionately more leasing 
or trade fi nance compared with larger fi rms, so these fi nancing sources 
do not compensate for lower access to bank fi nancing by small fi rms. 
Consistent with these fi ndings, fi nancial sector assessments conducted 
by the World Bank also often point to the limited availability of leasing 
and factoring, two important fi nancing products for small and medium 
enterprises.
If fi rms do not use bank fi nance, why don’t they? Of the ones that 
have applied and have been rejected, what are the reasons? Box 1.6 
provides some highlights from three of the largest countries for which 
Banks are the most common 
source of fi nance
Figure 1.10 Sources of external fi nance for new investments
Source: ICS, covering 71 countries.
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surveys have offered answers to these questions. Surveys of small fi rms 
suggest that while some fi rms are excluded from bank fi nance because 
of high interest rates, collateral requirements, corruption in banking, 
cumbersome paperwork, and the like, a large proportion simply have 
no demand for or good projects to fi nance. 
ALTHOUGH BANK FINANCE IS THE MOST COMMON 
type of external fi nance, a large proportion of small 
fi rms do not have a bank loan. For example, enterprise 
surveys of small fi rms suggest that only 20 percent in 
China, 30 percent in Russia, and 55 percent in India 
have a bank loan. 
Of those who do not have a loan, 85 percent in 
China, 95 percent in Russia, and 96 percent in India 
have not applied for one. So the rejection rates are 
15, 5, and 4 percent, respectively.
Do these numbers refl ect barriers to access or lack 
of need? Some of the fi rm surveys include questions 
that help shed light on this issue. 
The survey results suggest that a large proportion 
of small fi rms that do not use bank loans actually 
do not need external fi nance or have been refused 
a loan for basic business reasons. However, in poor 
contractual and informational environments, the 
need to rely on collateral, rather than an assessment 
of the quality or feasibility of the project and credit 
history of the fi rm, is an important barrier for many 
fi rms. High interest rates may refl ect lack of com-
petition and infrastructure problems, in addition 
to other macroeconomic issues. Bank corruption is 
also a potential barrier deterring fi rms from applying 
for bank loans. 
Box 1.6 Small fi rms’ access to fi nance vs. use: fi rm-level surveys
Source: ICS.
a. Multiple answers are allowed, and hence the percentages do not sum to 100.
Why did the fi rm not apply for a loan?a
 China (%) India (%) Russia (%)
Does not need a loan 69 80 60
Does not think it would be approved 22 N/A  2
Application procedures are too burdensome 27 16 23
Collateral requirements are too strict 26 18 25
Interest rates are too high 17 17 35
It is necessary to make informal payments 11 N/A  6
Other N/A  7  3
What was main reason the loan application was rejected?*
Perceived lack of profi tability 18 32 11
Lack of acceptable collateral 69 N/A 56 
Inadequate credit history of the fi rm 24 N/A 11
Incomplete application N/A 16 11
Other N/A 37 N/A
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Smaller fi rms tend to face greater access barriers than do larger fi rms. 
For example, the responses to the surveys discussed in box 1.5 suggest 
that in Georgia, Nepal, and Uganda, the minimum SME loan amount 
is 20 times GDP per capita, casting doubt on whether banks in those 
countries can meet the borrowing needs of smaller fi rms. Similarly, fees 
on SME loans and the time it takes to process an SME loan application 
may represent barriers. For example, while it takes more than a month 
to process an application in Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, and 
Uruguay, the wait is less than two days in Denmark (fi gure 1.11). These 
issues are explored in much greater detail in chapter 2. 
Two aggregate indicators can be created by summarizing different 
barriers that impede fi rms’ and households’ access to fi nancial services. 
These indicators, one for access barriers for deposit services and the 
other for loan services, suggest an overall impression of the country 
characteristics that are associated with high barriers.14 
Based on simple correlations, access barriers decline as per capita 
GDP rises (fi gure 1.12). The quality of physical infrastructure is also 
negatively associated with access barriers. Such relationships are not 
necessarily causal ones; both barriers and the country characteristics 
shown have common underlying structural causes. Nevertheless it is 
striking that indicators of competition, openness, and market orienta-
tion in the overall fi nancial sector and economic policy are also strongly 
negatively correlated with access barriers at the bank level. Examples 
include the Heritage Foundation index of banking freedoms15 and an 
index of media freedom developed by Djankov and others (2003). (Each 
of these has also been found to be correlated with fi nancial depth and 
economic growth.) 
As far as contractual and informational infrastructures are concerned, 
better credit registries are associated with lower access barriers, but there 
is no evident correlation with creditor rights, suggesting that a defi cient 
information infrastructure may be a greater barrier to access than a defi -
cient contractual framework. Countries that encourage market discipline 
by empowering market participants (through enforcement of accurate and 
timely information disclosure and by not distorting risk-taking incentives) 
also tend to have lower barriers to accessing loan services. Government 
ownership of banks is associated with lower barriers on the deposit side (as 
is foreign ownership of banks) but with higher barriers on the loan side. 
Not too much should be read into these simple partial correlations. 
They do, however, foreshadow the characteristics that emerge again and 
Smaller fi rms tend to face 
greater fi nancial exclusion
What determines access 
barriers for households and 
enterprises?
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Figure 1.11 Time to process an SME loan application
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again in the discussions in later chapters that take a more in-depth look 
at access and policies to broaden it. 
Conclusions
Data from fi nancial institutions and their regulators can contribute 
greatly to a better understanding of the many barriers to access and 
usage. Ultimately, however, researchers are interested not only in mea-
suring access to fi nancial services and the barriers that prevent access 
but also in understanding the welfare impact of removing these barriers 
and broadening access. For this, household and fi rm-level surveys are 
necessary to distinguish between supply constraints and demand-side 
constraints and to determine how the removal of these different barriers 
would affect household welfare. 
Figure 1.12 Economic development and barriers to access
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007a).
Note: The two panels show the fi rst principal component of the indicators of barriers to (a) 
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Access, and its welfare 
implications, can best be 
measured through surveys—
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In evaluating the impact of broadening access, randomized fi eld experi-
ments hold promise. These experiments, which use surveys of microenter-
prises and households, introduce a random component to the assignment of 
fi nancial products, such as subsidized fees for opening accounts or random 
variation in the terms of loan contracts. Continuing research in this area 
will shed more light on how reduced barriers and improved access affect 
growth and household welfare. These fi ndings, in turn, will inform the 
design of policy interventions to build more inclusive fi nancial systems, 
and the efforts to narrow the access indicators to track over time. We 
discuss these issues in more detail in the remainder of the report. 
Notes
1. Conceptually, when discussing the impact of fi nance on growth, it is 
important to distinguish between two different effects (Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil 1992) the impact of fi nance on raising income levels of developing coun-
tries and on helping countries converge in income toward advanced economies; 
and the impact on steady state growth rate. The second effect could result from 
the role of fi nancial development in promoting innovation and accelerating 
the outward movement of the frontier. Empirically, there is very little evidence 
to distinguish between these two effects. However, see Aghion, Howitt, and 
Mayer-Foulkes (2005), discussed below.
2. A return to rising inequality in several advanced economies in the past 
couple of decades shows further shortcomings of the Kuznet’s model.
3. Key contributors to this literature are Alesina and Rodrik (1994); Perotti 
(1992, 1993, 1996); Persson and Tabellini (1994); for a contrary view, see Forbes 
(2000). World Bank (2006a) and Birdsall (2007) also discuss the implications 
of this literature and provide further references. An interesting case study is 
that of the Republic of Korea and the Philippines, which looked quite similar 
with regard to their development in the early 1960s, except in the degree of 
income inequality. Over the following 30-year period, income per capita in the 
Philippines (the more unequal country) barely doubled, whereas fast growth 
in Korea resulted in a fi vefold increase.
4. There are other possible channels through which higher inequality could 
slow growth: for example, if inequality results in less-accountable governments 
or if it undermines civic and social life (compare Birdsall 2007). 
5. Also see the discussion in Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2007) and many 
references therein.
6. See for example, Aghion and Bolton (1997); Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-
Penalosa (1999).
—and randomized fi eld 
experiments have potential in 
evaluating impact of access
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7. See Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007); Honohan (2004).
8. Of course, some netting of interinstitutional accounts is still needed.
9. For a general review of issues around data collection in this area, see 
Honohan (2005b). 
10. The focus on individuals rather than households raises issues of com-
parability with other surveys: use of fi nancial services can differ considerably 
between different household members, and it would be a mistake to assume 
that one household member’s use is representative of the access of the other 
members. Surveys that randomly question individuals in a household are a 
less-promising basis for welfare analysis, which requires good-quality data at 
the household level. 
11. In the context of the Year of Microcredit 2005, a coordinated effort was 
also started by World Bank, UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and 
the U.K. Department for International Development to implement a consis-
tent, stand-alone household survey instrument across developing countries 
to measure access to and use of fi nancial services. Currently, the Research 
Department of the World Bank and UNCDF are planning to move forward 
with this effort, which should allow consistent cross-country comparison of 
fi nance-related questions and derivation of the share of households that use 
different fi nancial services from different providers. 
12. Genesis (2005a) examines the costs of using bank accounts in seven 
countries: Brazil, India, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa. 
According to Genesis (2005b), the 2 percent limit is based on unpublished 
research by the South African Universal Services Agency in the context of a 
mandated rolling-out of telecommunications service to lower-income families. 
As both fi nancial transaction accounts and telecom service can be considered 
network products, similar assumptions on affordability for both services seem 
reasonable.
13. Surveys are now being designed to reach informal fi rms also; see http://
www.enterprisesurveys.org.
14. The aggregate indicators are the principal component indicator of 
the underlying indicators for deposit and loan services, respectively. Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007a) use a data set of 209 banks in 
62 countries and regress these aggregate indicators of barriers on bank-level 
controls and one country-level variable at a time, such as the quality of physical 
and information infrastructures, protection of creditor rights, bank and media 
freedoms, and government ownership of banks. 
15. This index takes into account government involvement and ownership, 
existence of directed lending and controls, quality of regulation and supervi-
sion, and the ability of foreign institutions to operate freely.
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C H A P T E R  T W O
Firms’ Access to Finance: 
Entry, Growth, and Productivity 
IT IS BY PROVIDING FINANCIAL SERVICES TO ANY AND ALL FIRMS WITH 
good growth opportunities that the fi nancial sector helps develop-
ing economies to grow and to converge on the high-income levels of 
advanced economies. This is not just a matter of the overall volume of 
lending: it matters crucially which fi rms get fi nance and on what terms, 
that is, on whether creditworthy fi rms of all sizes, both incumbent ones 
and those that seek entry, have broad access to fi nance at reasonable 
costs. Improving access to external sources of funding is undoubtedly 
the main challenge for fi rm fi nance in developing countries, and that 
fact alone justifi es the attention it receives. Naturally, it is also the area 
of fi nance that has received the most econometric research attention. 
Other dimensions of fi nance also matter, such as cash management and 
payments services, risk management, and insurance, and they deserve 
further research attention. 
This chapter looks at how fi rms fi nance themselves in developing 
countries and explores the barriers to improved contracting between 
fi rms and the providers of funds. It discusses the channels through which 
fi nance affects fi rm performance and the relative importance of fi nancing 
obstacles as a constraint to fi rm growth compared with other obstacles in 
the business environment. Firms fi nance their operations and growth in 
many different ways, refl ecting both the preferences of management and 
the options that are available to them. Availability of external fi nancing 
for fi rms depends on the wider institutional environment, and lack of 
availability is one of the more important business obstacles fi rms have to 
overcome. Better access to fi nance can help new fi rm entry and growth, 
which in turn promotes growth at the aggregate level. 
This chapter examines the 
impact of fi nancial barriers 
on fi rms—
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The chapter documents how improvements in the functioning of the 
formal fi nancial sector can be expected to reduce fi nancing constraints 
more for small fi rms and others who have diffi culty in self-fi nancing or 
in fi nding private or informal sources of funding. As a result, the effec-
tiveness of fi nance has a signifi cant impact on the ownership structure, 
the dynamism, and the resilience of the economy at large. Finance does 
not just raise aggregate fi rm performance uniformly but also transforms 
the structure of the economy by affecting different types of fi rms in dif-
ferent ways. The removal of fi nancial barriers appears to be especially 
benefi cial for small fi rms—which embody much of an economy’s latent 
dynamism. Removal or reduction of fi nancial barriers can thus broaden 
the sectoral range of the economy and reduce its vulnerability to sector-
specifi c shocks. The institutional environment can also infl uence pat-
terns of ownership—for example, well-functioning fi nancial and legal 
systems can lead more fi rms to incorporate and result in more diffuse 
patterns of fi rm ownership. 
Finally, the chapter examines the ability of fi rms, especially small 
fi rms, to access fi nance from different sources, including banks and 
other intermediaries, securities markets, and foreign investment. Special 
attention within this section is given to the much discussed issue of 
foreign-owned banks and their contribution to improving access. The 
debate about whether banks or markets do a better job no longer excites 
much interest: each has its place in ensuring that fi nance reaches a wide 
clientele. Creating the infrastructures that let both markets and institu-
tions reach their optimal level is likely to be the best policy. Relationship 
lending, which relies on personal interaction between borrower and 
lender and is based on an understanding of the borrower’s business and 
not just on collateral or on mechanical credit scoring systems, is costly 
for the lender and thus requires either high spreads or large volumes to 
be viable. However, if the customer’s creditworthiness is hard to evaluate, 
then there may be no alternative to relationship lending—although this 
may lead to discrimination against certain groups. The modern trend 
to transactional lending—whether based on assets or, for example, on 
automated credit appraisal using improved data—is clearly the way of 
the future. Credit registries are an important tool for the expansion of 
transactions-based lending technologies.
Foreign banks bring with them capital, technology, know-how, and a 
degree of independence from the local business elite. However, the role of 
foreign banks in improving access has always been controversial, partly 
—and on economic structures 
in general—
—identifi es fi rms’ sources 
of fi nance—
—and considers the role of 
foreign banks—
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for political reasons. Foreign banks have a comparative advantage in 
transactional lending, which raises concerns about their contribution to 
credit access for countries where relationship lending is still needed. The 
entry of foreign banks has directly benefi ted larger fi rms, and in many 
countries this improved credit access has extended directly or indirectly 
to smaller fi rms. Nevertheless there are also some indications that the 
arrival of foreign banks has not always been good for small fi rm access 
to credit, at least at fi rst. 
Nonbank fi nance remains much less important than bank fi nance 
in most developing countries, but this can be expected to change. The 
corporate bond market and organized securities markets are chiefl y of 
relevance to larger fi rms, although by broadening the range of fi rms that 
have access to long-term funding, these markets do make a contribu-
tion to access. Foreign direct investment offers a partial substitute for 
local fi nance and is an alternative that has proved important in some 
countries. FDI appears to have eased fi nancing constraints—although 
again the benefi ts are most apparent for larger fi rms. 
Access to Finance: Determinants and Implications
Firms fi nance their operations and growth in many different ways. 
Their fi nancing choices are infl uenced by the preferences of each fi rm’s 
entrepreneurs and, more important, by the options that are available to 
them. In what form, from whom, how successfully, and at what cost 
fi rms are fi nanced thus depends on a wide range of factors both internal 
and external to the fi rm. The internal fi nancial resources available to 
the fi rm’s entrepreneurs and other insiders are of course important. Not 
only are these the basis for most start-ups, but they can help leverage 
external fi nance, that is, fi nance from outsiders. But given information 
and agency problems (discussed in chapter 1, box 1.2), external fi nancing 
also depends on the fi rm entrepreneurs’ own ability to project a credible 
fi nancing proposal, their willingness to share control, the nature of their 
business plan, and the uncertainties and risks involved in implementing 
it. The credibility of the proposal depends not only on the substance of 
the business plan, but on how the fi rm is governed and on the transpar-
ency of its operations and fi nancial condition. 
Circumstances external to the fi rm are also important. Availability of 
external fi nancing depends not only on the fi rm’s situation, but on the 
—and the growth of 
nonbank fi nance
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wider policy and institutional environment supporting the enforceability 
and liquidity of the contracts that are involved in fi nancing fi rms. And it 
depends on the existence and effectiveness of a variety of intermediaries 
and ancillary fi nancial fi rms that help bring providers and users of funds 
together in the market, not least by helping overcome information and 
agency problems (Tirole 2006). 
As countries differ in their fi nancial contracting environments, so 
too the extent and pattern of fi rm fi nancing tend to differ. Most impor-
tant, these background conditions affect the extent to which fi rms as a 
whole face fi nancing constraints in different countries (and even within 
countries across different states or provinces; see Laeven and Woodruff 
2007). As noted in chapter 1, access to fi nance is among the aspects of 
the business environment most frequently cited by surveyed enterprises 
in the developing world as an important obstacle to their growth.1
Moreover, investigations of the impact of fi nancing obstacles on 
fi rm growth reveal that fi rms’ complaints are valid—their growth is 
signifi cantly constrained by lack of access. One nice piece of evidence 
on this comes—somewhat ironically, given the policy recommenda-
tions of this report—from a study of a directed credit program in India. 
Banerjee and Dufl o (2004) studied detailed loan information on 253 
small and medium-size borrowers from a bank in India both before and 
after they became newly eligible for the program. Specifi cally, the size 
defi nition of the program was changed in 1998, which enabled a new 
group of medium-size fi rms to obtain loans at subsidized interest rates. 
Naturally these fi rms began to borrow under this favored program, but 
instead of simply substituting subsidized credit for more costly fi nanc-
ing, they expanded their sales proportionally to the additional loan 
resources, which suggests that these fi rms must have previously been 
credit constrained.
Moreover, as shown in fi gure 2.1, the new benefi ciaries experienced 
signifi cantly higher costs and profi ts, while there was no signifi cant 
effect for other fi rms.2 The reader should not, of course, jump to the 
conclusion that directed credit is the best—or even a good—solution 
to the existence of credit constraints. As discussed in chapter 4, not 
all such programs even reach their intended target groups or result in 
increased output for the eligible fi rms, let alone their impact on the rest 
of the economy. 
More extensive cross-country evidence comes from the responses of 
some 10,000 fi rms in 80 countries to the World Business Environment 
Barriers to fi nance are a 
constraint to fi rm growth— 
—indeed, the major constraint 
to fi rm growth, according to 
surveys of managers 
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Survey of 1999–2000. It turns out that respondents who identify fi nance 
as a constraint are more likely to experience slow output growth (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005).3 Among the three constraints 
these authors focus on—corruption, legal, and fi nance—fi nancing 
constraints lead to the greatest reduction in fi rm growth (fi gure 2.2). 
While other business environment obstacles are also important, they are 
Figure 2.1 Response of benefi ciaries under a credit scheme 
Source: Based on Banerjee and Dufl o (2004).
Note: This fi gure shows estimated logarithmic increase in sales, costs, and profi ts for ben-
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Figure 2.2 Impact of self-reported obstacles on growth of fi rm sales
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005).
Note: The fi gure shows the estimated reduction in the rate of fi rm sales growth for a fi rm 
reporting the given obstacle (calculated at the average value of the obstacle).
–0.1 –0.08 –0.06 –0.04





FFA_055-098_ch02.indd   59 10/26/07   6:17:09 AM
F I N A N C E  F O R  A L L ?  P O L I C I E S  A N D  P I T F A L L S  I N  E X P A N D I N G  A C C E S S
60
often related to fi nance, and even when these interactions are controlled 
for as well as they can be in a cross-section, access to fi nance seems to 
emerge consistently as one of the most important and robust underly-
ing factors that constrain fi rm growth (Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic 2006a). 
Both cross-country and case-study evidence thus points to the exis-
tence of fi nancing constraints and shows how access to and use of credit 
can alleviate these constraints. 
The Channels of Impact: Micro and Macro Evidence
The next issue is to identify the channels through which easier access to 
external fi nance increases fi rm growth and ultimately economic growth. 
There are numerous potential channels, and recent research shows that 
fi nance is associated with all of them. 
• The availability of external fi nance is positively associated with 
the number of start-ups—an important indicator of entrepre-
neurship—as well as with fi rm dynamism and innovation. 
• Finance is also needed if existing fi rms are to be able to exploit 
growth and investment opportunities and to achieve a larger 
equilibrium size. 
• Firms can safely acquire a more effi cient productive asset port-
folio where the infrastructures of fi nance are in place,4 and they 
are also able to choose more effi cient organizational forms such 
as incorporation.
To get a fl avor of the nature of the empirical evidence researchers use 
in detecting these effects, look, for example, at the evidence on start-
ups and their subsequent growth. Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2006) 
extracted data on more than 3 million fi rms from the Amadeus database 
(which assembles information mainly from national company registries 
in advanced and transition economies in Europe). From inspection of 
the reported age of each company, Klapper and her colleagues were able 
to compute the entry rate for each of eleven two-digit sector groups and 
thus assess the effect of entry and other regulations on the degree of 
new fi rm entry and fi rm growth. Figure 2.3 shows striking differences, 
even between two developed economies such as Italy and the United 
Kingdom, in such dimensions as the rate of fi rm entry (higher in the 
Better access to fi nance 
can promote new fi rm 
entry and growth 
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United Kingdom), initial fi rm size at start-up (higher in Italy), and more 
rapid growth (higher in the United Kingdom). 
The econometrics shows that such differences are in part related to 
fi rm registration costs (more than six times as high in Italy as in the 
United Kingdom), as well as to easier access to external fi nance in the 
United Kingdom. The authors also dig deeper and test the conjecture 
that, within countries, entry regulations would have the greatest effect 
in industries that—in a lightly regulated economy like that of the United 
States—would be most likely to have a high entry rate. Indeed, this 
proves to be so, providing a more convincing case for the importance 
of avoiding unnecessarily burdensome regulation. But not all types of 
regulations hinder: it turns out that the kinds of regulation needed for 
well-functioning fi nance (such as accounting standards and property 
rights) have a positive effect on entry.5 
The wealth of information generated on a cross-country basis by the 
Investment Climate Surveys can be used to examine the role of fi nance in 
infl uencing a range of enterprise characteristics. For example, Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2007a) exploited the responses 
of some 17,000 fi rms in 47 countries to the questions on enterprise 
innovation.6 Taking an average of each fi rm’s responses to the innova-
tion-related questions, these authors assembled a range of country- and 
fi rm-level variables likely to be associated with fi rm innovation, including 
Figure 2.3 Italy vs. U.K.: fi rm size at entry and over time 
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ECONOMETRIC STUDIES PURPORTING TO EXPLAIN 
cross-country differences in economic growth rates 
and other country characteristics have proliferated 
in recent years. Not all of these studies have been 
equally convincing. Numerous published papers did 
not take adequate account of the formidable prob-
lems of making valid inferences from such data. The 
most widespread problems include heterogeneity of 
effects across countries, measurement errors, omis-
sion of relevant explanatory variables, and endoge-
neity, all of which tend to bias the estimated effect 
of the included variables. These problems are not 
limited to cross-country regressions, but they seem 
especially prominent in this area. Of these, endo-
geneity is the most intractable. It arises when the 
common effect of an omitted factor or disturbance 
on two variables is misinterpreted as a causal link 
between them. Econometric theory offers a number 
of possible solutions, but most of them call (in one 
way or another) for what are known as instrumental 
variables. These are not always available or credible, 
given that their validity and effectiveness depends on 
the instrument being correlated with the explanatory 
variables, but (crucially) not otherwise correlated 
with the dependent variable. The second criterion 
for validity—the so-called exclusion restriction—is 
diffi cult to verify. 
The cross-country studies cited in this report 
have all made plausible efforts to deal with these 
problems, sometimes by painstaking collection of 
data on ingeniously chosen instrumental variables; 
indeed, the literature has relied heavily on just a 
handful of such instruments (compare Pande and 
Udry 2006). Since they cannot logically have satis-
fi ed the exclusion restrictions required to ensure their 
validity for all of the applications, in at least some 
applications they must have been invalid. 
Sometimes, a more direct approach can be taken 
using micro data and making use of sectoral or fi rm-
level differences. For example, instead of just looking 
at country aggregates, it may be plausible to assume 
that the effect being measured, if present at all, is 
stronger in some sectors, or for some types of fi rms, 
than others; in other words, some sectors or fi rms are 
more susceptible to the causal factor being examined 
(for example, fi nancial sector development). Even 
if the causal factor varies only across countries, its 
impact can then be more precisely measured if data 
is available at the fi rm or sector level.a 
The additional information obtained by working 
with cross-country fi rm- or sector-level data may 
not be as great as at fi rst appears, however; the dif-
ferent fi rms in any given country are likely affected 
by common disturbances, which, if neglected, can 
result in overestimating the precision of coeffi cient 
estimates. Dropping the cross-country dimension 
often allows researchers to take explicit account of 
special circumstances and to exploit more detailed 
data, such as data across different states or regions of 
a country. The quality of the data is more likely to 
be uniform for observations within a single country. 
But omitting cross-country variation comes at the 
cost of narrowing the range of variation in the phe-
nomena being studied—indeed, some causal factors 
of interest may not vary at all within a country. All in 
all, it is through an accumulation of evidence using 
different methodologies that the complete picture 
can be progressively fi lled in.
Box 2.1 Are cross-country regression results credible?
a. Several of the papers discussed in this chapter employ this assumption, using the product of the causal variable and the supposed 
sectoral or fi rm-level susceptibility as the explanatory variable. This approach was fi rst applied in the fi nancial access literature by 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Using fi rm-level data from 8,500 large companies in 
30 countries, the former used a fi nancial planning model to calculate how fast those fi rms could be expected to grow if they had no 
access to external fi nance. The extent to which fi rms were able to grow faster than this internally fi nanced growth rate represented 
the fi rm’s growth susceptibility to good fi nance. In countries with greater fi nancial depth, stock market development, and legal 
enforcement, a higher proportion of fi rms were able to grow at rates that are possible only with access to external fi nance. Rajan 
and Zingales worked with data on 36 sectors in 41 countries and assumed that each sector’s susceptibility to fi nancial development 
would be correlated across countries with the degree to which large fi rms in the same sector in the United States relied on external 
fi nancing. This statistical technique is also referred to as a form of “difference-in-differences” estimation.
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information about the structure of each fi rm’s fi nancing. Despite the 
inclusion of the other control variables and even after controlling for 
reverse causality by using instrumental variable techniques, they found 
that fi rms’ use of external fi nance was associated with more innovation. 
This fi nding was even more strongly evident when access to fi nance was 
from foreign banks.
The results of this fi rm-level, cross-country evidence are pretty 
unambiguous. Access to and use of fi nance, and the institutional 
underpinnings that are associated with better fi nancial access, favorably 
affect fi rm performance along a number of different channels. If entry, 
growth, innovation, equilibrium size, and risk reduction are all helped 
by access to and use of fi nance, it is almost inescapable that aggregate 
economic performance will also be improved by having stronger fi nan-
cial systems. 
Indeed, this result is likely a glimpse of the main underlying mecha-
nism behind the now relatively long-established fi nding that a signifi cant 
fraction of the differences across countries in economic growth in the 
latter half of the 20th century can be explained by variations in their 
level of fi nancial development (Levine 2005; World Bank 2001). The 
fi nance and growth literature typically measures fi nancial development 
by the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP, an inevitably 
crude measure that captures only two aspects of fi nancial development, 
namely, the ability of banks to mobilize resources, and the degree to 
which they channel these resources to the private sector. Indeed, research-
ers’ extensive use of this banking-depth variable to summarize fi nancial 
development occurs primarily because—unlike other measures—it is 
available for many countries over a long period of time. Among the 
dimensions not explicitly captured by this measure are the ability and 
success of banks in making good credit appraisal and monitoring deci-
sions and in maintaining operational effi ciency; the measure also does 
not capture the operation of nonbank aspects of the fi nancial sector, 
including the market for equities. Given the imperfections of this mea-
sure, it is all the more striking that such a strong statistical cross-country 
correlation between fi nancial development and growth was detected 
and proved robust to the application of instrumental variables to take 
account of endogeneity. Indeed, when the adjustment for endogeneity 
is made, it increases the estimated impact of fi nance on growth, which 
underscores that credit depth is only a proxy for the true degree of 
fi nancial development.7 
Broader access to fi nance 
also promotes growth at the 
aggregate level
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Overall banking depth (not just private credit) is also correlated 
across countries with overall economic growth, but less robustly: it does 
seem that restricting attention to private credit, as opposed to all bank 
intermediation, is correct. Look, for example, at China (a country that 
is excluded from most econometric studies, not least because of the dif-
fi culty of reliably measuring private credit, due to the ambiguity of fi rm 
ownership in the process of China’s transition from the planned economy 
system). Interprovincial differences in growth rates in China are highly 
correlated with banking depth—but negatively (Boyreau-Debray 2003; 
Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2005). Mobilizing huge amounts of funds to 
pour into the declining parts of the Chinese state enterprise system, as 
the main Chinese banks were doing during the last decades of the 20th 
century, does not appear, on this evidence, an effective way of employ-
ing the fi nancial system in the interests of economic growth. China 
has continued to grow rapidly, as more workers shift from subsistence 
agriculture and other low-productivity activities into the modern sector. 
But the Chinese banking system, despite being one of the deepest in the 
world, has not been a major contributor to this growth (fi gure 2.4).8 
The fi nance and growth link is thus better seen as one that operates by 
enabling privately owned fi rms to reach their potential.9 Likewise, the 
aggregate evidence on long-term growth shows that fi nance has its infl u-
ence through productivity gains rather than simply through an increase 
in the volume of investment (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Love 
2003); fi nance also plays an important role in reallocating investments 
across sectors as demand shifts (Wurgler 2000).10 
Banking systems can grow too quickly—with the boom inevitably 
followed by a bust—and in some countries the huge size of the bank-
ing system refl ects policy distortions that are inhibiting the emergence 
and growth of complementary segments of fi nance. Perhaps therefore 
it is not so surprising that the econometric link between banking depth 
and aggregate economic growth has weakened in recent years, in par-
ticular when the data set includes the 1997–98 East Asia fi nancial crisis 
(Rousseau and Wachtel 2005). 
There also seems to be a threshold effect at the other end of the scale: 
below a certain level of fi nancial development, small differences do not 
seem to help growth.11 In these countries, fi nancial development may 
boost income but not the long-run growth rate. Indeed, Aghion, Howitt, 
and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) suggest that it is lack of access to fi nance 
that prevents entrepreneurs in poor countries with undeveloped fi nancial 
Rapid growth of the banking 
sector can be potentially 
destabilizing
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systems from catching up. Without access to fi nance at a reasonable 
cost, and lacking suffi cient personal wealth, these entrepreneurs cannot 
afford to make the needed investments in innovation. The theoretical 
access-based model of Aghion, Howitt, and Mayer-Foulkes implies that 
low-income countries with low fi nancial development will continue to 
fall behind the rest, whereas those reaching the fi nancial development 
threshold will converge and, up to a certain point, will do so faster the 
higher the level of fi nancial development. Comparing average long-term 
economic growth rates for a cross-section of about 70 countries, they 
fi nd—consistent with their theory—that fi nancial development helps 
an economy converge faster but that there is no effect on steady-state 
growth. 
Summarizing, access to credit supports fi rm growth and ultimately 
national growth through a variety of different channels. Providing 
access to credit to the most effi cient and innovative enterprises is behind 
the well-documented causal relationship between fi nancial depth and 
national growth. But who benefi ts the most from fi nancial deepening 
Figure 2.4 Finance and growth across Chinese provinces
Source: Boyreau-Debray (2003).







40 60 80 100 120
State-owned bank credit/provincial GDP (percent)





















FFA_055-098_ch02.indd   65 10/26/07   6:17:13 AM
F I N A N C E  F O R  A L L ?  P O L I C I E S  A N D  P I T F A L L S  I N  E X P A N D I N G  A C C E S S
66
and better access? What impact does fi nancial deepening and broadening 
have on the economy’s structure? We turn to these questions next.
Transforming the Economy: Differences in Impact
Finance does not just raise aggregate fi rm performance uniformly; it 
also transforms the structure of the economy by affecting different 
types of fi rms in different ways. As already discussed, some categories 
of fi rms—the small and the new, for example—have more diffi culty 
obtaining external fi nance than others. But as fi nancial access condi-
tions improve in an economy, those that were formerly shut out have an 
TWO ASSUMPTIONS, EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT, IN 
much of the literature on fi nancial access are that 
availability of external fi nance and greater formality 
in fi nance are both improvements over internal and 
informal fi nance.
The idea that availability of external fi nance rep-
resents an improvement comes from two rather dif-
ferent perspectives. First is the idea that a latent pool 
of enterprise and innovation exists in an economy 
that, absent external fi nance, can be made effective 
only if the entrepreneurs happen to begin with suf-
fi cient wealth either themselves or through associates 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). Second (and in a sense 
the opposite problem) is the question of agency: a 
fi rm that generates too much free cash may fi nd its 
insiders making poor investments and relaxing cost 
control efforts (Jensen 1988; Stulz 1990). If that 
happens in enough fi rms in a rapidly growing and 
profi table enterprise sector, excess free cash could 
actually weaken the growth process compared with 
a situation where the enterprise sector has to rely 
more on external fi nance provided by an effi cient 
and competitive fi nancial system. The contemporary 
case of profi table state-owned companies in China 
provides an interesting case for this last point, as 
discussed by Kuijs (2005).
The argument that informal fi nancial systems 
may substitute for formal fi nancial systems has been 
canvassed for the case of China by Allen, Qian, and 
Qian (2005, 2008). But their story takes as given 
obstacles to formal fi nancial development such as 
restrictions on entry and pervasive state owner-
ship of banks. Even if informal fi nance works in 
such conditions, it is just a second-best solution. 
Besides, informal sources of fi nance vary widely in 
their effectiveness. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2007b) provide evidence from China 
that, on average for the fi rms in their sample, access 
to formal fi nance was associated with faster fi rm 
growth. More generally, informality and relation-
ship lending survive where the institutions needed 
to support modern technologies of credit appraisal 
and monitoring are not present. 
Box 2.2 External vs. internal and formal vs. informal fi nance 
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opportunity to expand. In this way, fi nancial sector development has 
consequences for the composition and performance of the enterprise 
sector in terms both of size and of ownership. 
The size distribution of fi rms can be affected by the availability of 
external fi nance: fi nancial development aids entry of small fi rms much 
more than that of large ones, but small fi rms usually struggle more to get 
fi nance when the environment is weak.12 The size and success of sectors in 
which small fi rms have a natural advantage, or those in which fi rms gen-
erally rely more on external fi nance (including export-oriented fi rms),13 
are also particularly dependent on fi nancial sector development. 
Not only do small fi rms report higher fi nancing obstacles than do 
large fi rms; they are also more severely affected when they encounter 
these obstacles. Survey fi ndings suggest that fi nancing obstacles loom 
much more for small fi rms than for large fi rms (fi gure 2.5). Specifi cally, 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) fi nd that fi nancing 
constraints reduce fi rm growth by 6 percentage points, on average, for 
large fi rms but by 10 percentage fi rms in the case of small fi rms. This 
difference between small and large fi rms is as big or even bigger for 
some of the specifi c fi nancing obstacles reported in the World Business 
Environment Survey, such as collateral requirements, bank paperwork, 
Lowering fi nancial barriers 
is especially benefi cial 
for small fi rms—
Figure 2.5 The effect of fi nancing constraints on growth: 
small vs. large fi rms
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005).
Note: This graph shows the effect of different fi nancing obstacles on fi rm growth for small 
and large fi rms, measured at the average constraint for the two size groups. 
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interest rate payments, the need for special connections, and banks’ lack 
of lending resources. In addition, the lack of access to specifi c forms 
of fi nancing such as export, leasing, and long-term fi nance is signifi -
cantly more constraining for small fi rms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic 2005).
To the extent that small fi rms embody much of an economy’s latent 
dynamism, a weaker fi nancial system, by constraining such fi rms, may 
condemn a country to a much slower growth path. More generally, the 
economy as a whole may lose out on the potential for wealth creation 
in sectors that might give the economy a comparative advantage were 
it not for the sector’s diffi culty in accessing needed fi nancial services.14 
With a narrower range of healthy sectors, the economy’s resilience to 
sector-specifi c shocks is also likely to be weakened.
While lack of fi nancial access tends to hurt small fi rms the most in 
countries with underlying weaknesses in their institutional environment, 
empirical evidence also suggests that small fi rms benefi t disproportion-
ately—in terms of seeing their constraints relaxed—as fi nancial systems 
develop (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2005; Beck and others 
2005). Hence it is those who were previously constrained—not those 
who were already getting fi nance—that benefi t most from fi nancial 
development. This effect also shows up when studying episodes of 
fi nancial liberalization. Laeven (2003) shows that small fi rms’ fi nancing 
constraints decrease following fi nancial liberalization (including inter-
est rate liberalization, elimination of credit controls, privatization, and 
foreign bank entry), while large fi rms’ fi nancing constraints actually 
increase (perhaps refl ecting the loss of preferential access to fi nance by 
large and politically well-connected fi rms).
Perhaps even more important, ownership patterns depend on fi nancial 
sector development, both because fi rm entrepreneurs choose ownership 
structures in large part to ensure adequate fi nancing, and because fi nance 
tends to go to fi rms with conducive ownership structures—the selection 
effect. Specifi cally, background conditions in the fi nancial sector infl u-
ence the degree to which the producing fi rms choose to incorporate or 
remain controlled by a closed group of family members. 
For example, Demirgüç-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic (2006) use 
survey data from 52 developed and developing countries to investigate 
the drivers of the decision to incorporate and the gains for the enterprise 
from incorporation They fi nd that fi rms are more likely to incorporate 
—which in turn can widen 
an economy’s sectoral 
range and dynamism
Financial development 
infl uences ownership patterns
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in countries with better-developed fi nancial and legal systems, strong 
creditor and shareholder rights, and effective bankruptcy processes. 
While incorporated fi rms do not necessarily report lower fi nancial 
barriers to their operation and growth in an average country, fi nancial 
and institutional development does seem to lower obstacles more for 
incorporated than unincorporated fi rms. Similarly, incorporated fi rms 
grow faster than unincorporated fi rms only in countries with higher 
levels of institutional development. These results suggest that the 
costs and benefi ts of the legal form of enterprises is endogenous to a 
country’s institutions: incorporated fi rms have a comparative advantage 
in countries with institutions that support formal contracting, while 
unincorporated fi rms are more adapted to operate in countries with 
less-developed formal institutions where fi rms have to rely on informal 
institutions and reputation. 
The institutional environment can also affect other dimensions of 
ownership. Family fi rms, even large ones, are still remarkably common, 
as are interrelated multifi rm business groups. Ownership concentration 
is prevalent in countries with weak minority shareholder rights, suggest-
ing that the inability to share control and profi ts with nonmanagement 
shareholders might very well result in limiting the opportunities for 
raising external equity (La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999). The 
prevalence of interrelated business groups in many developing countries 
is similarly attributed to the lack of functioning fi nancial markets, forc-
ing fi rms to look for alternatives in the form of internal capital markets 
of large business groups. 
Financial development and easier access to external fi nance thus allows 
incorporated, self-standing, and independent enterprises with widely 
spread ownership to fl ourish. This has a range of broader implications 
for the identity and concentration of ownership in the economy at large. 
For one thing, a developed fi nancial sector also tends to be associated 
with a greater degree of competition in the nonfi nancial enterprise sector. 
More broadly, ownership structures in the enterprise sector can infl uence 
political economy performance (Rajan and Zingales 2003). 
Summarizing, fi nancial development that improves access to external 
fi nance by fi rms has a deep impact on the sectoral and industrial structure 
of an economy. What institutions and markets matter most for broader 
access to external fi nance, particularly for small fi rms? We address this 
question in the next section. 
Increased shareholder 
rights can broaden the 
ownership base
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What Aspects of Financial Sector Development 
Matter for Access?
We now examine different sources of access to fi nance. This section looks 
fi rst at the old “banks versus markets” debate, before turning to a more 
detailed look at the role of banks (especially foreign banks), nonbank 
debt markets, and equities. Other dimensions of fi nance, such as cash 
management, payments, and insurance, are not specifi cally discussed, 
refl ecting the state of the literature. In particular, the role of domestic 
and foreign fi nancial intermediaries (including insurance fi rms) in help-
ing to manage risk for fi rms in developing countries is an area deserving 
much more formal econometric research to add to a sizable practitioner 
literature.
The main message of these subsections can be briefl y summarized. 
On the debate between banks and markets, the suggestion that one type 
of system is clearly better than the other no longer has much support 
in the literature, whether for access or for fi nancial sector development. 
Instead, creating the infrastructures that let both markets and institu-
tions reach their optimal level is likely to be the best policy.
Making credit from banks and other intermediaries that provide debt 
fi nance more widely accessible calls for two complementary approaches. 
On the one hand, the modern trend to transactional lending, whether 
based on assets or on automated credit appraisal such as credit registries, 
for example, is clearly the way of the future. On the other hand, neglect 
of relationship lending can mean that large parts of the market are 
underserved where infrastructures are weak and economic activity more 
informal. The role of foreign banks in improving access has always been 
controversial, partly for political reasons. We look in some detail at the 
evidence here, and conclude on balance that opening to foreign banks 
is likely over time to improve access for small and medium enterprises, 
even if the foreign banks confi ne their own lending primarily to large 
fi rms and governments.
The corporate bond market and organized securities markets are 
chiefl y of relevance to larger fi rms, though by broadening the range of 
fi rms that have access to long-term funding, they do make a contribution 
to access. Indeed, the spillover effects of greater access for large fi rms may 
be signifi cant for smaller fi rms because they often rely on trade credit, 
another area that deserves more research. Opening up the equity market 
to foreign investors improves access for the larger fi rms. The market for 
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private equity (including through inward foreign direct investment) can 
also reach medium-size fi rms, and its development depends on adequate 
shareholder protections and accounting and other information. 
Banks versus Markets
As mentioned, much of the early econometric evidence on cross-coun-
try differences used broad measures of fi nancial development such as 
banking depth. That was largely a matter of convenient availability of 
data, and it certainly does not imply that nonbank fi nance is of lesser 
concern. Even a deep banking sector can hinder access if it lacks compe-
tition, mainly serves incumbents at high cost (something that has often 
been observed with state-owned banking systems), or operates without 
regard to prudential standards. In contrast, a liquid securities market can 
contribute an additional valuable dimension to fi nancial access (albeit 
mainly for larger fi rms). 
Following a vigorous debate about the relative merits of bank-domi-
nated systems and those oriented to the securities market, the proponents 
of each seem to have fought themselves to a standstill. There are good 
reasons for thinking that each has its sphere of comparative advantage 
(Allen and Gale 2000). For instance, banks can be effective in fi nanc-
ing ventures and fi rms active in sectors where there is little dispute over 
the sector’s prospects and where fi rms can be relied upon to pay back 
loans provided they maintain cost control and productive effi ciency. 
Even though just a few banks may control most of the loanable funds, 
that need not result in exclusion of creditworthy borrowers. In contrast, 
where an entrepreneur seeks external fi nancing for a venture about whose 
prospects there is considerable disagreement, the securities markets can 
help: even if majority opinion is against the scheme, the entrepreneur 
can fi nd fi nancing if a suffi ciently well-fi nanced minority of investors 
likes the project. 
But when it comes to aggregate economic growth, the research 
evidence shows that it does not matter for long-term economic growth 
whether a fi nancial system is primarily bank-based or market-based. 
What does matter is the level of overall fi nancial development of banks 
and markets (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001; Levine 2002). 
The same is true at the sectoral level: there seems to be no tendency 
for sectors especially reliant on external fi nance to grow more (or less) 
quickly in a bank-dominated system than in a market-based system 
Both banks and markets 
have a role to play—
—although markets may 
be better at providing 
long-term fi nance
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(Beck and Levine 2002). The growth in the number of fi rms in the sec-
tor, or in the average size of fi rms, is likewise insensitive to the relative 
size of the banking and securities sectors.15 There is a hint, however, in 
the results obtained by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002), that 
fi rms’ ability to obtain fi nancing may be affected in different ways by 
the two systems, especially at lower levels of fi nancial development.16 
While development of both banks and markets improves access to exter-
nal fi nance, a relatively larger securities market may be associated with 
relatively better access of fi rms to long-term fi nancing, with banking 
development more associated with availability of short-term fi nancing. 
Hence differences in the contracting environments and their impact 
on relative development of banks versus markets may have important 
implications for which fi rms and projects have access to fi nance, despite 
our inability to observe an impact on growth using aggregate data. More 
recent analysis helps shed light on some of the underlying aspects of 
fi nancial sector development in broadening access.17 
Access to Debt Finance
Debt fi nance is typically the major source of external funding for fi rms 
of all sizes, no matter how small.18 Diverse lending technologies are 
employed for reaching different types of client in contrasting environ-
ments, especially where clients do not have conventional collateral or 
where collection of collateral is not secure.19 Conventional practice 
distinguishes between transactions lending, based primarily on “hard” 
quantitative data (such as a credible set of borrower fi nancial accounts) 
or secured on assets, and relationship lending, based signifi cantly on 
“soft” qualitative information. In practice, however, the menu is much 
broader (as Berger and Udell 2006 emphasize). 
Because of the time and effort involved in understanding the bor-
rower’s business and fi nancial needs, relationship lending is costly for 
the lender and therefore requires either high spreads or large volumes 
to be viable. If the customer’s creditworthiness is hard to evaluate, then 
there may be no alternative to relationship lending. In a broad sense, 
relationship lending is at the core of the banking business, continu-
ing to give banks a comparative advantage over markets and nonbank 
fi nancial institutions, even in developed countries (Boot and Schmeits 
2005). Indeed, limited access to credit in some diffi cult environments 
may be attributable to the reluctance of existing intermediaries to engage 
Debt fi nance is the major 
source of external funding 
for fi rms of all sizes
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in relationship lending on a small scale (Honohan and Beck 2007).20 
For lenders willing to put in the effort, however, relationship lending 
can be profi table. 
Credit networks that employ and sustain a form of social capital 
through relationship lending have long been observed in different parts 
of the world. These networks are often characterized by a common 
ethnicity of the participants, although ethnic group membership does 
not automatically convey membership in the credit network.21 Biggs 
and Shah (2006) describe credit networks observed in the responses to 
enterprise surveys in a sample of African countries in the 1990s.22 They 
show that a common ethnicity greatly increases the likelihood of a trade 
credit relationship between any two fi rms, and that a lengthy specifi c 
relationship history between the two fi rms involved in the credit transac-
tion is not required: network membership itself seems to be suffi cient. 
Credit between fi rms from different networks is much less likely and 
does require a lengthy trading relationship. As a result, fi rms that are not 
in the dominant networks are effectively shut out of credit, resulting in 
ethnically biased fi nancial access. For example, enterprises that form part 
of a network of European-owned or Asian-owned fi rms enter at a larger 
size, show higher productivity, and grow faster compared with other 
African enterprises.23 To overcome the de facto exclusion of the latter 
from these networks based on relationship lending, it would be desir-
able to build the infrastructures that allow a move towards the greater 
formality and anonymity of modern transaction-based lending. 
Corruption in India and the strong pro-state orientation of formal 
fi nance in China mean that relationship lending has had to assume an 
important role in supporting the recent fast growth of fi rms in those 
countries, as documented by Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005, 2008) and 
by Allen and others (2006). For the fi rms that responded to their sur-
vey in India, informal governance mechanisms, such as those based on 
reputation, trust, and relationships, are more important than formal 
mechanisms, such as courts, in resolving disputes, overcoming corrup-
tion, and supporting growth. Apparently, the pervasiveness of petty 
corruption more than offsets the advantages of inheriting the common 
law legal origin in India, inhibiting the growth of transactional lending. 
Despite the need to rely on relationship lending, however, the Indian 
economy has managed to grow at a rapid rate, showing the potential for 
these mechanisms to substitute at least partially for more formal fi nance 
in a very poor country. Likewise in China, the fast growth of private 
Informal relationship lending 
discriminates against fi rms 
outside the credit networks—
—though informal fi nance has 
fi lled some of the gaps left by 
constrained formal systems
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fi rms in some coastal provinces seems to depend a lot on relationship 
lending (facilitated by Confucian ethics), including from unlicensed 
private fi nancial intermediaries, as well as on relationships built on social 
capital and shared interests with local government offi cials. (See box 2.2, 
however, for a somewhat different perspective).
But even where standard types of transactional lending based on 
transparent fi nancial accounts are not available, other forms of transac-
tion lending may be possible, as Berger and Udell (2006) stress. Provided 
the relevant laws are in place, asset-based lending such as factoring, 
fi xed-asset lending, trade fi nance, and leasing are technologies that can 
release sizable fi nancing fl ows even for small and nontransparent fi rms 
to fi nance the relevant assets. To be sure, factoring does require a degree 
of creditworthiness but not necessarily of the “borrower,” but rather its 
customers. That may often be the case, as where a major exporter buys 
on credit from smaller suppliers. As a result, factoring is found to be more 
prevalent where credit information is good, though it does not seem to 
require a high degree of property rights protection (Klapper 2006). 
It is striking that some of these techniques have not been more widely 
used in developing countries. Leasing, for example, constitutes only a few 
percentage points of fi xed investment in the typical developing country, 
while it reaches up to 20 percent in many developed countries. Similarly, 
factoring in the United Kingdom reaches 7 percent of GDP, whereas 
it constitutes less than 1 percent of GDP in most developing countries 
(Klapper 2006). The limited role of leasing and other nonstandard debt 
fi nancing is also illustrated by the fi nancing patterns reported in chap-
ter 1 and potentially refl ects the shortcomings of the underlying legal, 
informational, and institutional environment, as is discussed later. 
Credit registries are important tools for the expansion of transac-
tions-based lending technologies (Miller 2003; Love and Mylenko 
2003; Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano 2006; Powell and others 2004). 
Credit registries ease for the lender the routine task of verifying aspects 
of the repayment record (and sometimes the outstanding indebtedness) 
of the applicant borrower and increase the cost of delinquency, thereby 
reducing moral hazard. They also help build a database that the lender 
can use to generate credit scores predicting repayment on the basis of 
borrower characteristics. This technology is quite mature in the United 
States, where, as shown by Berger, Frame, and Miller (2005), the use of 
credit-scoring technology for small business loans has led to an expan-
sion in the availability of loans to small and riskier fi rms, even by larger 
Other forms of lending can 
provide fi nancial access
Credit registries and credit 
scoring can expand access 
for small fi rms—
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banks that would hitherto have shied away from this segment. The use 
of credit scoring for small business lending, often based on data col-
lected for credit registry purposes, is growing in developing countries 
as well (De la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler 2007), although 
it has yet to reach many countries: this is banking at what is currently 
a very active frontier.
The more information is stored in the credit registry, the more useful 
it is in selecting out the risky borrowers without reducing overall access to 
credit. For instance, Powell and others (2004) use the actual data in the 
public Argentine credit registry to show that availability of systemwide reg-
istry information can substantially improve the precision of credit decisions 
even for a large bank (fi gure 2.6). In addition, they show that availability of 
positive information (for example, history of borrowings, not just defaults) 
could enable a lender to lower the default rate from 3.8 percent to 2.9 percent 
while still lending to 60 percent of the sample borrowers. 
It is not just the lenders who benefi t from better credit information 
sharing. Using fi rm-level survey data across 24 transition economies, 
Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2006) fi nd a positive association between 
the quality of the credit registry and the ease of external fi nancing (fi gure 
2.7). This relationship was confi rmed using panel data over time for a 
limited set of countries. 
—by helping to identify 
risky loans
Figure 2.6 Credit information sharing and loan losses
Source: Based on an experiment using actual data in the Argentine credit registry, as processed 
by Powell and others (2004).
Note: Default rate is computed for banks that are targeting a 60 percent acceptance rate of 
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While public credit registries may have some potential advantages, 
such as the power to compel lenders to share positive information, the 
experience has been that most public registries do not make as much 
of the information at their disposal as they might. Increasingly public 
credit registries are being complemented, where they exist, by private 
credit bureaus. 
With more countries considering the move to Basel II, which can 
make use of private credit rating agencies, the credit information industry 
is likely to see considerable expansion in the years ahead.24 And the more 
sophisticated the statistical analyses of loan loss probabilities, the more 
small borrowers can benefi t through cheaper access to bank loans. For 
instance, using data from the Chilean public credit registry, Adasme, 
Majnoni, and Uribe (2006) have shown that the distribution of loan 
losses from small loans (equivalent to less than $20,000) is much less 
skewed than that for large loans (fi gure 2.8).25 
The implication is that, while banks making small loans do have to 
set aside larger provisions against the higher expected losses from small 
loans—and therefore they need to charge higher rates of interest to cover 
Figure 2.7 Credit information sharing and fi rms’ fi nancing constraints
Source: Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2006). 
Note: This fi gure plots the quality of credit information sharing against the across 24 transi-
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these provisions—they need relatively less capital to cover the upper tail 
of the distribution, that is, to support the risk that losses will exceed 
their expected value (such losses are sometimes known as “unexpected” 
loan losses). It is important that in making regulatory arrangements, 
such as those of Basel II, policy makers do not neglect such fi ndings and 
unnecessarily penalize small borrowers. 
The Role of Foreign Banks
The growing market share of foreign-owned banks in developing and 
transition economies has resulted from a number of forces, including the 
privatization of long-established state-owned banks (in response to their 
disappointing fi nancial and economic performance) and the aftermath 
of banking crises, when distressed banks were put up for sale, often after 
being fi nancially restructured at the expense of the host country govern-
ment. Foreign banks were often the successful acquirers, transforming 
the ownership structure, especially in many parts of Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and Africa. Foreign banks have also entered de novo, 
although typically remaining relatively small in that case. In addition 
Figure 2.8 Credit loss distribution for portfolios of large and small loans
Source: Adasme, Majnoni, and Uribe (2006).
Note: This fi gure shows the loan loss distribution for portfolios of large and small loans based on data from 
Chile. Although the probability of loss on small loans is higher, the median percent loss on large loans is much 






0.016 0.025 0.034 0.043 0.053 0.0800.0710.062
% likelihood of loss
Median % loss on loan
Large loans
Small loans
FFA_055-098_ch02.indd   77 10/26/07   6:17:19 AM
F I N A N C E  F O R  A L L ?  P O L I C I E S  A N D  P I T F A L L S  I N  E X P A N D I N G  A C C E S S
78
to the big international banks, foreign entry has come from regionally 
specialized banks or those from a neighboring country often exploiting 
close business or cultural ties (Claessens and van Horen 2007).
Foreign owners bring capital, technology, know-how, and a degree of 
independence from the local business elite. It has been suggested that they 
can help stabilize the banking system and the macroeconomy, and they 
have tended to be more effi cient and profi table than incumbent banks 
in developing countries. But have they improved access? This is a highly 
contested issue. Most foreign banks are relatively large (at least in their 
global operations) and may struggle to understand aspects of the local 
business culture. It is a commonplace observation in advanced countries 
that large banks have a comparative advantage in transactions banking 
based on “hard” information, whereas the comparative advantage for 
relationship lending to small or otherwise opaque fi rms lies with small, 
thus local, banks. The progressive extension of credit information will 
tend to erode these differences over time, but there is no doubt that the 
credit environment in developing countries tends to be considerably 
more opaque than in advanced economies. Could it therefore be that in 
countries relying heavily on foreign banks, the SME sector will experi-
ence more limited access to credit? Indeed, many foreign banks do not 
concentrate on SME lending but stick mainly to the banking needs of 
larger fi rms and high-net-worth individuals.26 Foreign banks are more 
effi cient and can undercut the local banks in their targeted segments. 
But that does not imply that foreign entry will result in lower system-
wide availability of credit for SMEs. Instead, the increased competition 
for large customers can drive other banks to focus more on providing 
profi table services to segments they had formerly neglected.27
Ultimately this is an empirical issue, and one on which much recent 
evidence from developing countries has accumulated, although with 
somewhat contrasting results across different regions. Overall, foreign 
bank entry has been a welcome improvement for larger fi rms, and this 
improved credit access has in many countries extended to smaller fi rms. 
Nevertheless there are also some indications that the arrival of foreign 
banks has not always been good for small fi rm access to credit, at least 
at fi rst.28
The evidence on the impact of foreign banks comes from a myriad 
of different types of analysis on different types of data sources; some 
international, some (more fi ne-grained) at the national or subnational 
level.
A growing market share 
for foreign-owned banks 
excites controversy
The evidence suggest foreign 
banks benefi t fi rms of all 
sizes—
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The benchmark research fi nding on the relation between fi nancial 
access and foreign bank presence comes from a reanalysis of the responses 
to access questions in the WBES surveys. In a very direct approach that 
yielded striking results, Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2006) found 
that respondent fi rms were less likely to rate high interest rates and access 
to long-term loans as major obstacles in countries with sizable foreign 
bank shares. The effect was stronger for larger fi rms but was present 
even for small fi rms (fi gure 2.9).29 
Figure 2.9 Foreign bank participation and fi nancing obstacles
Source: Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2006), table 3.
Note: This fi gure shows the likelihood that small, medium, and large enterprises rank high 
interest rates and lack of access to long-term loans as the major obstacles in developing countries 
at the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile of foreign bank ownership, holding other fi rm and country 
characteristics constant. Small fi rms are defi ned as those with 5–50 employees, medium fi rms as 
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One contrary suggestion that a larger share of foreign bank ownership 
might not always be so good for fi nancial development or access comes 
from broad-brush aggregate cross-country data. Confi ning themselves 
to low-income countries (the poorest 60 or so) Detragiache, Gupta, and 
Tressel (2006) found that a higher share of foreign-owned banks is sig-
nifi cantly and negatively correlated with private credit growth, even after 
controlling for some other national variables. This somewhat surprising 
result does not hold for middle- and upper-income countries and may 
refl ect the more cautious approach that foreign banks take in countries 
with defi cient legal and information infrastructures.
Greater richness of evidence is obtained if bank-by-bank data for 
locally owned and foreign-owned banks is available for comparing 
behavior between the two groups and also to see whether more entry by 
foreign banks affects the behavior of local banks. Among recent stud-
ies taking this approach, Clarke and others (2005) collected data from 
bank supervisory entities in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Peru for 
the late 1990s, a period in which there was substantial foreign entry 
in that region. The data included each bank’s origin (and, if foreign, 
its mode of entry; distinguishing between de novo, by acquisition, or 
long-established), and the share of its lending portfolio going to SMEs. 
Controlling for the bank’s size, age, and fi nancial performance, they 
fi nd that, as expected, foreign banks lend less to SMEs, but that the dif-
ferential is largely associated with small banks. There is little difference 
between the share of small business lending in the portfolio of medium 
and large foreign-owned and domestic banks—with foreign banks even 
nudging ahead in Chile and Colombia.30
This bank-level evidence is partly confi rmed by fi rm-level evidence 
from transition economies, which have also seen rapid foreign bank 
entry over the past 15 years, with foreign-owned banks accounting 
for over 90 percent of total credit in several countries. Examination 
of fi rm-level data (from the Amadeus database) on medium and large 
fi rms in that region shows that the process of foreign bank entry has 
been associated with more rapid sales growth and total assets of large 
fi rms, and an increase in both fi rm entry and exit rates. Using 60,000 
fi rm-year observations covering the period 1993–2002,31 Giannetti and 
Ongena (2005) also found that these effects were stronger for fi rms in 
sectors that are more bank-susceptible (in the sense explained above). 
However, they also found that foreign bank entry was negatively asso-
ciated with the growth of the smaller fi rms in their sample. It remains 
—although the impact 
of foreign banks has not 
always been positive—
—especially for smaller fi rms 
in the short term
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to be seen to what extent this experience proves to be a transitional 
one, both in the sense of being specifi c to the rapid structural changes 
that were happening in Eastern Europe in those years—indications 
are that fi rms established from 1989 through 2003 did not benefi t 
so much from foreign bank entry—and in the sense of evolving over 
time as the foreign banks’ behavior matures. Foreign bank managers in 
Eastern Europe themselves report an evolution in their strategy toward 
a focus on smaller fi rms as the lending environment becomes both more 
competitive and more transparent. 
The arrival or expansion of foreign banks, however, can also be 
disruptive, generating extensive changes in economic behavior. A study 
in India by Gormley (2004) is highly instructive in this regard. He 
shows that the state-owned development banks reduced the volume of 
long-term lending in districts where foreign banks had entered. The 
newcomers took up only some of the slack. While they gave some fi rms 
more credit than these fi rms had before—in effect skimming the cream 
of the best clients—they did not take on all of the clients dropped by 
the state-owned development banks, regardless of profi tability. Many of 
those fi rms that thus lost access to long-term bank fi nance were able to 
make up the defi ciency, however, because they were part of an industrial 
group. Gormley was unable to detect any adverse consequences of the 
refocusing of bank lending in sales or bankruptcies.32 
Gormley notes that in the years following entry the foreign banks 
seem to have expanded the clientele to whom they would lend, but even 
though the liberalization that triggered entry started in 1994, he suggests 
that it is still too early to determine the scale of long-term effects. Also, 
as observers of the Indian scene will be aware, foreign entry was not the 
only source of heightened competition in India; bank privatization also 
contributed to increased competition.
Mian’s (2006) study of 80,000 bank loans in Pakistan during the 
period 1996–2002 throws light on the possible limitations of many 
international banks when it comes to lending in developing countries. 
He fi nds that foreign-owned banks were more conservative, shying away 
from soft-information loans; this was true even for foreign banks that had 
been present in Pakistan for a very long time. Specifi cally, they were less 
likely to lend to small fi rms, domestically owned fi rms, fi rms that were 
not part of a business group (that is, groups of fi rms with overlapping 
directorships), or those without other banking relationships (fi gure 2.10). 
Mian also compares foreign banks of different nationalities and fi nds 
Foreign banks can generate 
extensive changes in 
economic behavior
Foreign banks tend to avoid 
relationship lending
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that non-Asian foreign banks were less likely than Asian banks to lend to 
Pakistani fi rms. Second, despite being such conservative lenders, foreign 
banks did not have lower default rates in Pakistan and were less likely 
to renegotiate and recover after default. It is not as if all the good bor-
rowers were being served by existing locally owned banks: Mian found 
that during the period under review, private domestic banks established 
new branches from which they served new, soft-information costumers 
rather than existing customers from other banks.33 
Foreign bank entry can also infl uence the degree of concentration in 
a country’s banking system (although it is only one contributory factor; 
Figure 2.10 Bank ownership and borrower characteristics in Pakistan
Source: Mian (2006).
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large state-owned banks, for example are another contributing factor). 
On the one hand, the arrival of foreign banks injects a degree of competi-
tion for the rest; on the other hand, the foreign banks tend to be large 
and their entry might displace others (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Huizinga 2001; Bonin, Hasan, and Wachtel 2004).34 The competitive 
structure of banking can also affect the degree to which fi rms have access, 
but the effect seems to be highly dependent on other characteristics of 
the business environment for banking. Greater concentration is often 
equated with greater monopoly power, but this may not be the case in 
banking if the various market segments are vulnerable to new entrants 
(Berger and others 2004). Other indicators of monopoly power are 
also needed.35 Nevertheless, big banks almost inevitably enjoy a degree 
of monopoly power; indeed the logic of modern banking increasingly 
entails exploiting economies of scale and diversifi cation.36 
Some scholars have suggested that a degree of monopoly power for 
banks might even be good for small borrowers’ access to credit. They 
argue that the investment in relationship banking required to determine 
whether a small borrower is creditworthy is likely to be rewarded by a 
stream of profi ts only in an uncompetitive market.37 If so, only banks 
with monopoly power will make the effort to build the relationship. 
However the responses of fi rms to the WBES survey provide little evi-
dence to support the idea that a more concentrated banking system is 
good for access. Adverse effects of concentration can be found only in 
low-income countries or in those countries with weak credit information 
or tight restrictions on the scope of banking (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Maksimovic 2004). Although small, low-income countries may 
stand to benefi t most from greater banking competition, it is precisely in 
these that achieving a suffi cient number of well-capitalized and qualifi ed 
bankers is problematic.
A balanced overall statement of the available empirical evidence is 
that opening to foreign banks has the potential to convey net benefi ts 
by introducing competition and increasing effi ciency and independence 
of local political processes and that these benefi ts are likely to be greater 
as time goes on and the entrants learn more about local conditions. The 
benefi ts are also likely to be greater in host countries that have the neces-
sary information and contractual frameworks and incentive structures 
in place that facilitate foreign banks doing what they are best at, namely, 
automated transactions lending. While foreign entry generally generates 
more competition for the incumbents, the end result may not always be 




The benefi ts of foreign banks 
are more apparent in the 
longer term
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an increase in competition if entry happens through acquisition, espe-
cially in a small market. Given the little empirical support for the theory 
that increased monopoly power improves the access of small borrowers, 
such entry may not necessarily lead to greater access. There are indica-
tions that foreign entry tends to make domestic fi nancial institutions seek 
out nontraditional businesses, including services for previously excluded 
segments of the population, as these institutions fi nd their traditional 
businesses coming under competition. Hence, locally managed banks 
with a business model focused on addressing opportunities in the local 
business community have the potential to survive foreign entry, adding 
value by broadening access, especially to the SME sector.
Access to Nonbank Debt Finance
Where long-term fi nance is available, the evidence is that it makes a 
positive contribution to fi rm growth (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
1999). But there are numerous barriers to availability of long-term 
fi nance. It is not just that banks need to maintain liquidity, an aspect 
that is often stressed. In reality, well-run banks with a stable deposit 
base can and do lend at maturities well beyond the nominal maturity 
of their deposits. Indeed this maturity transformation is one of the key 
contributions of banking to the wider economic system. Other factors 
at both the national and fi rm-level also impose barriers to long-term 
fi nance. At the aggregate level, macroeconomic risks loom large in the 
decision to make a long-term loan, as do weaknesses in the credit infor-
mation environment and contract enforcement.38 In dealing with riskier 
and more opaque borrowers (for example, small or new fi rms, or those 
with an adverse credit history), banks prefer to use shorter-term loans, 
which can be renewed or renegotiated, so that they can maintain control 
over the lending relationship and retain the possibility to infl uence fi rm 
management during the course of the relationship.39 
For long-term lending, the role for bond fi nancing is potentially larger, 
can provide competition for banks, and can serve as a spare tire to be 
employed in the event of a banking crisis. The potential here should 
not be exaggerated, however, as Gormley, Johnson, and Rhee (2006), 
for example, point out in their study of the Korean fi nancial crisis of 
1997–98. When that crisis triggered a freeze in bank lending, a private 
bond market easily sprang to life, capturing households’ savings and 
channeling them to corporations. But it was the largest corporations, 
A poor business environment 
can inhibit long-term bank 
fi nancing
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the chaebols, that received the fi nancing, and the public was willing to 
invest in bonds because it perceived them as a safe investment, assuming 
that the chaebols would be regarded by the authorities as too big to fail. 
This public perception was proved correct by the bailout of bond inves-
tors after the 1999 collapse of the large chaebol Daewoo. Smaller fi rms, 
despite their often better corporate governance structures, were unable 
to access the bond market even after banks stopped lending. 
Private bonds can provide a competitive alternative to banks, but 
banks can also use bonds to exploit their credit appraisal capacity while 
economizing on capital and liquidity by packaging residential mortgages 
and other small or medium-size loans into larger units that then can 
be sold to pension funds and other institutional investors. Mortgage-
backed bonds issued by banks perform a similar function and can 
work in less sophisticated fi nancial systems. The legal, accounting, and 
other requirements to make this kind of fi nancial engineering effective, 
Bond fi nancing can provide 
competition for banks
ONE MAJOR RISK THAT CAN ARISE FROM FINANCIAL 
globalization is the assumption by fi nancial, and 
especially nonfi nancial, fi rms of much greater foreign 
exchange risk than is prudent. The temptation to do 
so often arises when macroeconomic and exchange 
rate policy results in high and volatile nominal inter-
est rates for borrowings in local currency, whereas 
creditworthy borrowers may access foreign currency 
borrowing either from locally based or foreign banks 
at much lower nominal interest rates, but accepting 
the exchange risk.a The combination of availability 
of foreign capital and high domestic interest rates 
has often been associated with a policy of fi xing the 
exchange rate at what seems an undervalued rate: 
promoting an export and profi t boom as well as 
capital infl ows caused by expectations of a nominal 
currency appreciation. The combination greatly 
heightens the risks, and a reversal of investor senti-
ment can mean very large currency movements and 
an economic crisis, as has been seen in such disparate 
cases as Chile in 1982–83 and Indonesia in 1997–98. 
It is not a simple task to calculate even approximately 
what a prudent foreign exchange exposure would 
be for a fi rm whose nonfi nancial business has an 
international component. (South African Airlines 
recently incurred heavy losses as a result of treasury 
policies that could be characterized as overhedging 
of foreign exchange.) The scale of onshore dollariza-
tion of bank deposits and international fi xed-interest 
lending has surged several times in the past couple 
of decades (De Nicoló, Honohan, and Ize 2005; 
Goldstein and Turner 2004), making currency 
exchange risk a problem that is likely to recur.
Box 2.3 When access can be too tempting: risks and use of foreign currency 
borrowing by fi rms
a. See Allayannis, Brown, and Klapper (2003) for a study of fi rms’ strategies to hedge foreign exchange rate exposure in East 
Asia before and after the crisis.
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including the role of independent credit-rating fi rms to help investors 
price these bonds, are considerable and beyond the reach of smaller or 
less advanced markets, but the details need not concern us here. Where 
bond fi nancing is possible, it can improve the price and availability of 
longer-term credit to smaller borrowers. 
Access to External Equity
Even start-up fi rms need equity to fi nance working capital; entrepreneurs 
everywhere have recourse to relatives and friends for initial equity to 
supplement their own resources. The quantitative importance of internal 
fi nancing from retained earnings to help support the growth process has 
already been discussed. As fi rms grow, so too does the importance of 
having access to sources of external equity. Bank loans cannot perform 
this function. In most countries there are individuals and fi rms who, in 
one way or another, arrange private equity for some of the most promis-
ing growth fi rms, but a wider investor clientele can be tapped through 
a listing on an organized stock exchange. 
The development of shareholder capitalism depends on strong inves-
tor rights and on adequately enforced public disclosure of the fi nancial 
condition of public companies (Morck and Steier 2005). Reliance on 
disclosure and private enforcement mechanisms seems more effective 
than public enforcement policies and restrictions imposed by authorities 
(La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006). In many countries, 
information and investor protection are not adequate to allow the stock 
market to fulfi ll its full potential in establishing the full price of each 
equity stock. As Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) and Jin and Myers 
(2006) show, stock prices of different fi rms move closely together in 
the stock exchanges of many countries and especially in countries with 
weak shareholder rights and lack of fi rm transparency (fi gure 2.11).40 
This contrasts to the situation in advanced economies, where the cor-
relation of individual stock prices with the average of the market tends 
to be rather low. The strong co-movement of stock prices may mean that 
little fi rm-specifi c information comes into the public arena. As a result, 
individual fi rm equity is not, on average, fully priced, and the discount 
is likely to be greater, the greater the fi rm’s growth prospects. It is not 
surprising, then, that most of the largest fi rms in the corporate sector of 
such countries tend to be controlled by a small elite group of families, 
as outsiders doubt they will benefi t from holding shares—with reason, 
Stock market development 
requires a sound regulatory 
environment
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as Desai and Moel (2007) document in several spectacular cases. The 
consequences can be lower investment than optimal.41 
Investor rights and transparency might not be enough to foster liquid 
equity markets. Rather, a critical mass of issues, issuers, and investors 
seems to be necessary (De la Torre and Schmukler 2007). The recent 
merger wave among the stock exchanges of developed countries and 
the deepening of a rather limited set of emerging stock exchanges raise 
questions about the extent to which smaller emerging countries will have 
the critical mass to support national stock exchanges or will need to rely 
on regional or foreign exchanges for fi rms’ funding needs.
These fi ndings confi rm the importance of shareholder protection and 
information for ensuring that the stock market makes external capital 
available to fi rms with growth prospects. However, making reforms is 
not an easy matter. Controlling families often do not seem interested 
in increasing the transparency of the market or in boosting the rights 
of minorities (even though such actions could make cheaper capital 
available). Indeed, they seem to be effective in blocking, through their 
Figure 2.11 Stock price synchronicity with disclosure and governance
Source: Jin and Myers (2006).
Note: This fi gure compares the degree to which stock prices tend to move together in each of 



































Small economies may benefi t 
from regional exchanges
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rent-seeking activities, a strengthening of the fi nancial system for fear 
that a stronger system would allow the emergence of challengers to their 
incumbency.42 Venture capital is also more effective when underlying 
legal protections are present (Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz 2006). 
Opening up equity markets to the outside world has made a big con-
tribution to improving access and cost of equity fi nance for larger local 
fi rms.43 A listing (or ADR44) in a foreign market by such fi rms improves 
their access to equity by increasing the share price and making them 
more attractive for institutional investors, thus generating an incentive 
for fi rms to expand (Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki 2005; Levine 
and Schmukler 2007a). Such listings can import corporate governance 
(Coffee 2002), although this fi nding is not refl ected in any sustained 
increase in the market value of the fi rm (Levine and Schmukler 2007a). 
These gains, however, might be partly offset by loss of liquidity in local 
markets, potentially limiting access to outside equity for smaller fi rms 
(Levine and Schmukler 2007b). The net overall impact on the access 
of small fi rms is not clear; after all, improved access by large fi rms may 
spill over to small ones through trade credit. Furthermore, as larger 
fi rms have greater access to, and substitute, these alternative sources of 
funding for bank fi nance, banks are likely to become more interested 
in serving smaller clients.
Foreign direct investment offers a partial substitute for local fi nance, 
a fact that has proved important in some countries, where it appears to 
have eased fi nancing constraints, at least for large, publicly listed fi rms.45 
To be sure, foreign investors likely choose some of the best-performing 
local fi rms in which to invest, so this selection bias needs to be taken 
into account (Weiss and Nikitin 2004). However, FDI transactions 
in which fi rms in advanced economies have acquired listed fi rms in 
developing countries have been associated with sizable stock market 
gains for both acquirer and target. That fi nding implies consequential 
gains in profi tability over time, according to a study by Chari, Ouimet, 
and Tesar (2005) of 1,629 acquisitions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, and 
Thailand (fi gure 2.12). 
The mode of entry can be infl uential in determining how productive 
the investment will be. A particular issue is whether insisting on joint 
ventures rather than allowing foreign control of the enterprise is better 
for the host country overall. Moran (2005) has observed that target 
companies that have been integrated into the foreign acquirer’s worldwide 
External listing by larger fi rms 
might not be good for equity 
access of smaller fi rms
FDI may ease fi nancing 
constraints—
—and improve fi rm 
management and use of 
technology
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operations tend to be larger, better managed, and more technologically 
advanced than those whose purpose is to serve protected domestic mar-
kets in the host country. Many of the most effective FDI transactions, 
therefore, go well beyond providing fi nancial access to the target fi rms, 
which instead are swallowed up.
With the emergence of large private equity fi rms in the advanced 
economies temporarily taking majority stakes in fi rms in the develop-
ing world (such as banks in Korea, following the crisis of 1997–98), 
the dividing line between FDI and other equity investment has become 
somewhat blurred. At the same time, locally controlled private equity 
funds, often affi liated with banks or other fi nancial service providers, 
have also been created in numerous countries. One way or another, 
venture capital and private equity (including venture capital for near 
start-ups) have been an increasingly important source of fi nance for 
certain categories of fi rms in developing countries, although such 
investment has been subject to waves of enthusiasm (the mid-1990s, 
for example) followed by valley periods. These transactions are not very 
fully documented in available data, so they have not been subjected to 
the same kinds of econometric analysis discussed in this chapter.46 A 
half-dozen large emerging economies currently receive most of the fl ow 
of FDI—Brazil, China (including Taiwan), India, Korea, Russia, and 
South Africa. This geographic concentration is likely to persist, because 
Figure 2.12 Returns to shareholders in acquiring and target fi rms around the 
date of FDI announcement
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of the size of these economies, the availability (in some of them) of large, 
capital-hungry, natural resource–based projects for foreigners to invest 
in, and the perceived quality of the overall investment environment, 
including the availability of local currency debt fi nancing to complete 
the package and a market on which the equity stake can be fl oated in due 
course (Rubenstein 2006). Nevertheless, private equity fi rms have been 
looking at most countries with increasing interest since 2003, and, while 
there may be interruptions, private equity may become an increasingly 
important source of fi nancing for larger fi rms with growth potential. 
Conclusions
Availability of external fi nancing for fi rms depends on the wider insti-
tutional environment; lack of availability does constrain fi rm growth, 
and it is one of the more important business obstacles fi rms have to 
overcome. Access to fi nance contributes to fi rm entry, growth, and 
innovation, among other things. Small and new fi rms are affected the 
most by fi nancing constraints. Yet they also benefi t the most as fi nancial 
systems develop and fi nancing constraints consequently ease. Empirical 
evidence suggests that it is through improving access for enterprises 
that fi nancial sector development makes an important contribution to 
economic growth.
While relationship lending remains important in many parts of the 
world, the modern trend is increasingly toward transactional lending. 
In this regard, good credit registries can be a powerful force for expand-
ing the reach of lenders. Not least because international banks have a 
comparative advantage in transactional lending, their arrival or expan-
sion in a country can cause natural apprehension about their possible 
effect on broad access to credit. However, the balance of a large body 
of evidence is that even where foreign entrants are highly selective in 
their target credit market, access to credit from the system as a whole 
usually improves. And it is increasingly likely to do so as time goes on. 
In contrast, the performance of state-owned banks in this dimension 
has tended to be poor.
Nonbank fi nance remains much less important in most developing 
countries, but that too can be expected to change. Bond fi nance is an 
increasingly important alternative to bank fi nance, mainly for large fi rms. 
Access to external equity requires strong investor rights; where these are 
Barriers to fi nance are a major 
obstacle, especially for new 
and small fi rms
Foreign banks improve access 
to fi nance, especially in the 
longer term
Nonbank fi nance has a 
growing role to play
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present, opening to capital infl ows can greatly improve access and lower 
the cost of capital. That is true both for portfolio equity investments 
and for foreign direct investment and private equity, which are likely 
to become increasingly important. While bond and equity markets are 
most directly relevant for improving access to fi nance for larger fi rms, 
these markets are also likely to have an indirect effect on access for small 
fi rms, as trade credit represents an important source of external fi nance 
for many small fi rms.
Notes
1. There is a large empirical literature on fi nancing constraints that arise 
because of information asymmetries and on the resulting agency problems 
between lenders and borrowers (see surveys by Schiantarelli 1995; Blundell, 
Bond, and Meghir 1996; Hubbard 1998; and Bond and Van Reenen 1999). 
While most of this literature has tried to infer fi nancing constraints indirectly 
from investment–cash fl ow correlations or deviations from optimal investment 
patterns, studies highlighted in this chapter use more direct measures. Also 
see Beck and others (2006), who use the WBES survey data discussed in the 
text and show that self-reported fi nancing constraints are robustly correlated 
with fi rm size, age, and ownership (domestic or foreign). 
2. The increase in sales was proportional to the increase in bank credit, 
another piece of evidence to support the authors’ hypothesis that credit con-
straints were at work. While the increase in profi ts might be partly explained 
by the subsidized interest on directed lending, the magnitude seems too large 
to be the sole factor.
3. Surveyed businesses in the WBES were asked (among other things) to 
rate fi nancing, legal, and corruption obstacles, as well as others, on a scale 
from 1 (no obstacle) to 4 (major obstacle), to refl ect the extent to which these 
obstacles affected the growth of their business. Regressing fi rm sales growth 
on fi nancing, corruption, and legal obstacles, while controlling for fi rm and 
country characteristics, shows that all three obstacles signifi cantly constrain 
fi rm growth. If all three obstacles are entered in the regression, fi nancing 
and legal obstacles still remain negative and signifi cant, while the corruption 
obstacle loses its signifi cance.
4. This is evidenced for example by the increased willingness of fi rms to 
diversify by acquiring intangible assets in countries where property rights are 
secure (Claessens and Laeven 2003).
5. Using household survey data from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Demirgüç-
Kunt, Klapper, and Panos (2007) study determinants of self-employment for 
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individuals. They fi nd that personal wealth predicts the choice of becoming 
an entrepreneur, as does receiving remittances (although negatively). However, 
access to bank fi nance predicts survival as an entrepreneur beyond the fi rst 
year.
6. Specifi cally, respondents were asked whether they had (i) developed a 
major new product line; (ii) upgraded an existing product line; (iii) introduced 
new technology that has substantially changed the way that the main product 
is produced; (iv) discontinued at least one product (not production) line; (v) 
opened a new plant; (vi) closed at least one existing plant or outlet; (vii) agreed 
to a new joint venture with a foreign partner; (viii) obtained a new licensing 
agreement; (ix) outsourced a major production activity that was previously 
conducted in-house; or (x) brought in-house a major production activity that 
was previously outsourced.
7. Measurement error in a causal variable tends to bias the OLS (ordinary 
least squares) estimates downward, whereas reverse causality or an unobserved 
common causal factor would tend to bias the OLS estimates upward. This 
downward bias has been noted in econometric studies of other supposed causes 
of growth as well (Pande and Udry 2006). Note however that this interpre-
tation depends on the use of valid instruments in the attempt to adjust for 
endogeneity. Using an invalid instrument (for example, one that should really 
be included in the equation as an explanatory variable) will bias the adjusted 
(instrumental variables) estimate.
8. The supposed ineffi ciency of Chinese bank lending should not be over-
stated, though, especially for recent years. Using fi rm-level survey data, Cull and 
Xu (2000, 2003) fi nd that bank fi nance was associated with higher subsequent 
fi rm productivity in the 1980s, while government transfers were not. This 
relationship, however, weakened in the 1990s. Drawing on a sample of mostly 
small and medium Chinese fi rms, which account for the most dynamic part 
of the Chinese economy, Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2007b) 
show that those receiving bank credit around 2002 did tend to grow more 
quickly than the average fi rm, whereas those receiving funds from informal 
sources did not. This suggests that even if the bulk of Chinese bank credit has 
not been directed to fi nancing the most productive fi rms, credit decisions of 
Chinese banks regarding smaller enterprises have been associated with faster 
fi rm growth, and the formal fi nancial system is still better than the informal 
one in picking the best performers.
9. That Vietnam has also seen perverse fl ows of credit is argued by Malesky 
and Taussig (2005), who fi nd that despite rapid increases in both bank deposits 
and credit in recent years, suggestive of fi nancial development, this additional 
credit does not seem to have found its way into the provinces where it is most 
needed, that is, provinces with the highest share of private entrepreneurs. 
Private entrepreneurs seem to be crowded out systematically by state-owned 
enterprises. Connection to the government and the party, in contrast, seem to 
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help private entrepreneurs gain access to credit. These authors also fi nd a nega-
tive relationship between access to credit and investment growth. Simply put, 
fi rms receiving bank fi nance in Vietnam are not the engines of growth. At the 
same time, expanding private fi rms seem to rely mostly on retained earnings 
and personal savings to fi nance investment. There is one positive exception 
to this disappointing picture: in more competitive provinces, that is, in those 
where there are more private entrepreneurs per capita competing for credit, 
easier access to credit is positively related to investment growth. Overall, these 
results point to a misallocation of banking credit to connected fi rms in less 
competitive regions of the country.
10. Also, Rajan and Zingales (1998) fi nd the growth effect of fi nance only 
on industries that need it most, and not on all industries, suggesting that it 
is the effi ciency of fi nancial intermediation that matters, not simply capital 
accumulation. 
11. See, for example, Rioja and Valev (2004a, b).
12. Noting that most enterprises need some initial wealth, Aghion, Fally, 
and Scarpetta (2006) see the fi nancial system as allowing entrepreneurs to lever-
age this initial wealth—the better developed the fi nancial system, the higher 
the leverage, a phenomenon that allows effi cient newcomers to displace even 
well-fi nanced but ineffi cient incumbents. Working with data on more than 
10,000 fi rms drawn mainly from national business registries and administra-
tive records in 16 countries, including 7 developing or transition economies 
(and using the susceptibility measure of Rajan and Zingales, mentioned in 
box 2.1), they fi nd that national policies that restrict credit availability tend 
to limit entry and growth of small fi rms to a much larger extent than do labor 
market regulations. On the other hand, large fi rm entry is not affected by 
fi nancial development. 
13. Given that exporting fi rms face fi xed costs and might therefore depend 
more on external fi nance than other fi rms, Becker and Greenberg (2005) 
conjectured that countries with higher levels of fi nancial development should 
have higher exports. And indeed—using bilateral trade data and controlling 
for other variables in a gravity regression—they fi nd that countries with higher 
levels of fi nancial development export more. This effect is stronger in industries 
in which exporters potentially face higher fi xed costs, as proxied by the lack of 
standardization, or for exports to nonneighboring countries or countries with 
a different language. 
14. Using the Rajan and Zingales methodology, Beck (2003) shows coun-
tries with better-developed fi nancial systems have a comparative advantage in 
industries relying more on external fi nance. 
15. These results are reported by Beck and Levine (2002), who used the 
same sectoral data source for 42 countries as Rajan and Zingales (1998) (see 
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box 2.1), but added measures of the relative size or activity of the securities 
markets and the banking system. 
16. Specifi cally, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) found no addi-
tional explanatory power when they added a variable indicating the relative 
size of securities markets and banks to their analysis of the proportion of each 
county’s fi rms that were growing faster than could be achieved solely with 
internal resources. But the equations, containing both banking depth and stock 
market turnover as independent explanatory variables in quadratic form, did 
suggest that stock market development might be more important than bank 
development in allowing fi rm growth that required long-term fi nancing. (For 
their dependent variable, they counted the number of fi rms—out of a total of 
more than 10,000 from 32 countries—that were expanding sales faster than 
would seem supportable from internal resources or short-term borrowing, as 
modeled by a standard fi nancial planning model. (This study built on a paper 
they published in 1998; see box 2.1). 
17. Of course the dichotomy between banks and markets is also too sim-
plistic. Many nonbank institutions, including nondepository mortgage lenders, 
leasing, and factoring companies, are involved in specialized forms of asset-based 
fi nance. And important channels of equity fi nance—venture capital, business 
angel fi nance, and other forms of private equity—can operate without much 
use of organized securities exchanges. Institutional investors too are important 
providers of several forms of fi nancing. The bank-market distinction is never-
theless a useful handle: much of what can be said about bank fi nance applies 
to nonbank lenders; much of what is important for securities markets is also 
relevant for private equity.
18. There are good theoretical reasons for debt fi nance to be the major 
source of external fi nance, not least because, relative to other forms of sharing 
the returns on a project, the debt contract economizes on precise monitoring 
of project performance (Diamond 1984).
19. De la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler (2007) show that banks in 
two very different institutional environments (Argentina and Chile) adapt to 
lend to SMEs and overcome institutional weaknesses. Banks do so by lending 
short term, collateralizing their loans, or securing their loans in some other 
forms. 
20. It is perhaps worth emphasizing the difference between relationship lend-
ing and related-party lending, which is a form of self-dealing. Although banks 
often resort to related-party lending where information about other borrowers 
or contract enforcement is lacking, such lending can ultimately impose social 
costs, as is well illustrated in the discussion by Maurer and Haber (2004) of 
Mexico’s experience in the early 1900s and by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Zamarripa (2003) of the more recent experiences in East Asia in the 1990s.
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21. A classic account of the Jewish Maghribi traders’ network in the late 
Middle Ages is in Greif (1993).
22. These Regional Program on Enterprise Development surveys were car-
ried out in fi ve African countries during the 1990s. For a book-length discussion 
of the fi ndings, see Fafchamps (2004).
23. Fisman (2003) controls more carefully for unobserved fi rm quality and 
still fi nds that fi rms are more than twice as likely to receive trade credit from 
within their ethnic community than from outside. However, he also fi nds that 
these ethnic ties account for only 15 percent of the overall preferential credit 
access enjoyed by entrepreneurs of non-African descent. 
24. Ensuring that the growth of this industry is based on trustworthy rating 
agency fi rms is a nonnegligible challenge (Honohan 2001).
25. Bebczuk (2007) undertook a similar exercise using Argentine data and 
reported similar fi ndings. 
26. In some countries foreign banks have entered the SME lending market 
themselves (De la Torre, Martinez Peria, and Schmukler 2007). This does not 
only imply relying on the transaction-lending techniques mentioned above, 
but it does imply a learning process for foreign banks. Similarly, bank-survey 
evidence from transition economies has shown that many foreign banks are 
taking advantage of the improving contractual and information frameworks 
in these countries and are applying business models from their mostly West 
European home countries and (de Haas and Naaborg 2005). Some banks in 
transition countries also have been expanding intraregionally and moving 
beyond a traditional focus on large corporations to provide more fi nancial ser-
vices geared to SMEs in host countries. In Sub-Saharan Africa, where foreign 
banks have long been criticized for neglecting all but the large, international 
borrowers, a more differentiated picture has been emerging in recent years 
(Honohan and Beck 2007).
27. In most cases, an important market segment typically remains to be 
served by locally owned and smaller banks. Indeed, cross-country evidence 
(Berger, Hassan, and Klapper 2004) suggests that where smaller non-state-
owned local banks have a higher market share, economic growth is stronger, 
although it has not proved possible to establish that this growth is attributable 
to more SME lending. 
28. The Mexican case, where foreign banks spent $30 billion between 1997 
and 2004 and increased the foreign ownership of the Mexican banking sys-
tem from 11 to 83 percent, provides an interesting illustration of the fact that 
large-scale foreign entry is not a panacea even for a highly distressed banking 
system. Tracking each bank in Mexico, Schulz (2006) shows that, over the 
period 1997–2004, bank capital strengthened, the quality of the loan portfolio 
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improved, and there appears to have been a modest increase in productivity (the 
latter always hard to measure in banking because of its multiple joint outputs). 
During this period, bank lending to the private sector continued the slump 
that had begun with the crisis of 1994; there has since been a recovery. But 
Haber and Musachio (2005) fi nd it impossible to detect any indication in the 
data that foreign acquisition slowed credit granting by a bank, although the 
foreign banks did effectively screen out problem borrowers and were ahead of 
the others in achieving reduced loan losses.
29. Of course one might get such results if foreign banks tend to be attracted 
to countries where the fi nancial market works well anyway. To control for this, 
Clarke, Cull, and Martinez Peria (2006) also looked at fi rms’ opinions about 
access to nonbank fi nance. It turns out that the presence of foreign banks has 
no signifi cant impact on the responses to the control question.
30. It is not so easy to draw conclusions about the interest rates charged. For 
example, using the same basic data sources, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) 
found that whether bank entry was by merger, acquisition, or de novo, foreign-
owned banks charge narrower margins, by 50 basis points on average, than 
domestic banks; and the difference is even larger for de novo foreign banks. 
Of course, with interest rates differing widely between customer types, it is 
diffi cult to be sure that the control variables are adequate to reveal a true price 
differential, rather than a refl ection, for example, of foreign banks lending to 
low-risk, low-spread borrowers, and funding on wholesale terms.
31. And using instruments that predict foreign bank entry, but not fi rm 
growth, in a convincing attempt to ensure that the measured effects were not 
attributable to a common hidden cause.
32. Even fi rms outside a formal group structure can indirectly access bank 
credit if they are granted increased trade credit from fi rms with growing bank 
borrowings. Trade credit in effect offers credit access to an additional layer 
of fi rms, exploiting information and other bilateral relationships (Fisman and 
Love, 2003; Love, Preve, and Sarria-Allende 2007; Burkart, Ellingsen, and 
Gianetti; 2004; Omiccioli 2005). 
33. But the same database from Pakistan has also thrown light on the poten-
tial defi ciencies of state-owned banks and specifi cally on the nexus between 
politicians and state-owned banks (see chapter 4).
34. Levy Yeyati and Micco (2007) argue that the extensive foreign bank 
entry in Latin America in the 1990s resulted in a less competitive banking 
system overall, although this contention is not undisputed. Their evidence 
comes from showing that bank revenues became less sensitive to variations in 
input costs, as happens with a monopolist charging “what the market will bear,” 
in contrast to a competitive system that effectively fully passes on changes in 
input prices to the customer.
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35. For example Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) show that 
restrictions on bank entry, measured by the fraction of entry applications 
rejected by the regulatory agency, are more closely correlated with interest 
margins than with concentration. Using data on net interest margins of some 
1,165 banks from 47 countries, they fi nd that countries that restrict foreign 
bank entry end up with higher bank margins.
36. It seems that transactions costs, including those of acquiring informa-
tion, are strongly related to distance, resulting in a degree of monopoly power 
for local banks. Very convincing evidence on this point comes from a market as 
developed as Belgium, for which Degryse and Ongena (2005) document how 
the lending rates charged by one bank vary according to the physical distance 
between the customer and the nearest competitor bank.
37. Studies of this proposition for the United States and other advanced 
economies show that its applicability is context specifi c, with few simple les-
sons directly applicable to all developing countries. For instance, Cetorelli and 
Strahan (2004) show that new entrants found it more diffi cult to get fi nance 
in U.S. states with less competitive banking markets, but Zarutskie (2005), 
using data based on corporation tax returns, fi nds less investment (as indicated 
by higher rates of return) and less external fi nancing for small fi rms following 
increases in competition resulting from the liberalization of U.S. interstate 
banking. Using data from different Italian regions, Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia (2004) fi nd that bank concentration can have a positive effect 
on fi rm entry where information is opaque. Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar 
(2007) show that the far-reaching French banking liberalization of the 1980s 
did not uniformly increase credit availability but made it more sensitive to 
borrowers’ business prospects.
38. Using data on 27,000 publicly listed fi rms in 27 developed economies 
and 18 developing economies, Sorge and Zhang (2006) fi nd that countries with 
better quality of credit information (broader coverage of public and especially 
private credit registries as well as better accounting standards) are characterized 
by a higher share of long-term debt as a proportion of total corporate debt.
39. Based on an extensive U.S. survey of small business fi nance, Ortiz-
Molina and Penas (2006) provide evidence that loan maturity is positively 
correlated with fi rm size and age and with the amount of collateral posted—
though personal guarantees do not have this effect. Firms that have had a loan 
delinquency in the previous three years had shorter maturities.
40. The Jin and Myers (2006) results are based on data from 40 stock 
exchanges and use a variety of measures of opacity, including the diversity of 
analysts’ forecasts, accounting completeness, and auditing activity.
41. Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (2002) examine the return on capital 
for a panel of more than 6,000 listed fi rms on 38 stock exchanges and detect 
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a strong and sizable positive relationship between the share of stock held by 
insiders and the accounting return on capital, suggesting underinvestment in the 
most closely held fi rms. With such a high return, they “should” have invested 
more. The degree of ownership concentration is also strongly correlated with 
an index of shareholder protection (measuring, for example, whether voting 
is proportional to shareholding, use of proxy voting, and the right of minor-
ity shareholders to challenge oppressive majority decisions in court). See also 
Burkart, Panunzi, and Shleifer (2003) and Nenova (2003). 
42. For a review of these and other issues related to family control, see 
Morck and Yeung (2003). 
43. See overviews by Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) and Gupta 
and Yuan (2005).
44. An American Depository Receipt (ADR) is, in effect, a repackaging of 
a non-U.S. equity into a convenient form for U.S. investors to trade in U.S. 
stock markets. Depository receipts are also traded in the securities markets of 
some other advanced economies.
45. This, at least, was the fi nding of Harrison, Love, and McMillan (2004), 
who took data for 7,000 fi rms from 40 countries and estimated the sensitivity of 
each fi rm’s investment decisions to its available cash. The authors were exploit-
ing the idea that if a fi rm has easy access to fi nance, it should be able to fi nance 
profi table investment opportunities regardless of the immediate availability of 
cash balances. In practice, fi rms’ investments do tend to be sensitive to their cash 
holdings. But this sensitivity proves to be lower for fi rms in countries with high 
inward FDI. Contrary, then, to the fears of some that inward FDI would tap 
local capital markets, diverting funds from incumbent fi rms, it seems that FDI 
does brings its own funding with it. In specifi c cases, though, borrowing from 
banks by foreign-owned fi rms could crowd out local fi rm fi nancing. Another 
paper by Harrison and McMillan (2003) fi nds this crowding-out effect for 
Cote d’Ivoire, which the authors conjecture may result from the existence of 
interest ceilings and the links between many of the foreign-owned fi rms with 
the French parents of the local banks. 
46. An interesting study by Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2004) 
shows the way. It uses information on the size of private equity investments 
in 14 European countries. The authors track the impact of policy and other 
variables on the division of these funds between early stage (seed and venture 
capital) and late stage, and between high-tech and other sectors.
FFA_055-098_ch02.indd   98 10/26/07   6:17:29 AM
99
C H A P T E R  T H R E E
Household Access to Finance: 
Poverty Alleviation and 
Risk Mitigation
OVER THE LONG TERM, ECONOMIC GROWTH HELPS REDUCE POVERTY 
and can be expected to lift the welfare of most households. This chap-
ter returns to the questions fi rst raised in chapter 1: Well-functioning 
fi nancial systems contribute to growth, but do poor households benefi t 
proportionately from fi nancial reforms that strengthen the economy 
generally? To what extent is an emphasis on fi nancial sector development 
as a driver of growth consistent with a pro-poor approach to develop-
ment? Or could the deepening of fi nancial systems lead to a widening 
of income inequalities? Must poor households and microentrepreneurs 
have direct access to fi nancial services for there to be meaningful poverty 
reduction? What techniques are most effective in ensuring sustainable 
provision of credit and other fi nancial services on a small scale?
This chapter reviews the fi ndings of recent research on these questions. 
Although several theoretical models have highlighted the risk that selec-
tively increased access to credit could worsen inequality, the empirical 
evidence does not seem to bear out this risk. Instead, available evidence 
suggests that a more developed fi nancial system tends to reduce inequal-
ity in the long run. That is not simply because microfi nance could help 
the poor directly—indeed the evidence from microstudies of favorable 
impacts from direct access of the poor to credit is not especially strong. 
The conclusions of studies using calibrated general equilibrium models, 
specifi c policy experiments, and econometric analysis of cross-country 
data tend to be more positive than are those of the microstudies. 
These studies alert us to the likely importance of indirect effects in 
explaining the relationship between fi nancial development and income 
inequality. These effects are well tracked in the general equilibrium 
models discussed below, which show that better fi nancial access for 
The empirical evidence 
suggests that fi nancial sector 
development is consistent 
with a pro-poor approach to 
development—
—but some of the most 
important links may be indirect
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nonpoor entrepreneurial households has a strongly favorable, indirect 
effect on the poor. These fi ndings imply that for fi nancial development 
to have maximum impact on pro-poor growth, the focus should be 
broadened from improving fi nance for the poor to improving fi nance for 
all. That is particularly true in many developing countries, where large 
segments of the middle class are still among the fi nancially excluded, as 
was discussed in chapter 1.
Delivering broader access is the task of a growing array of fi nancial 
institutions, including specialized microfi nance institutions (MFIs), 
cooperatives, and savings banks. The techniques they use to reach a 
wider clientele, while controlling both risks and operating costs, are 
evolving, as is their use of information and communication technology. 
This chapter reports on recent research that has thrown much light on 
the relative importance of different obstacles to improved access at the 
micro level and on the techniques that work well, particularly given the 
recent trends of globalization and technological advances.
Finance, Inequality, and Poverty
At the outset, it is not immediately obvious that expanding access 
to fi nancial services will reduce inequality. After all, the successful 
microentrepreneur who manages to get fi nancing for her ideas will 
experience an increase in income that her neighbor does not. Indeed, 
the more successful she becomes, the wider the income gap would be. 
This increase in income inequality is what is predicted by some of the 
theories discussed in chapter 1. At the same time, giving people a wider 
set of growth opportunities through increased access to fi nance should 
eliminate inequities caused by barriers to such access. At the end of the 
day, the net result of greater fi nancial access on measured inequality 
will be an empirical issue, and it is one on which there is a considerable 
body of recent research.
Theoreticians have developed simple, stylized models to analyze these 
questions. Imagine a world in which individuals, differing in their wealth 
and entrepreneurial skills, must choose between subsistence farming, 
wage work, or entrepreneurial endeavor. Without access to external 
fi nance, the amount of investment an entrepreneur has to start is limited 
to her wealth. Start-up costs will often be too large to allow poorer or 
less-skilled individuals to become entrepreneurs, so they will remain 
Access can be provided by a 
range of institutions
Theory suggests that 
greater fi nancial access 
could raise income inequality 
in the short term—
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subsistence farmers or work for a wage if it is high enough. Introducing 
a banking sector into such a world allows skilled entrepreneurs to borrow 
to fi nance setup costs. Although such a stylized world is far from the 
complex reality of even the very poor in developing countries, it offers 
a glimpse of the range of possible impacts on growth, inequality, and 
welfare that can come from increasing access to fi nance. But the size 
and even the nature of these impacts depend on the magnitude of, for 
example, the behavioral responses, the distribution of skills and wealth, 
and the productivity of labor and capital. Is it possible to derive realistic 
estimates of the size of these various parameters from what is known 
about the economic decisions of actual individuals and households? A 
paper by Giné and Townsend (2004) attempts to do just that. Drawing 
on data from a collection of surveys of Thai households, stretching 
from 1976 to 1996, the authors use information about wealth, wage 
rates, fi nancial transactions, and occupational choices to estimate some 
of the model’s parameters; they calibrate other parameters to help the 
model fi t the evolution of Thai growth and savings rates. The authors 
then use this model to simulate how increasing the share of households 
with access to credit affects entrepreneurship, employment, wages, and 
ultimately growth and income distribution.
Giné and Townsend compare the evolution of growth and inequal-
ity in the model with the actual development in the Thai economy and 
show that fi nancial liberalization and the consequent increase in access 
to credit services can explain the fast GDP per capita growth in the 
Thai economy during the period, but they also initially increase income 
inequality. Underlying these developments are occupational shifts from 
the subsistence sector into the intermediated sector, that is, the sector 
with access to credit and accompanying changes in wages. Net welfare 
benefi ts of increased access are found to be substantial. Although they are 
concentrated disproportionately on a small group of talented, low-wealth 
individuals, who without credit could not become entrepreneurs, a wider 
class of workers also benefi ts because eventually wage rates increase as 
the new entrepreneurs use their newfound access to credit to build their 
companies. Savers also benefi t in the form of higher interest paid on their 
savings. But there are also losers; these are former entrepreneurs who lose 
because they have to pay the much higher postliberalization wage rates.1
When calibrated to fi t Thai data on fi nance, growth, and inequality, 
the general equilibrium model analyzed by Giné and Townsend implies 
that the greatest quantitative impact of fi nancial deepening and fi nancial 
—which was evident in a study 
of the Thai economy—
—although the biggest impact 
was due to higher wages, 
which led to lower inequality 
in the longer run
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access on income inequality comes through indirect labor market 
effects. Depending on initial conditions and the choice of parameters, 
these effects also result in a long-term decrease in income inequality 
that off-sets short-term increases coming from wealth gains of new 
entrepreneurs.
Although calibrated theoretical models illuminate important aspects 
of the fi nancial development process and provide illustrative quantifi -
cation of these processes, their fi ndings must be interpreted with care, 
because they do exclude other potentially important infl uences on 
growth and inequality.2 A more direct approach to assessing the impact 
of access to fi nance is to zoom in on specifi c schemes or experiments 
in which some, but not all, households are eligible, and try to uncover 
the consequences both for benefi ciaries and for those excluded. Unlike 
general equilibrium models and the aggregate regression methodology, 
discussed later, the microanalyses often focus on the direct effect of access 
to fi nance on the well-being of households with access, not always taking 
into account possible spillover and indirect effects that are highlighted 
in the general equilibrium analyses. 
The success stories of microfi nance are well documented. But to be 
convinced of the overall benefi t of microfi nance, skeptics require careful 
differentiation between those changes that can be clearly attributed to 
fi nancial access and those that might have happened anyway or result 
from other changes in the environment in which microfi nance clients 
operate. In other words, is measurement of the true effect biased by a 
selection effect? For example, was it the more talented or otherwise well-
endowed households that actually got the loans and might have prospered 
even in their absence? Or did the MFI target the village because it was 
particularly deprived and hence may have benefi ted even if its condition 
remains behind that of unserved villages? How specifi c is the impact 
to the village; can the same MFI scheme have the same effect in other 
villages? Numerous studies have attempted to fi nd ways of answering 
these questions on the basis of particular features of the MFI design. 
Debate surrounding even the most famous MFI, Bangladesh’s 
Grameen Bank, illustrates how diffi cult this task has been. In a cel-
ebrated and very careful study of Grameen Bank and two other MFIs in 
Bangladesh, Pitt and Khandker (1998) exploited an exogenous eligibility 
criterion: to be eligible for credit from these three MFIs, households 
could not own more than one-half acre of land. All other things being 
equal, the difference in the fortunes of two households with just under 
Finance and poverty—
the micro evidence
The benefi ts of microfi nance 
may refl ect selection bias—
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and just over half an acre could be attributed to the program. The sharp 
cutoff of the eligibility criterion seemed to allow the researchers to avoid a 
selection-effect bias. Using appropriate econometric techniques to correct 
in this way for selection, Pitt and Khandker found small but signifi cant 
and positive effects of the use of credit on household expenditures, 
household assets, labor supply, and the likelihood that children attend 
schools.3 This effect was stronger for female program participants than 
for male participants. The study also found that labor supply response 
was surprisingly low compared with the response of assets and expen-
ditures, suggesting that the effect of fi nance goes through productivity 
of labor, rather than the amount. 
However, even this research has not gone unchallenged. For example, 
there is doubt that the half-acre rule was systematically and rigorously 
applied. If it was not, then its use to correct for selection bias is weak-
ened. Khandker (2003), using panel data from a follow-up survey on 
the same group of borrowers, was able to obtain more precise estimates 
by controlling for unobserved, but time-invariant borrower character-
istics. His results suggest a substantially lower impact of credit than the 
original Pitt and Khandker study found. 
Another opportunity to assess the impact of access to credit while avoid-
ing selection bias was seized by Coleman (1999), who studied microcredit 
borrowers in northeast Thailand. He exploited the fact that six commu-
nities had been identifi ed as future locations for village banks, and that 
there was a list of self-selected villagers who wanted to apply for loans once 
the banks were established. By comparing these borrowers-in-waiting 
with actual borrowers of existing banks in other villages, Coleman could 
reasonably hope to have corrected for the selection bias that would have 
resulted from simply surveying a random group in the not-yet-served vil-
lages.4 He found no signifi cant impact of credit on physical assets, savings, 
production sales, productive expenses, labor, or expenditures on health care 
or education. In a similar study, Cotler and Woodruff (2007) compared 
small-scale retailers receiving loans from a Mexican microfi nance lender 
with a similar group of retailers that had been selected to receive such 
loans in the future. They found a positive and signifi cant effect of the 
microlending program on sales and profi ts only for the smallest retailers, 
but a negative effect on larger retailers’ sales and profi ts. 
A more direct way to avoid selection bias is to construct a genuine 
experiment in which the subjects and the control group are chosen 
randomly and thus create the necessary exogenous variation needed to 
—and the empirical evidence 
is mixed
A fi eld experiment using 
random selection criteria 
highlights the benefi ts of 
microcredit—
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identify impact. Recently, Karlan and Zinman (2006a) persuaded a South 
African consumer lender to relax its risk assessment criteria for a randomly 
chosen group of barely rejected loan applicants. The random nature of 
the assignment of credit helps the authors to get around the problem of 
selection bias.5 Comparing the group of randomly chosen borrowers with 
the control group of marginally rejected applicants, Karlan and Zinman 
found that six to twelve months after the loan application, borrowers were 
signifi cantly more likely to retain wage employment, less likely to experi-
ence hunger in their household, and less likely to be impoverished. 
Further research, ideally using real experiments, is needed to convince 
the skeptics that access to microcredit really is good for the neighborhoods 
where it becomes established, as most well-informed observers and prac-
titioners believe.6 It has to be said that the current systematic statistical 
research evidence on the benefi ts of microcredit is not yet overwhelming. 
The studies reviewed here were undertaken in very different institutional 
settings and with different credit products. Individual or household welfare 
is notoriously diffi cult to measure, which biases microanalysis against fi nd-
ing a positive effect of access to credit. More research is needed to assert 
whether there is a robust and positive relationship between the use of credit 
and household welfare, including moving out of poverty. 
Several other studies have used cross-sectional household data to assess 
the impact of access to fi nance on households’ consumption patterns, 
income prospects, and the decision to send children to school rather than 
using them as laborers in the household. Most of these studies, however, 
use proxy measures of access to fi nance such as durable assets, which can 
be used as collateral, rather than the direct measures used by the studies 
mentioned above. Survey data of this type for Peru suggest that lack of 
access to credit reduces the likelihood that poor households send their 
children to school, while studies for Guatemala, India, and Tanzania 
point to households without fi nancial access as being more likely than 
households with more assets to reduce their children’s school attendance 
and increase their labor if they suffer transitory income shocks. Survey 
data for Guatemalan microentrepreneurs show a positive effect of credit 
use on upward class mobility, allowing them to expand their businesses. 
Finally, consumption patterns of Indonesian households that live closer 
to the nearest BRI branch, the largest MFI lender in the country, show 
smaller or no effects from health shocks compared with households liv-
ing farther away.7 Box 3.1 discusses the links between access to fi nancial 
services and some of the Millennium Development Goals. 
—but more research is 
needed in this area
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IN 2000, 189 NATIONS ADOPTED THE MILLENNIUM 
Declarat ion, speci f y ing eight Mil lennium 
Development Goals, including eradicating extreme 
poverty by 2015. The other goals concern education 
(universal primary education), gender equality, health 
(reductions in child and maternal mortality and 
reversing the spread of AIDS, malaria, and other dis-
eases), environment, and global partnerships. While 
access to fi nancial services is not explicitly mentioned 
among these goals, both theory and numerous empiri-
cal studies, including many mentioned in this text, 
suggest that access to fi nancial services is an important 
direct or indirect contributor to the achievement 
of most of the goals (Claessens and Feijen 2006; 
Littlefi eld, Morduch, and Hashemi 2003). 
In the case of education and health, one impor-
tant effect of access to fi nancial services is through 
the income effect: better access to fi nancial services 
improves incomes and therefore the possibility of 
obtaining health and education services, and at the 
same time it reduces the need to rely on children 
as laborers in the household. Allowing women 
direct access to fi nancial services might improve 
their possibilities to become entrepreneurs, thus 
increasing their individual incomes, their chances 
to become more independent, and their participa-
tion in family and community decision making. 
There is also an important insurance effect: bet-
ter access to credit, savings, or insurance services 
reduces the need to use child labor as a buffer in the 
case of seasonal income fl uctuations and transitory 
income shocks and allows consumption smoothing 
in the case of transitory income reductions resulting 
from health shocks. It also allows faster attention 
to health problems. Finally, there is an aggregate 
infrastructure effect, with more effi cient fi nancial 
institutions and markets allowing more private and 
public investment in the construction of schools 
and health facilities. 
The links between access to fi nance and the goals 
of environmental stability and global partnerships 
might be less obvious and have not been researched 
very thoroughly. However, arguments can be made 
for such relationships, at least at the aggregate level. 
Ensuring environmental stability will require large 
investments in new technologies, and fi nancial depth 
has shown to be conducive for capital reallocation 
across sectors. Finally, the goal of global cooperation 
will be hard to achieve without better functioning 
global fi nancial markets.
Box 3.1 Access to fi nance and the Millennium Development Goals
To evaluate the effect of increasing fi nancial access for households 
and microentrepreneurs, one has to look beyond the direct impact on 
the household or enterprise and assess the impact on the whole economy. 
That cannot be done through micro studies. In particular, even if the 
very poor do not themselves gain access to fi nancial services, they may 
benefi t substantially from increased employment and other opportunities 
resulting from the activities of less-poor microentrepreneurs whose access 
has improved. With large numbers of the nonpoor still excluded from 
access to credit, these systemic effects could include trickle-down effects 
for the poor from improved access for the nonpoor. However, they could 
also include perverse trickle-down effects: if only a subset of households 
in a village has access to credit or insurance to smooth consumption, 
Finance, inequality and 
poverty—the aggregate 
evidence
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that subset will bid up the price of nontraded goods when a negative 
shock hits the village, so excluded households will be worse off than if 
nobody had access to credit or insurance (Morduch 2006).
Chapter 2 has already discussed the evidence for a strong causal link 
between fi nancial development, as measured by fi nancial depth, and 
overall national economic growth. That chapter also identifi ed improved 
access to fi nance by fi rms as an important channel through which this 
effect works. If income growth rates of the poor remain broadly in line 
with those of the rest of the population, aggregate economic growth 
will mean a reduction in absolute poverty as more households graduate 
beyond the poverty threshold (Ravallion 2001). Only a sizable fall in 
the income share of the poor could prevent aggregate economic growth 
from lowering absolute poverty.8 If growth reduces the absolute poverty 
count, it is said to be pro-poor in the absolute sense. Growth that reduces 
poverty by narrowing income differentials is said to be pro-poor in the 
relative sense. Recent research suggests that fi nancial development gener-
ates pro-poor growth in both senses. 
For example, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) look at 
cross-country data for varying periods during 1960–2005 to assess 
the relationship between fi nancial depth and changes in both income 
distribution and absolute poverty. They work with a simple decomposi-
tion of the income growth of the poorest income quintile into mean per 
capita national income growth and the change in the share of the poorest 
quintile. A large body of literature has established that fi nance has a posi-
tive impact on GDP per capita growth; but what about the relationship 
between fi nance and changes in the income share of the lowest income 
quintile? The authors fi nd a positive relationship between fi nancial depth 
(as measured by the ratio of private sector credit to GDP) and the change 
in the share of the lowest quintile in total national personal income. 
Not only does a deeper fi nancial system accelerate national growth, but 
it is associated with a faster increase in the income share of the poorest 
group. Indeed, almost half of the benefi cial effect of fi nancial deepening 
on average income of the poorest quintile comes from this improvement 
in the (relative) distribution of income. 
They also obtain similar results when they look at the changes in the 
Gini measure of income inequality. The relationship between fi nancial 
development and the growth rate of the Gini coeffi cient is negative, 
suggesting that fi nance reduces income inequality. Not only are these 
fi ndings robust to controlling for other country characteristics associated 
Financial development 
reduces poverty through its 
effect on overall growth—
—increases the income share 
of the poorest quintile—
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with economic growth and changes in income inequality, but the authors 
also make an attempt to control for potential reverse causality, using 
historic variables such as national origin of the legal system to extract 
an exogenous component of fi nancial development, as well as panel 
techniques that control for omitted variable and endogeneity bias. 
Although cross-country studies are subject to the caveats discussed in 
box 2.1, these fi ndings are also consistent with the fi ndings of general 
equilibrium models discussed earlier, in that fi nancial development 
is associated with reductions in income inequality over the long run. 
Further evidence is provided by cross-country studies looking at the 
relationship between fi nancial development and the level of income 
inequality. Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) and Li, Xu, and Zou (2000) fi nd 
a negative relationship between fi nance and the level of income inequal-
ity as measured by the Gini coeffi cient, a fi nding confi rmed by Clarke, 
Xu, and Zhou (2006), using both cross-sectional and panel regressions 
and instrumental variable methods. 
In some countries, far more than the bottom 20 percent are poor when 
measured against the international standard poverty lines of $1 or $2 a day; 
in other countries almost nobody is poor by these demanding standards. 
To look more directly at the impact of fi nancial development on absolute 
poverty, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007) also estimate the change 
in the share of each country’s population below the international poverty 
line that results from fi nancial deepening. Again, they fi nd a robust effect 
of fi nance on poverty alleviation—countries with higher levels of fi nancial 
development experienced faster reductions in the share of population living 
on less than $1 a day over the 1980s and 1990s (fi gure 3.1).
The economic impact is strong as well, as discussed in box 3.2. The 
relative importance of economic growth and the distributional impact 
of fi nance vary according to initial conditions: not surprisingly, the 
distributional impact is strongest for countries with relatively high per 
capita income and a very unequal income distribution, while the growth 
impact is strongest in relatively poor countries with a relatively equal 
income distribution. 
This fi nance-poverty evidence is consistent with the fi ndings of 
Honohan (2004), who showed that even among societies with the same 
average income, those with deeper fi nancial systems have lower absolute 
poverty. These fi ndings all point in the same direction: policies fostering 
fi nancial sector development are not only pro-growth, but also pro-poor 
in both relative and absolute senses.9
—and lowers poverty
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The cross-country evidence has the merit of broad coverage, but the 
quality of the data is uneven from country to country. Gini coeffi cients, 
quintile shares, and poverty headcounts are all subject to substantial mea-
surement problems.10 The shortcomings of fi nancial depth as a measure 
of fi nancial development, let alone fi nancial access, have already been 
pointed out. That the results obtained with aggregate data are stronger 
than the results of the micro studies cited earlier may point to the poten-
tially greater importance of spillover effects, which are not captured by 
micro studies. But the stronger results may also refl ect the diffi culty of 
controlling for reverse causality in cross-country regressions. It is there-
fore important to seek additional types of evidence for systemic effects 
of improved fi nancial access. Two policy changes that can be thought 
of as akin to natural experiments point in the same direction.
One experiment involved the Indian government’s policy on bank 
branching, imposed between 1977 and 1990. In those years a com-
mercial bank in India was allowed to open one new branch in a district 
that already had a bank presence only after it opened four branches in 
areas without a bank presence. This policy led to the opening of 30,000 
Figure 3.1 Financial depth and poverty alleviation
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007). 
Note: This fi gure is a partial scatter plot of growth of poverty headcount vs. private credit to 


























from Indian regulations 
shows the impact of 
improved access—
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new rural branches over the period, as well as to an increase in deposit 
and credit volume in states with initially low levels of fi nancial develop-
ment. Burgess and Pande (2005) fi nd that as a result of this branching 
regulation, nonagricultural output grew faster, and poverty declined 
faster, in states that started the period with a lower level of fi nancial 
development, while the opposite was true before and after this period 
of regulation. Further, wages of agricultural workers grew faster during 
this period, while the wages of urban factory workers do not show such 
a time pattern. This seems to suggest that fi nancial development—trig-
gered by the branching regulation—led to faster reductions in poverty. 
The cost-benefi t calculation of this policy, though, is a different matter 
(see box 4.3 in chapter 4) and suggests that the macroeconomic costs 
might have been signifi cant.
Another natural experiment is offered by the branching deregulation 
implemented by different U.S. states over a 20-year period from the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Following Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), 
a large literature has evaluated the effect that easing restrictions on 
intra- and interstate branching had on income growth, banking sector 
structure, and entrepreneurial activity. The variation in timing of the 
JUDGING FROM THE REGRESSIONS ESTIMATED BY 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007), the rela-
tion between fi nancial depth and poverty is not only 
causal and statistically signifi cant but sizable. Even 
after account is taken of the effect of other control 
variables, almost 30 percent of the cross-country 
variation in changing poverty rates can be attributed 
to cross-country variation in fi nancial development. 
Consider, for example, the fact that the share of the 
population in deep poverty (less than $1 a day) fell 
by 14 percent a year in Chile between 1987 and 
2000, whereas it rose at a similar rate in neighbor-
ing Peru. Chile has a much deeper fi nancial sector 
(private credit is 47 percent of GDP) than Peru 
(private credit is 17 percent of GDP). The estimated 
regression implies that had Peru started with the 
same fi nancial depth as Chile, its poverty headcount 
would have grown a full 5 percentage points more 
slowly, so that by 2002, just 5 percent of Peru’s 
population would have been living on less than $1 
a day instead of the actual share of 10 percent. 
Such comparisons have to be interpreted with cau-
tion, though, for several reasons. The regression coef-
fi cients indicate marginal, not large, discrete changes; 
the variable measuring fi nancial depth is only a proxy; 
omission from the equation of other unmeasured 
causal variables may be exaggerating the measured 
impact of fi nancial depth. However, even if one is 
convinced that private credit is associated with faster 
poverty reduction, that is not an invitation to policy 
makers to expand credit freely: attempts to force the 
rate of fi nancial deepening through lax monetary 
policy, for example, will not generate true fi nancial 
development and will prove to be unsustainable. 
Box 3.2 Financial depth and poverty reduction: how big is the effect?
—as does one from the U.S. 
experience with liberalization
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deregulation over a 20-year period and the fact that the deregulation was 
not driven by expectations of higher growth or higher entrepreneurial 
activity allow researchers to perform difference-in-differences estimates, 
thus holding constant unobserved state-level and year effects. Beck, 
Levine, and Levkov (2007) exploit the same quasi-natural experiment 
to assess the effect of branching deregulation on income inequality; they 
fi nd that states see their Gini coeffi cient decrease by a small but statisti-
cally signifi cant amount in the years after deregulation relative to other 
states and relative to their own level before the deregulation (fi gure 3.2). 
This effect eliminated about one-sixth of the overall increase in income 
inequality that the United States experienced over this time period. Over 
three-quarters of the inequality reduction after deregulation comes from 
changes in the distribution of income among wage and salary earners, with 
less than a fi fth coming from distributional changes among self-employed 
proprietors, suggesting that the main effect of branch deregulation on 
income inequality in this case is not enhanced entrepreneurship, but rather 
the indirect effects of higher labor demand and higher wages. 
Figure 3.2 Branch deregulation across U.S. states and income inequality
Source: Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2007).
Note: This graph illustrates a regression of the log of the Gini coeffi cient across U.S. states and 
over the years 1977 to 2003 on state and year dummies, other time-variant state characteristics 
and dummy variables indicating t + x years, where t is the year of branch deregulation and x goes 
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Of course care must be taken in extrapolating fi ndings from a system 
as developed as that of the United States, where most households have 
at least some access to formal fi nancial services, in contrast to the situ-
ation in low- and middle-income countries. Nevertheless, these results 
are consistent with the results obtained by Giné and Townsend (2004) 
for the effects of fi nancial liberalization in Thailand.
Despite the theoretical possibility that a selective expansion of access 
to fi nance could initially worsen income inequality, and methodological 
challenges notwithstanding (see box 3.3 for a summary), the balance of 
evidence from specifi c quasi-experimental events, estimation of general 
equilibrium models, and broad cross-country regressions is that fi nancial 
development and improved access to credit tends not only to accelerate 
economic growth but to lower household poverty and inequality.
Much remains to be learned about the channels through which fi nan-
cial development affects income inequality and poverty alleviation. Is it 
through providing access to credit to a larger proportion of the population 
or through fostering more effi cient capital allocation, that is, through 
fostering more competitive and open markets? Is it through depth or 
through broader access that fi nance helps reduce income inequality and 
poverty? Given the wide differences that exist in fi nancial inclusion across 
countries, to what extent do these effects depend on the initial level of 
fi nancial access and economic development?
Since the strongest evidence for a favorable fi nance-inequality rela-
tionship points to important labor market effects of fi nancial deepening 
and broadening, one must consider whether direct provision of fi nancial 
services to the very poor is the best way to use fi nance to help the poor. 
Indeed, improving access for small fi rms and for nonpoor entrepreneurial 
households can be a powerful mechanism for helping reduce poverty. It 
is easy to see that fi nancing opportunities for the nonpoor in particu-
lar regions or among particular ethnic groups could help improve the 
functioning of labor and product markets and the effi ciency of invest-
ment, leading to better employment opportunities for the poor in those 
regions as well.
The discussion so far has focused exclusively on the use of credit ser-
vices, since that is the fi nancial service the literature has focused on most 
extensively. However, credit is rarely the fi rst fi nancial service priority 
for very poor households. Access to savings and insurance services helps 
cushion income shocks and smooth consumption, while access to formal 
In summary, improved access 
to fi nance reduces inequality 
and poverty—
—but the nature of the 
transmission mechanisms 
is unclear—
—with evidence suggesting that 
the indirect effects on poverty 
may be more important
Poor households need other 
fi nancial services, not just 
access to credit
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BOTH THE TECHNICAL ADVANCES IN COMPUTING 
power and the availability of subnational and even 
household data have helped researchers move beyond 
cross-country regression analysis to assess the rela-
tionship between fi nance, growth, and inequality 
and thus overcome problems of endogeneity, hetero-
geneity of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables across countries, and nonlinear 
effects. Some of these strategies use innovative his-
torical instruments and panel data. However, even 
employing fi rm- or household-level data, be it within 
or across countries, does not by itself solve the iden-
tifi cation problem of endogeneity and spurious cor-
relations, as the debate between Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) and Morduch (1998) has shown. Identifying 
an exogenous policy change, preferably at different 
times across subnational units, overcomes selection 
problems by utilizing a difference-in-differences esti-
mator that holds constant other confounding effects. 
Two such examples, the social banking experiment in 
India, and the branching deregulation in the United 
States, are discussed in the text. 
However, such quasi-natural experiments are rare, 
and researchers have therefore also exploited general 
equilibrium models and household-level micro data 
to calibrate them. This technique has the advantage 
of being thoroughly based in theory and control-
ling for dynamic effects, unlike regression analysis. 
At the same time, its application is limited by the 
variables included in the theoretical models and 
by the availability of household data. While these 
structural models are promising in improving the 
understanding of the micro foundations of growth 
and inequality, it is not always clear how much the 
insights from these stylized models rely on specifi c 
details of how the imperfections were modeled and 
whether the results are robust to these choices. 
Another valuable approach is the use of controlled 
or natural experiments in specifi c countries or in 
specifi c locations, such as the one undertaken by 
Karlan and Zinman (2006a) in South Africa and 
others discussed here in the context of evaluating the 
impact of microfi nance. Of course, natural experi-
ments are scarce, and controlled experiments can 
be costly to implement and their results specifi c to 
their context. In addition, they necessarily measure 
partial equilibrium effects and, unlike aggregate 
studies, do not pick up spillover and indirect effects. 
Furthermore, many important policy issues with 
implications for fi nancial access, such as regulation 
and supervision of fi nancial institutions, involve 
country-level variation and do not lend themselves 
to randomization. 
Finally, laboratory experiments work with 
potential clients or people with similar profi les and 
mimic different fi nancial contract mechanisms. 
Experimental games have the advantage of allowing 
researchers to have even more control of events, but 
they also have the shortcoming of being a staged 
setting that might or might not be consistent with 
real life behavior. 
Given that each methodological approach has 
its advantages and shortcomings, a robust research 
philosophy would try to identify the most important 
policy questions and to employ appropriate and 
feasible methods for addressing them.
Box 3.3 Methodological challenges in analyzing the impact of fi nancial access
payment services is increasingly important in market-based economies. 
This is an area that requires future research. 
Having established the importance of access to fi nance, the next 
task is to consider what is the best way of reaching out to low-income 
households and microentrepreneurs to foster access to and use of 
credit, savings, and payment services. The following section discusses 
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institutional and product innovations to reach out to these customers 
traditionally excluded by the banking system. 
Providing Financial Access to Households and 
Microentrepreneurs: How and by Whom?
The considerable success of the microfi nance movement, both technically 
and in its ability to mobilize fi nancial and political support, has focused 
attention on direct access to credit for poor people and especially for 
poor women. In what has been an accelerating revolution over the past 
few decades (Robinson 2001), specialized microfi nance institutions have 
reached millions of clients, and many of them have achieved impres-
sive repayment rates, especially when compared with the disappointing 
record of an earlier generation of development banks. Attention has also 
broadened to other types of fi nancial institutions, such as savings banks, 
including postal savings banks, and fi nancial cooperatives and credit 
unions that have also been catering to the fi nancial needs of low-income 
households and microenterprises.
Now mainstream fi nancial institutions are becoming interested in 
the market at the “bottom of the pyramid,” to use the term popularized 
by Prahalad (2004). At the same time, some of the stronger MFIs have 
secured banking licenses and offer a wider range of services to a broader 
clientele. Many have graduated beyond the need for sizable subsidies to 
ensure their fi nancial viability, whereas others still seek subsidies to help 
keep the costs to the borrower to a minimum. There has been much 
experimentation in lending technologies as practitioners fi nd the various 
formulas with which they began unduly constraining. These techniques 
included the use of various forms of mutual guarantee in small or large 
borrower groups (joint liability), and programs of progressively larger 
loan sizes as loans were repaid and new loans given (dynamic incentives). 
To attract savings, fi nancial institutions of all sorts are using new meth-
odologies, such as mobile branches, deposit collectors, and cell phone 
technology, and developing new products, such as commitment savings 
products and micro-insurance policies. 
Against this background, a growing number of researchers has been 
using formal econometric techniques to assess quantitatively some of the 
key operational issues that face MFIs and other providers of fi nancial 
services to small-scale users. The fi ndings—several of them striking in 
The growth of microcredit has 
attracted new players—
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their precision—have used replicable statistical evidence that has either 
confi rmed or questioned practitioner intuition. This section reviews some 
of the main fi ndings in fi ve areas of interest: the relative importance of 
transaction costs and two key information barriers, moral hazard and 
adverse selection, for outreach to low-income borrowers; the sensitivity of 
the demand for microcredit to the level of the interest rate charged; the 
relative effectiveness of group and individual lending; the complemen-
tary role of access to noncredit services; and the link between subsidies 
and outreach to the poor. While most emphasis is placed on credit, the 
discussion also highlights the importance of depository, insurance, and 
especially payments services. Throughout, the discussion emphasizes the 
potential effects of globalization and technological advances on access 
to fi nancial services. It concludes with some observations on the likely 
welfare implications of targeting efforts to expand household access 
to the very poor, noting again that access for nonpoor entrepreneurial 
households can have a sizable antipoverty impact. 
As already discussed, the main problems in delivering credit are 
linked to risk management and the high transaction costs of processing, 
monitoring, and enforcing small loans, which increase break-even interest 
rates for these loans. The risks include those arising out of information 
asymmetries. These asymmetries can result from adverse selection, that 
is, the inability of the lender to distinguish between high- and low-risk 
borrowers, or from moral hazard, that is, the tendency for some borrowers 
to divert resources to projects that reduce their likelihood of being able 
to repay the loan and the inability of the lender to detect and prevent 
such behavior. Depending on the specifi c information asymmetry and 
the ability of potential borrowers to pledge collateral, lenders may try to 
use the interest rate or a combination of the interest rate and collateral 
as a screening and sorting mechanism (Bester 1985). If collateral is not 
available, lenders are forced to rely only on the interest rate, but in doing 
so, they risk excluding, or crowding out, safe borrowers. Indeed, under 
some circumstances lenders will prefer to keep the lending rate below 
the market-clearing level for fear of worsening adverse selection; that 
behavior in effect rations credit by nonprice means (Stiglitz and Weiss 
1981). Even more borrowers will be rationed out if the high transaction 
costs of lending to them lead to break-even interest rates that are too 
high to make lending safe (Williamson 1987).
How relevant and important are these three factors—adverse selec-
tion, moral hazard, and high transaction costs—for credit rationing 
—despite obstacles to 
delivering credit to the poor
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of poor households and microentrepreneurs? The existing evidence 
points to moral hazard as the driving factor, with a less signifi cant role 
for adverse selection. Although high transaction costs can also result in 
high repayment burdens, there is evidence of very high rates of return to 
investment by microentrepreneurs, which explains why some borrowers 
are prepared to pay very high interest rates.
Are the interest rates on microloans too high? Much of the microfi -
nance revolution has been built on the premise that its clients can afford 
to pay high interest rates given very high marginal returns on capital. 
But measuring these returns is challenging. Using fi eld experiments, de 
Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2006) and McKenzie and Woodruff 
(2007) estimate capital returns to investment in microenterprises in light 
manufacturing and commerce in Sri Lanka and Mexico, respectively. 
The enterprises are given cash or equipment, depending on the outcome 
of a lottery, and this exogenous shock is used to compute the return to 
capital. They fi nd returns of 5–7 percent per month in Sri Lanka and 20 
percent or more in Mexico! While these returns might seem high—even 
unrealistically high in the case of Mexico—they are based on grants, not 
loans; are measured only over the short term; and increased capital by 
25 percent on average. Thus, these returns might not be replicable over 
the long term. Nor does it follow that the microentrepreneurs would 
have pursued the same strategies if they had had loans instead of cash or 
equipment. Nevertheless, these estimates suggest that some microentre-
preneurs are indeed able to pay the high interest charged by microfi nance 
institutions, at least where these loan resources are being invested. 
That is not to deny that high interest rates are costly for borrowers, 
especially poor ones. In their eagerness to emphasize the importance for 
the development of sustainable microfi nance by removing constraining 
interest rate ceilings, some advocates may have overstated the insensitivity 
of borrowers to high interest rates. In contrast, Dehejia, Montgomery, 
and Morduch (2005), using data from a credit cooperative in Dhaka, and 
Karlan and Zinman (2007), using data from a South African consumer 
lender, both fi nd rather high elasticities of loan demand with respect to 
interest rates, that is, loan demand decreases as interest rates increase. 
Emran, Morshed, and Stiglitz (2006) provide a theory to reconcile 
these empirical fi ndings with practitioners’ oft-repeated assertions that 
borrowers are insensitive to interest rates. They point to imperfections 
in the labor market, especially for women, and suggest that it is only 
for as long as these imperfections prevent women from entering the 
High returns allow some 
microentrepreneurs to pay 
high interest rates—
—but the demand for 
microcredit is interest-elastic
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labor market that their demand for credit will be so interest inelastic. 
Curiously, the Bangladesh data suggest that the elasticity decreased (in 
absolute value) with the borrower’s income, whereas the South African 
data suggest the opposite. While MFIs in Bangladesh demanding higher 
interest rates to compensate for higher costs and risks may face problems 
reaching out to poorer clients, the South African lender does not seem to 
face these problems. These contrasting results might refl ect differences 
between consumer and production credit or different institutional set-
tings. Ongoing research is trying to shed more light on the interest rate 
elasticity of microcredit borrowers. 
One recent experiment in which interest rates were varied among a 
homogenous group of borrowers suggests that the repayment burden is 
the least of the obstacles the borrowers faced. This experiment points 
to moral hazard, including the inability of the lender to enforce repay-
ment from willful defaulters, as the driving factor limiting outreach 
to the poor. Karlan and Zinman (2006b) used a randomized direct 
mail offer by a South African consumer lender to distinguish between 
adverse selection, moral hazard, and repayment burden, as illustrated 
in fi gure 3.3. Specifi cally, customers were sent credit offers with either 
Moral hazard may be more 
important for default rates 
than repayment burden
Figure 3.3 Testing for credit constraints in South Africa
Source: Karlan and Zinman (2006b). 
Note: This fi gure illustrates the setup of the consumer credit experiment that Karlan and 
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a high or a low interest rate, and the response of customers to this offer 
helps to identify adverse selection, that is, the difference between ex 
ante high-risk and low-risk customers (difference between points 3 and 
5 in fi gure 3.3). Some of the customers with the initial high offer rate 
then received a lower rate when they responded favorably to the offer, 
and the difference between customers with the same high initial offer 
rate (and thus the same ex ante risk profi le) but different fi nal contract 
rate helps identify default due to repayment burden of high interest 
rates (difference between points 1 and 2 in fi gure 3.3). Finally, some 
borrowers were offered the prospect of a repeat loan if they repaid their 
loan in time; the comparison between borrowers with and without this 
dynamic incentive allows identifi cation of moral hazard, that is, incen-
tives to repay (difference between points 2 and 3 and between points 4 
and 5 in fi gure 3.3). Karlan and Zinman fi nd strong evidence for moral 
hazard but evidence for adverse selection only for female borrowers and 
borrowers who had not borrowed from this lender before. The evidence 
for default due to repayment burden is weak. Quantifying the effect of 
moral hazard, they fi nd that between 10 and 15 percent of default is 
due to moral hazard, with the remainder due to observable differences 
in risk across borrowers.11 
The entry of a Guatemalan MFI into a credit bureau offers another 
innovative experimental setup to distinguish between adverse selection 
and moral hazard and yields similar results to those in South Africa (de 
Janvry, McIntosh, and Sadoulet 2006). While this entry was initially not 
announced to borrowers, the subsequent staggered education of borrow-
ers, who were organized in joint-liability groups, allowed the research-
ers to distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection effects. 
Specifi cally, the initial effect on repayment of the announcement of the 
existence of the credit bureau helps isolate and identify moral hazard, 
that is, repayment incentives, as group composition is constant in the 
short run. Subsequent changes in group composition and the effect of 
those changes on repayment, on the other hand, can be attributed to 
adverse selection, that is, selection of lower-risk group members. The 
authors fi nd that delinquency attributable to moral hazard declined 18 
percent. Reductions in delinquency resulting from changes in adverse 
selection, that is, replacement of high-risk with low-risk group members, 
as measured over several loan cycles where groups can adjust their com-
position, are weaker, but still present. The most signifi cant change in 
group composition was a large exit of women and corresponding large 
Adverse selection problems 
might be more pronounced 
among female borrowers
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entry of men, suggesting again that adverse selection problems might 
be more pronounced among female borrowers. 
Summarizing, many microentrepreneurs are able to pay high interest 
rates given high returns on capital. Therefore, the high transaction costs 
associated with small loans, the resulting high interest rates, and thus the 
higher repayment burden do not seem to be obstacles to reaching poor 
households. Rather, outreach to these groups is impeded by the inability 
of poor borrowers to commit the use of loan resources to projects with 
a risk acceptable to the lender and by the inability of lenders to enforce 
repayment. The inability of lenders to distinguish between good and 
bad credit risks before making the loan is also an obstacle, but less so. 
The research reviewed so far, however, points to two techniques that can 
be used to overcome these barriers—joint-liability lending and dynamic 
incentives through repeat lending. 
Joint-Liability Lending and Dynamic Incentives 
The use of joint-liability groups is a traditional tool to overcome the 
hurdles of adverse selection, moral hazard, and monitoring and enforce-
ment costs. Joint liability can reduce all three of these barriers to lend-
ing, but there are trade-offs (see Ghatak and Guinnane 1999 for an 
overview). By pooling borrowers that know each other well and making 
them jointly liable for each others’ loan repayment, the lender effectively 
outsources the screening and monitoring function. Through assortative 
matching—safe (risky) borrowers will join with other safe (risky) bor-
rowers—the lender can screen borrowers by the company they keep. 
Joint-liability lending reduces monitoring and enforcement costs and 
thus allows lower interest rates. These lower rates reduce the repayment 
burden and result in less credit rationing. Most important, lower moni-
toring costs and strong enforcement through social sanctions can reduce 
moral hazard problems in joint-liability credit contracts if borrowers 
decide cooperatively on project choices. However, joint-liability lending 
can also induce strategic default; if good borrowers see the prospect of 
future loans wane because other group members are not repaying their 
loans, they have fewer incentives to repay (Besley and Coate 1995). 
Further, joint-liability lending is not suitable where different members 
of the group have different borrowing needs. 
Joint-liability lending was already being applied by German coopera-
tives in the 19th century. Introduced into the microfi nance movement 
Overcoming obstacles—
joint-liability lending and 
dynamic incentives
FFA_099-142_ch03.indd   118 10/26/07   8:40:15 AM
119
H O U S E H O L D  A C C E S S  T O  F I N A N C E :  P O V E R T Y  A L L E V I A T I O N  A N D  R I S K  M I T I G A T I O N
in the 1980s by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, joint-liability lending 
quickly became popular with pioneer microcredit institutions. Given its 
limitations, however, many MFIs, including Grameen itself, have moved 
away from a pure joint-liability lending model and now also offer indi-
vidual loans. The limitations of relying on just one lending model are also 
refl ected in the results of recent fi eld research, especially some studies that 
have made very effective use of randomized control trials (box 3.4).
How important are reductions in adverse selection, moral hazard, 
or monitoring and enforcement costs for the success of joint-liability 
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF NEW MICROFINANCE 
programs or products requires careful design 
because standard assessments comparing customers 
before and after introduction of a new program or 
product or a comparison between participants and 
nonparticipants suffer from two serious shortcom-
ings (Goldberg and Karlan 2005). First, selection 
bias can occur if there is a correlation between the 
take-up decision of customers and other individual 
characteristics that explain the outcome variable. 
Further, dropouts can bias the comparison between 
program participants and nonparticipants. Second, 
such assessments suffer from a lack of a proper 
counterfactual, that is, how the same group of cli-
ents would have behaved without the new program 
or product. 
To overcome these methodological challenges, 
researchers are increasingly using randomized exper-
iments to assess new microfi nance programs and 
products. The characteristics of these experiments 
can be summarized as follows. First, the evaluation 
has to be prospective; in other words, it has to start 
before the new product is introduced so that the 
changes induced by the product can be properly 
assessed. Second, to have a proper counterfactual, 
the evaluation should be based on comparison of a 
treatment and a control group, where only the fi rst 
has access to the new program or product. Third, 
assignment to either group has to be random to 
ensure that clients in both groups have the same 
characteristics; only then can the effects of the new 
program or product be isolated. Fourth, the research-
ers have to take into account two potential spillover 
effects: experiment spillover, where members of 
treatment and control groups fi nd out about each 
other; and impact spillover, where the effects of the 
new program or product spread to people and areas 
beyond the treatment group.
Although they have limitations, carefully planned 
and executed impact evaluations are a powerful 
instrument both for individual fi nancial institutions 
that want to assess the profi tability and impact of 
new products and programs and for policy makers 
who want to assess which interventions are the most 
promising in reducing poverty. A signifi cant short-
coming is the high costs of such evaluations, which 
prevent many MFIs from using them (Armendáriz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2005). In addition, the 
question of external validity—whether the results 
of the evaluation are applicable in different socio-
economic and institutional contexts—cannot be 
addressed with such experiments.
A fi nal word of caution concerns the use of these 
impact evaluations for public policy or public resources. 
Because no counterfactual or alternative intervention 
is being evaluated, either in the fi nancial sector or for 
nonfi nancial interventions, one has to keep in mind the 
partial equilibrium aspect of these assessments.
Box 3.4 Testing impact with randomized control trials
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lending? Giné and others (2006) fi nd in the setting of laboratory experi-
ments in Peru that both the screening of group members before the loan 
is made and the monitoring of borrowers afterward have an important 
role in the success of joint-liability lending.12 However, they also fi nd 
that joint liability helps reduce moral hazard only when the group forms 
voluntarily. Using household data across members of more than 262 Thai 
joint-liability groups, Ahlin and Townsend (2007) fi nd that informal 
sanctioning, thus ex post reductions in moral hazard, fi ts the data best 
in poor rural areas, while ex ante screening, thus reducing the risk of 
adverse selection, fi ts the data best in more affl uent areas. 
The importance of moral hazard reductions through joint-liability 
lending is confi rmed with evidence from poor rural Peru, where Karlan 
(2007) exploited a natural quasi-random group-building process, where 
members were randomly assigned to groups rather than selecting their 
peer group members themselves. He fi nds that stronger social connec-
tions between group members (as measured by geographic proximity 
and common ethnicity) lead to better repayment and higher savings than 
for groups where social connections are weaker. Given the absence of 
peer selection in this group-building process, Karlan concludes that the 
better repayment behavior is attributable to reductions in moral hazard; 
in other words, joint-liability groups that were more socially connected 
were better able to prevent their members from diverting loan funds to 
risky projects or other purposes.13 He fi nds direct evidence that members 
of groups with better social connections have better knowledge of each 
other and are more likely to punish defaulters by cutting relationships; 
however, they are also more likely to forgive debt, suggesting that peers in 
these groups know how to distinguish between culpable or blameworthy 
default on the one hand, and bad luck on the other. 
However, some evidence suggests that social ties can be too strong, lead-
ing to collusion and lower repayment. Ahlin and Townsend (2007) fi nd 
evidence in their Thai data that stronger social ties, measured by more shar-
ing between unrelated members of the groups and clustering of relatives, are 
associated with lower repayment performance. Similarly, Giné and others 
(2006) fi nd in their laboratory experiment that communication between 
group members leads to higher default due to riskier investments. 
Existing evidence thus clearly shows that group-based joint-liability 
lending can, but does not necessarily, lead to better repayment performance. 
Yet recent evidence has also shed doubt on the superiority of group-based 
lending vis-à-vis individual lending. In an experiment in the Philippines, 
Joint liability can help reduce 
moral hazard when social 
connections are strong—
—but group-based lending 
may not always be better than 
lending to individuals
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some of the borrower groups were randomly converted from group liability 
to individual liability. Giné and Karlan (2006) found that conversion to 
individual liability groups does not change the repayment rate for preexist-
ing borrowers but does attract more borrowers. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
new members have closer links to the other individual liability borrowers, 
suggesting that fear of peer pressure might have been limiting growth of 
existing joint-liability groups. It could also be that the joint-liability nature 
of the program was keeping the good-risk borrowers out of the program. 
Ongoing research is trying to distinguish between new microcredit clients 
that are randomly assigned to either individual or joint-liability lending. 
Some observers have criticized MFIs for making larger loans to indi-
viduals, complaining that the MFIs are drifting from their focus on the 
poor. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007) examined data from 
124 MFIs in 49 countries and fi nd that both group- and individual-based 
lending institutions are able to earn profi ts while serving the poor, but 
a trade-off between profi tability and outreach emerges when serving 
the very poor.14 Individual-based lenders have the highest average profi t 
levels but perform less well on measures of outreach. 
To summarize, joint-liability lending can help overcome barriers to 
reaching poor households and microentrepreneurs and has shown its 
usefulness in many different settings, but it also has its limitations. As 
members’ borrowing needs diverge over time, conversion to individual 
lending might be necessary. Further, diverging borrowing needs might 
also destroy screening and monitoring incentives and may create tension 
among borrowers, as those borrowing little are still liable for the larger 
amounts of their peers. Finally, joint liability can result in collusion and 
increased, rather than reduced, risk taking.
Dynamic incentives, such as the promise of repeat lending, have 
been another mechanism to overcome moral hazard in lending rela-
tionships with risky and high transaction cost borrowers, as shown by 
Karlan and Zinman (2006b) in the context of their work with a South 
African consumer lender. Similarly, Giné and others (2006) fi nd that 
giving borrowers the prospect of repeat loans reduces both the riskiness 
of investment and improves repayment performance. The introduc-
tion of progressive lending, that is, increasing loan amounts over time, 
can further increase the opportunity costs of default for borrowers, 
thus reducing loan delinquency (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 
2005).15 The interaction of joint liability and repeat lending, however, 
can also backfi re; if borrowers see the prospect of future loans wane 
Overcoming moral hazard 
through the promise of 
repeat lending—
FFA_099-142_ch03.indd   121 10/26/07   8:40:17 AM
F I N A N C E  F O R  A L L ?  P O L I C I E S  A N D  P I T F A L L S  I N  E X P A N D I N G  A C C E S S
122
INFORMAL FINANCE IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF THIS 
report, which deals essentially with formal fi nance. 
To be sure, informal fi nancial services still do rep-
resent a signifi cant part of the fi nancial dealings of 
poor people, especially but not only in developing 
countries, although reliable quantifi cation on this 
point is not readily available. An extensive literature 
discusses this area (see Rutherford 1998). 
The reason for focusing on formal fi nance is the 
underlying premise that formal, modern fi nance can 
potentially provide most of the fi nancial services 
needed by poor people with greater effi ciency and 
security than informal fi nance (see box 2.2). Formal 
fi nance has not yet superseded informal fi nance 
largely because the current working practices of for-
mal fi nancial intermediaries are not adapted to pro-
viding services in small packets at a cost that makes 
them affordable to the poor. Technology—fi nancial 
and physical—as well as an improved overall infra-
structure, can help bring costs down to realistic levels, 
but only if the management of formal institutions 
chooses to focus on the potential for doing profi table 
business with what C. K. Prahalad has termed the 
“bottom of the pyramid.” Prahalad’s image conveys 
the potential volume of small-scale business, which 
can make it attractive even if the setup costs (required 
to achieve low unit costs) are high.
At the same time, many features of informal 
fi nance convey lessons that can and have been suc-
cessfully adopted and adapted by formal and semi-
formal intermediaries. Scholars have in particular 
been fascinated by the durability of rotating savings 
and credit associations (ROSCAs), one of the most 
striking forms of informal fi nancial intermediary 
(see, for example, Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). 
Regular payments by each member and assignment 
of the collected resources to one member help over-
come savings and credit constraints, reduce problems 
of cash management and storage, and allow members 
to realize large investments, be they for consump-
tion or business purposes. The use of social capital 
and peer pressure that holds ROSCAs together and 
reduces the threat of default by individual members 
has important parallels to the use of joint-liability 
lending by many MFIs. But ROSCAs cannot hope 
to match the scale of resources of the formal fi nancial 
system, with its ability to pool risks and intermediate 
over extended periods and across geographic areas. 
Hawala and other ethnically based international 
money transfer businesses have achieved astonishing 
effi ciencies for payments along certain migration 
corridors. Corresponding small payments made 
through the banking system’s procedures have gener-
ally been more costly and slower, though of course 
the banking system’s procedures are scalable and the 
network of correspondents is essentially universal, as 
are the networks of the major formal international 
money transmission companies. Funeral insurance 
arrangements are a common product of community-
based informal insurance associations, especially in 
AIDS-plagued Africa. 
The high cost of credit from informal mon-
eylenders is often cited as a main reason why the 
microfi nance revolution can bring benefi ts to the 
poor (Robinson 2001). The possibility of providing 
alternative formal fi nancial solutions for those who 
might otherwise fall into the trap of debt bondage 
is for many a suffi cient reason to emphasize the 
need for improving the reach of the formal fi nan-
cial sector. Yet unregistered (and therefore usually) 
illegal moneylenders continue to operate in deprived 
neighborhoods of even the richest economies (as is 
discussed in chapter 4). The shortcomings of infor-
mal fi nance mean that it will fade in importance 
as economies and fi nancial systems mature and 
improve in their outreach.
Box 3.5 Informal fi nance
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as other members fail to repay, their incentives to repay decrease. The 
Ecuadorian microlender Childreach is an example: as rumors of its 
impending failure spread, the microlender faced a rapid increase in loan 
delinquency (Bond and Rai 2002).
Other mechanisms linked to the microcredit movement have not been 
thoroughly assessed yet. Specifi cally, frequent (weekly, for example) and 
regular repayments are said to impose discipline on borrowers. On the 
one hand, repayment schedules that are too frequent might limit the 
investment opportunities of borrowers and are useful only for borrowers 
with several diversifi ed income sources. Some observers even claim that 
frequent repayment schedules are paid out of savings rather than from 
returns on investment (Rutherford 1998). In those cases, providing credit 
services is only a second-best solution, and the fi rst-best would be the 
provision of savings services for the poor. On the other hand, frequent 
repayment might also be a tool of MFIs to use better informed informal 
lenders, inasmuch as some borrowers have to rely on these moneylenders 
to help them make weekly payments (Jain and Mansuri 2003).
Some other microlending techniques include repayment in public, 
forced savings, notional collateral, and targeting of women. Public repay-
ment is said to increase social pressure and the threat of stigma, while 
at the same time reducing transaction costs for lenders (Armendáriz de 
Aghion and Morduch 2005). The requirement to keep a certain frac-
tion of the credit as savings with the microfi nance institution has often 
been cited as a success factor, although the practice has not yet been 
thoroughly evaluated. The use of assets with “notional” rather than 
resale or salvage value, such as refrigerators and televisions, has often 
been quoted as increasing the leverage of the lender over the borrower 
and augmenting payment discipline. Finally, the targeting of women by 
microlenders has been indicated as a factor for commercial success as 
well as enhanced social benefi t (box 3.6). 
Most of the microcredit movement and literature has focused on 
production credit for household enterprises or microenterprises. But even 
if lack of fi nancing is fundamentally the only constraint for poor micro-
entrepreneurs, as is asserted by Muhamed Yunus, founder of Grameen 
Bank and winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, they do also face 
numerous practical challenges. Hence some MFIs have decided to offer 
complementary extension services, such as training or health services. 
Are they wise to do so? There could be economies of scope in providing 
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Karlan and Valdivia (2006), and Ashraf, Giné and, Karlan (2007) fi nd 
that MFIs that offer extension services have higher client retention and 
better repayment performance than MFIs that do not offer such services. 
Their clients also have better business outcomes. 
Even the limited focus on production credit might be mistaken. 
Recent analysis of survey data from Indonesia suggests MFI clients use 
credit as much for consumption as for investment purposes (Johnston 
and Morduch 2007). This fi nding applies not only to households that 
do not run microenterprises but even to a quarter of microentrepreneur 
households (fi gure 3.4). As discussed earlier, consumer credit is also the 
THE MICROCREDIT MOVEMENT HAS FOCUSED 
on women, with some programs providing services 
exclusively for women and others having a majority 
of female borrowers. Why this focus on women? 
First, women traditionally face greater access 
barriers to formal banking services and are thus 
also credit-constrained to a greater extent than men. 
In some countries, women are legally barred from 
opening accounts or applying for credit. In most of 
the developing world, women would not be deemed 
creditworthy since they do not hold formal sector 
jobs or the titles to their houses. Many restrictions 
faced by the poor in the developing world are thus 
even more exacerbated for women. As discussed 
by Emran, Moshed, and Stiglitz (2006), women 
also have lower opportunity costs if they do not 
hold formal sector jobs and are thus more likely to 
pay the high interest rates required for sustainable 
microfi nance. 
Second, experience has shown that repayment is 
higher among female borrowers, mostly due to more 
conservative investments and lower moral hazard 
risk. The lower moral hazard risk might stem from 
lower mobility and higher risk aversion. Given that 
moral hazard seems to be the constraining factor in 
outreach to low-income households, women might 
therefore be the more attractive clients. While 
adverse selection might be more problematic among 
women, the joint-liability technique can control for 
this risk. 
Third, some practitioners stress social objec-
tives as women seem to be more concerned about 
children’s health and education than their husbands. 
As already discussed, Pitt and Khandker (1998) and 
Khandker (2003) fi nd a stronger effect of Grameen 
Bank in Bangladesh on female than on male borrow-
ers. For example, Khandker (2003) shows that the 
impact of credit on nonfood expenditures is higher 
among female compared to male borrowers. 
Finally, focusing on women might empower 
them in the intrafamily decision process, as shown 
by Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006b); use of a com-
mitment savings product increased expenditures on 
female durable goods. Similarly, access to credit and 
the subsequent establishment of a microenterprise 
might give women more say in intrahousehold deci-
sions, as Johnson and Morduch (2007) illustrates 
with some anecdotes from Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, 
and Zambia. Providing access to fi nancial services 
for female savers and borrowers might thus directly 
contribute to the Millennium Development Goal of 
gender equality (box 3.1). For a detailed discussion 
of gender and credit, see Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005, chapter 7).
Box 3.6 Microfi nance and gender 
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only credit type shown to be robustly linked with higher household wel-
fare (Karlan and Zinman 2006b). This is not a negative outcome, but it 
does suggest a very different vision of microfi nance from the original. 
In addition to the reluctance of traditional lenders to reach out to 
low-income households and microentrepreneurs, risk-averse producers 
might be reluctant to take up loans. While credit-fi nanced microenter-
prise might increase the level of income, it might also increase its varia-
tion. Indeed, in their survey Johnston and Morduch (2007) fi nd a large 
group of households that do not want credit although they are deemed 
creditworthy by offi cials of a microcredit institution. 
While research on a randomly chosen sample of entrepreneurs in 
Sri Lanka fi nds credit constraints are the main reason for the lack of 
expanding business, not missing insurance markets (de Mel, McKenzie, 
and Woodruff 2006), take-up of credit might be increased if coupled 
with a proper insurance mechanism. This might be especially true for 
agricultural producers who are subject to high price and yield volatility. 
Figure 3.4 Use of microcredit for consumption purposes
Source: Johnston and Morduch (2007). 
Note: This fi gure shows the percentage of surveyed Bank Rakyat Indonesia customers at differ-
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Insurance products with or without credit might thus help these farm-
ers expand without taking on too much additional risk. Traditional 
insurance to farmers to protect them against climatic and other shocks 
has proved costly and unmarketable because of high moral hazard risk 
from misreporting. As an alternative, insurers have developed weather 
index insurance, which compensates farmers according to objectively 
verifi able benchmarks likely to be correlated with the actual damage 
the farmer has suffered.
How successful are such insurance schemes? Giné, Townsend, and 
Vickery (2007) assess the introduction of a rainfall insurance product, 
fi rst designed by a large insurance company in southern India in 2004 
and marketed by a microfi nance institution. In villages where policies 
were sold, the authors fi nd that less than 5 percent of the targeted popula-
tion buys the insurance product and less than 3 percent of the purchasers 
change their production patterns. Why such low uptake of the product? 
The most common reason given for not buying the insurance, accord-
ing to Giné, Townsend, and Vickery (2007), is lack of understanding 
of the product. The cost of insurance combined with credit constraints 
constitute another powerful factor explaining the lack of take-up. Lack of 
trust that the insurer would pay claims promptly or at all if the insurable 
event occurs is likely also a factor—not unwarranted given the experi-
ence with many fi nancial innovations in low-income environments in 
the past. Overall, it seems the insurance product did not reach the most 
vulnerable households that would benefi t most from it. 
In a similar experiment in Malawi, farmers were randomly offered 
the choice between a simple credit contract or one that combined 
credit with insurance (Giné and Yang 2007). The latter is effectively a 
contingent credit contract, that is, a loan that has to be repaid only in 
good times. Surprisingly, the take-up of the credit-insurance contract 
was signifi cantly lower than the take-up of the credit contract, and 
the difference cannot be explained by the cost of including insurance. 
Unlike microcredit, microinsurance products are still in their infancy, 
so it is too early to draw defi nite conclusions. But this research shows 
the substantial barriers that providers have to overcome to market the 
product effectively to the target population. 
Rainfall insurance is only one of the microinsurance products that 
have been developed over the past years. Life and health insurance poli-
cies are increasingly offered by both commercial and nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) insurance institutions. For such policies to be viable 
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for a commercial insurer, there needs to be a delivery channel with which 
potential clients are familiar, such as an MFI or an NGO (as in the two 
cases discussed). While a large practitioners’ literature discusses these 
different products and delivery mechanisms, rigorous research assessing 
their impact is still to be conducted.16 
To what extent do poor households really need credit? In the absence 
of credit, the poor might simply accumulate savings over time before 
investing and thus overcome credit constraints. If they are too poor 
to accumulate savings, access to credit can improve their incomes, 
although poor households might run the risk of overindebtedness. Dale 
Adams and others argue that better savings vehicles, not what they call 
“microdebt,” are the fi nancial service most needed by most of the poor: 
rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and microcredit 
are thus seen as imperfect tools to address savings constraints (Adams 
and von Pischke 1992; Rutherford 1998). This school also argues that 
despite popular beliefs to the contrary, the fact that the poor are capable 
of weekly repayments shows that the poor are capable of saving, even if 
it is only in small amounts (Rutherford 1998). 
Why are poor households less likely to save in monetary forms, that 
is, through the banking system, than other households? One constraint 
is certainly the geographic distance to bank outlets. A large share of 
the poor population in many developing countries is still concentrated 
in rural areas, and banking systems in developing countries typically 
concentrate their branch network in urban areas. That geographic access 
can matter for monetary savings is shown by the analysis of a pseudo-
natural experiment in Mexico. Specifi cally, Aportela (1999) analyzed 
the results of the expansion of a government-owned Mexican savings 
institute in the early 1990s. This expansion happened only in some states, 
and there seems to be no signifi cant correlation of state characteristics 
with the expansion programs. Computing savings rates of low-income 
households from survey responses before and after the expansion started, 
Aportela shows that the expansion increased the savings rate of low-
income households—the ones targeted by the expansion in the fi rst 
place—but had no effect on high-income households. In addition, the 
increased fi nancial savings did not seem to crowd out other informal 
ways of savings: there was a positive net effect on the overall savings of 
the typical household. 
The importance of geographic proximity points to local savings 
banks and post offi ce networks as important tools for attracting savings 
—and microsavings
Geographic distance is an 
important barrier to savings 
for many households
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by low-income households. In 19th century Germany, municipalities 
established local savings banks to do just that. The fact that almost all 
adults in most countries in continental western Europe have checking 
or savings accounts is often attributed to the dense networks of savings 
and cooperative banks. Similarly, postal savings banks have traditionally 
played an important role in the rural and more remote areas of many 
developed and developing countries, despite their often weak fi nancial 
structure and suboptimal service provision.
Lack of geographic access is not the only impediment to saving in mon-
etary form, however. Time inconsistency problems—short-run impatience 
(high discount factors in the near future) and long-run patience (low dis-
count factors in the far future)—could explain why many individuals often 
regret how little they have saved. Confl icts within households over savings 
can also result in undersaving. In developing countries as in developed, a 
variety of commitment devices are used to help overcome such problems. 
Indeed, some of the practices of the informal ROSCAs can be rationalized 
in this way. Microfi nance institutions around the world offer a wide variety 
of savings commitment devices for their clients (Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin 
2003). But do these commitment devices work in increasing savings? Do 
they infl uence intrahousehold decision processes and consumption-savings 
patterns? Several recent papers assess these questions. 
Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006b, c) assess the effect of a commitment 
product where savers commit to forgo their access to savings accounts 
until a specifi c date or until they have reached a precommitted balance. 
Specifi cally, the authors conducted an experiment by randomly giving 
half of 1,800 existing or former clients of a rural Philippine bank the 
option to save through a commitment savings account (a locked box) 
that allowed them access to the funds only after they reached a self-set 
date or a self-set amount of savings. Only 28 percent of clients decided to 
take up this product, but Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin fi nd an increase of 81 
percent in average savings balances of account holders who participated 
in the scheme over a 12-month period. This effect was not sustained, 
however; after 30 months the average balance was only 33 percent higher 
than the average balance of nonparticipants and the difference was no 
longer signifi cant; many clients stopped saving with the commitment 
product after an initial period. At the same time, this commitment device 
led to a shift in the power of decision making by women, which was seen 
in higher investment in durable goods associated with women, such as 
washing and sewing machines and kitchen appliances. 
Commitment devices may 
encourage savings
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Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006a) assess the effect of another technique 
to attract savings, designed to overcome both the problem of geographic 
distance and the lack of commitment, namely, door-to-door collection 
of savings. Among those who did take up this service, savings increased 
by 25 percent over a 15-month period, while borrowing went down; it 
is possible that savings, rather than borrowing, were thus used for con-
sumption smoothing. Households accepting this service lived farther 
away from the nearest bank branch, thus indicating the importance of 
travel costs; and they were more likely to be married, again showing the 
importance of intrahousehold confl icts in the savings decision. The fact 
that the offer of a convenient savings instrument reduced borrowing is 
yet more evidence for those who interpret microcredit take-up as a sur-
rogate solution in the absence of savings opportunities. 
Geographic impediments and intrahousehold confl icts are only some 
of the barriers poor people face in accessing savings services offered by 
fi nancial institutions, as discussed in chapter 1. Continuing research 
in Indonesia is exploring other dimensions such as barriers related to 
affordability and fi nancial literacy. 
While access to fi nancial services, such as credit or savings services, 
has received a great deal of attention in recent years, access to payments 
services has generated even more attention. Increased globalization has 
heightened demand for these services. International remittances, funds 
earned by migrants abroad and sent to their families in developing coun-
tries, have grown so dramatically in recent years that they have become 
the second largest source of external fi nance for developing countries 
after foreign direct investment (fi gure 3.5).17 Moreover, a large share of 
the population in developing countries receives remittances. Relative to 
private capital fl ows, remittance fl ows tend to be relatively stable and 
countercyclical, that is, they increase in times of crisis. Technological 
advances have also become important for remittance fl ows, as the increas-
ing trend to send remittances through ATMs and cell phones shows.
Remittances sent through formal channels are commonly subject to 
high costs. These high costs drive many remittance senders to informal 
remittance agencies. Furthermore, the costs of sending remittances have 
important implications for the amount of remittances sent. Yang (2007) 
shows that Philippine migrants sent lower remittances in foreign cur-
rency when the Philippine peso depreciated, suggesting that they want 
their families to receive a fi xed amount in pesos. Gibson, McKenzie, 
and Rohorua (2006) show a negative cost elasticity for Tonga of 0.22; 
Demand for payments 
services has increased
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if the cost of sending the remittances were reduced to levels in more 
competitive markets around the world, they compute an increase of 28 
percent in remittances—an amount that would constitute 4 percent of 
Tonga’s GDP. 
A lack of bank competition and fi nancial underdevelopment seem to 
explain the high costs of formal remittances. The typical remittance fee 
is priced as a two-part tariff, consisting of a fi xed fee regardless of the 
amount sent, and a variable fee arising from the exchange rate commis-
sion. As a result, the average fee for sending remittances decreases as the 
remittance amount increases, so the small amounts that are typically sent 
are subject to high costs. But remittance costs vary signifi cantly across 
corridors. The decrease in fees in the U.S.-Mexico corridor, for example, 
has been attributed to a higher degree of competition in the remittance 
market (Hernandez-Coss 2005). In the Tonga-New Zealand corridor, 
where competition is minimal and migrants lack information about 
available options, the fees are three times as high as in the U.S.-Mexico 
Figure 3.5 Remittance fl ows across countries
Source: World Bank (2005, World Development Indicators).
Note: This fi gure shows remittance fl ows through offi cial channels as a proportion of GDP for 
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corridor (box 3.7). The example of Tonga also illustrates an important 
factor explaining high remittance costs: lack of bank penetration not only 
reduces competition but also makes remittances more expensive if the 
alternative money transfer operators have only indirect access (through 
banks) to the payment system. 
Tonga provides just one example of how expanded access to modern 
technologies can help. Technology can make business processes more 
effi cient for fi nancial institutions as well as increase access possibilities 
for customers. Technological advances can reduce the costs of bank-
ing, effectively enabling outreach further down the income pyramid to 
customers with demand for smaller transaction amounts.18 For example, 
payment systems based on electronic fund transfers rather than checks 
can substantially reduce the costs of payment transfers. Cell-phone-based 
fi nancial transactions (also referred to as m-banking or m-fi nance, with 
the m standing for mobile phone) have gained prominence in recent years. 
There are more cell-phone users in Sub-Saharan Africa than holders 
of bank accounts, and the use of cell phones for fi nancial transactions 
has increased rapidly in recent years. How far this technology can go 
in pushing out the access frontier is still subject to debate, however. 
Porteous (2006) fi nds that use of m-banking services in South Africa is 
predominantly concentrated among existing bank customers, with only 
a few providers targeting those without accounts. 
Technology can also affect customers directly. The introduction 
of ATMs has not only increased accessibility of accounts to 24 hours 
a day, thus improving convenience, but has also expanded the range 
of customers. Financial institutions in several Sub-Saharan African 
countries have introduced transaction accounts that are purely ATM 
based; customers do not have to enter banking halls, a cultural barrier 
for many Africans without bank accounts. Providing fi nancial services 
through ATMs is also cheaper for the fi nancial institution. And by 
encouraging channeling of payments such as remittances through 
the formal banking system, technological advances may broaden the 
deposit base of banks, allowing them to intermediate more funds to the 
private sector. If the banks can learn over time about their clients and 
their creditworthiness, including remittance recipients in the formal 
banking system as depositors, at least some of those customers may 
become borrowers. Receiving remittances through the formal banking 
system thus might enable recipients to gain access to other fi nancial 
services as well. Two recent studies show that remittance fl ows pull new 
—can be overcome with 
technology
Technology can also expand 
the customer base
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customers into the formal banking system. Combining municipality-
level and household survey data for Mexico, Demirgüç-Kunt and others 
(2007) fi nd a positive relationship between the share of households in 
a municipality that receives remittances and total deposits to GDP, 
deposit accounts per capita, and branches per capita, but no signifi cant 
relationship with total credit to GDP. Using household survey data for 
El Salvador, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria (2007) fi nd evidence 
that channeling remittances through the banking system increases 
banking outreach; the likelihood that the recipient has a bank account 
is twice as high if the remittances are received through the banking 
system than if they are received through informal channels, although 
there is no effect on the credit side.19 
R E M I T T A N C E S  A R E  E X T R A O R D I N A R I L Y 
important in Tonga, where they constitute more than 
30 percent of GDP and account for 20 percent of 
monetary household income (Gibson, McKenzie, 
and Rohorua 2006) Despite their importance, the 
transaction costs of sending remittances to Tonga 
by the most widely used methods are high. Typical 
transactions costs average 15–20 percent of the 
remittance amount for bank drafts, telegraphic 
transfers through banks, transactions through 
Western Union, and transactions through Melie mei 
Langi, a church-based money transfer operation. In 
contrast, transferring money through an ATM card 
linked to a New Zealand bank account set up by the 
sender costs less than 5 percent, but this method is 
not widely used. The cost spread between the more 
popular methods and ATMs means a potential loss 
for Tonga equivalent to 4 percent of GDP.
What accounts for the underuse of ATMs? Gibson 
and others (2006) use a survey among Tongan 
immigrants in New Zealand to explore this puzzle. 
First, the immigrants seem to lack knowledge: only 
2 percent of those surveyed knew how to use an 
ATM to send money, and few knew of the hidden 
exchange rate premiums that increase the cost of 
other methods. Second, distance of recipients from an 
ATM in Tonga outside the capital city of Nuku’alofa 
limits access to this method. The fi gure below shows 
the coverage areas of ATM machines and Western 
Union outlets on the main island of Tongatapu. 
Although there are more ATMs than Western Union 
outlets, the ATMs are concentrated in Nuku’alofa, 
and cover only 77 percent of the population within a 
10 kilometer radius, whereas Western Union reaches 
97 percent of that population. Finally, three-quarters 
of respondents indicated they would not use ATMs 
as a method of remitting because they did not trust 
them, fearing unauthorized withdrawals and card 
skimming among other things. 
This analysis suggests several ways for fi nancial 
sector policy to improve both the demand for and 
supply of newer and cheaper remittance technolo-
gies. In particular, more attention needs to be given 
to improving the fi nancial literacy of migrants and 
Box 3.7 Why don’t migrants use the cheapest methods? Evidence from Tongan 
migrants in New Zealand
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Reaching Out to the Poor or to the Excluded?
Thirty years after the establishment of Grameen Bank, the microfi nance 
movement has attained a certain maturity. Microfi nance increases 
access to fi nancial services for those participating in the program, and, 
because of lower staff salaries and lack of posh banking halls, it does so 
at lower operating costs than commercial banks can. Nonetheless, most 
microfi nance programs still incur high unit costs because of the small 
size of loans. As a result, a large proportion of the institutions—albeit 
mostly the smaller ones—are dependent on subsidies (Robinson 2001; 
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch 2005), and there is a continuing 
discussion about the fi nancial sustainability of microcredit, regarding 
both its feasibility and desirability. Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 
providing them with clear and accurate informa-
tion about the alternatives available for remitting. 
Community newspapers and associations could play 
an important role in disseminating this information. 
Second, expansion of access to modern technolo-
gies in the remittance-receiving country is needed 
to match the convenience and service offered by 
traditional money transfer operators.
Box 3.7 (continued)
Service areas of ATMs and Western Union on Tongatapu, Tonga


















Many microfi nance institutions 
require subsidies—
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(2007) looked at a sample of 124 MFIs in 49 countries representing 
around 50 percent of all microfi nance clients around the globe, most 
likely, the more profi table and cost-effi cient institutions. The authors 
fi nd that even in this select group, only half of the institutions were 
profi table and fi nancially self-sustainable, generating suffi cient revenue 
to cover their costs (fi gure 3.6). 
One of the reasons for this lack of self-sustainability might be the lack 
of scale; only in eight countries do microfi nance borrowers account for 
more than 2 percent of the population (Honohan 2004, fi gure 3.7), and 
most individual MFIs seem to be too small to reap the necessary scale 
economies to become fi nancially sustainable (fi gure 3.8). At the same 
time, as MFIs grow and mature, they seem to focus less on the poor (Cull, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch 2007), which could be interpreted either 
as a success story for their borrowers or as mission drift.
Microfi nance also suffers from another important limitation: for many 
MFIs, scaling up to nonpoor customers will be diffi cult, as will be the 
ability of MFIs to accompany their customers as they grow richer. Joint-
liability lending relies on groups of borrowers with similar borrowing 
needs, and the profi tability of the approach relies on large numbers of 
—raising questions 
about sustainability
Figure 3.6 Financial self-suffi ciency and subsidy dependence
Source: Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Morduch (2007).
Note: This fi gure shows the fi nancial self-sustainability (ability to generate suffi cient revenue 
to cover costs) of 124 MFIs across 49 countries, with the blue bars indicating MFIs in the top 
25th percentiles in subsidy dependence (given by share of subsidies as a proportion of total 
liabilities plus equity).
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Figure 3.7 Microfi nance penetration across countries
Source: Honohan (2004).
Note: This fi gure shows the ratio of borrowing clients to total population for the 20 countries 
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Figure 3.8 Distribution of MFIs by size of outreach
Source: Updated from Honohan (2004).
Note: This fi gure shows that the top 10 MFIs reporting to the Microcredit Summit (Daley-
Harris, 2006) accounted for 66 percent of the total number of MFI customers in the world. At the 
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borrowers and groups. The higher borrowers are on the income ladder 
and the larger the size of the enterprise, however, the more divergent are 
borrower characteristics and borrowing needs. Not surprisingly, loans 
made by individual-based microlending institutions are larger on aver-
age than loans made by MFIs using joint-liability lending. Furthermore, 
larger average loan sizes also imply lower costs (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Morduch 2007).
MFIs in most cases do not have suffi cient resources to fulfi ll the bor-
rowing needs of larger microenterprises. And microenterprises might 
no longer be willing and able to pay the higher MFI interest rates as 
they expand. MFIs are constrained by the lack of savings mobilization 
and their reliance on donor resources. Especially in developing coun-
tries, only the formal banking system has suffi cient resources to fulfi ll 
the borrowing needs of their economies’ private sectors. The obvious 
solution—linking the microcredit sector with the banking sector—has 
therefore become an increasingly popular solution. In several countries, 
such as Bolivia and Uganda, MFIs have been given the opportunity to 
convert into microbanks and collect deposits from the general public. 
Some of the leading microfi nance institutions have received equity fund-
ing from institutional investors, and links between banks and MFIs in 
numerous countries have provided MFIs with the necessary funding 
from banks, while maintaining their business and credit model to target 
low-income clients.20
Many MFIs, even with subsidies, have had trouble reaching the very 
poor. And, as mentioned, some MFIs have been moving upscale with 
their successful clients. Should policymakers worry about an apparent 
drift in the emphasis of many MFIs, and of the MFI industry as a whole, 
away from focusing on credit access for the very poor? Considering 
the indications that improving access for not-so-poor entrepreneurial 
households can have powerfully favorable indirect implications for the 
poor, such worries may be overstated. 
Focusing on fi nance for the very poor shifts the attention to subsidies 
and charity, which can hurt the quality of services. There are also good 
political economy reasons why the focus should not be on the poor or on 
how microfi nance can be made more viable, but instead on how fi nancial 
services can be made available for all.21 The poor lack the political clout 
to demand better services, and subsidies may spoil the credit culture, 
that is, the willingness to repay loans since they are perceived as grants. 
Defi ning the issue more broadly to include the middle class, who often 
MFIs often are unable to 
meet the needs of the 
excluded nonpoor
A narrow focus on the poor 
may be counterproductive—
FFA_099-142_ch03.indd   136 10/26/07   8:40:25 AM
137
H O U S E H O L D  A C C E S S  T O  F I N A N C E :  P O V E R T Y  A L L E V I A T I O N  A N D  R I S K  M I T I G A T I O N
also lack access, would make it more likely that policy makers would 
make fi nancial access a priority. Hence shifting the focus to building 
inclusive fi nancial systems and improving access for all underserved 
groups is likely to have greater impact on development outcomes. 
As a result, the development community has shifted its attention to 
building inclusive fi nancial systems focusing not only on specialized 
microcredit institutions, but on an array of other fi nancial institutions, 
such as postal savings banks, consumer credit institutions, and, most 
important, the banking system. This broader approach can lead to overall 
fi nancial system effi ciency and outreach to the whole population.
The recent expansion in banking services across Latin America, for 
example, has been driven by consumer credit, provided mostly by util-
ity and other nonfi nancial companies, such as large department stores. 
Although no fi rm data exist, anecdotal evidence suggests that this credit 
expansion is based on credit scoring and risk diversifi cation through the 
law of large numbers. Postal networks have come to play an increasingly 
important role, such as in Brazil, where the postal service linked with a 
private commercial bank through an agency agreement, thus effectively 
increasing geographic access to banking services to all municipalities. 
Private commercial banks have taken the lead in reaching out to low-
income households and microenterprises with new techniques and prod-
ucts, often driven by a combination of profi t and social objectives. 
The broader focus on an inclusive fi nancial system raises again the 
question of how to ensure that fi nancial institutions will expand outreach. 
How can governments and donors best help reduce transaction costs 
and risk that often impede commercially oriented fi nancial institutions 
from reaching out to the poor and near poor? Should donors subsidize 
microfi nance institutions so they can reach out to the very poor? Should 
the government subsidize fi nancial institutions so they reach out to rural 
and remote areas? Several ideas and questions arise in this context.22
First, subsidies in the fi nancial sector have to be assessed in a rigor-
ous manner to compare costs and benefi ts with subsidies in other areas, 
such as education or infrastructure. Any subsidy has the opportunity 
costs of forgone government intervention in other sectors and areas. 
Second, a distinction has to be made between credit services, on the 
one hand, and savings and payments services, on the other hand. More 
of a case might be made for subsidies in payment services, because such 
services are considered necessary for participation in a modern market 
economy. Further, payment services can be seen as a network good whose 
—highlighting the need 
to foster the development 
of a range of fi nancial 
institutions—
—and carefully assess 
whether subsidies could 
more effectively be used in 
other areas
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benefi ts increase as a larger proportion of the population has access to 
and uses them (Claessens and others 2003). Third, subsidies should 
focus on overcoming the barriers to access rather than distorting prices, 
such as interest rates. Finally, technological advances have the potential 
to revolutionize access for the poor, shifting attention from subsidies to 
establishing an environment conducive to technological innovations that 
may help overcome many of the restrictions. However, these technological 
advances, such as m-fi nance, also pose important regulatory questions. 
To what extent should electronic and m-fi nance providers be considered 
fi nancial institutions and thus be subject to the heavier regulatory and 
supervisory framework? This issue is discussed further in chapter 4. 
The simple point is that access to fi nance is lacking not only for 
the poor but for vast portions of the population in many low-income 
economies. If attempts to ensure that the poor do get credit result in 
distorting subsidies that damage the incentives for the microfi nance 
industry, and the fi nancial sector more generally, to innovate in provid-
ing access for the nonpoor, then their net effect on the poor could be 
counterproductive. 
Conclusions
While still far from conclusive, the bulk of the evidence suggests fi nancial 
development and improved access to fi nance is likely not only to acceler-
ate economic growth but also to reduce income inequality and poverty. 
The channels through which fi nance works to produce this impact are 
less clear, but the evidence from cross-country research, natural experi-
ments, and general equilibrium models suggests that direct provision 
of credit to the poor may not be the most important channel. Hence 
fostering more effi cient capital allocation through competitive and open 
markets has always been and still remains an important policy goal. 
In most countries around the world, however, fewer than half the 
households have even basic fi nancial access; many nonpoor and small and 
medium enterprises are effectively excluded from the fi nancial system. 
For the most part, then, improving effi ciency without broadening access 
is likely to be insuffi cient because it is likely to leave untapped the talents 
and innovative capacity of large segments of the population. Improving 
access for all of the excluded, not just the very poor, is therefore also likely 
to be an important policy goal for most developing countries. 
The direct provision of credit 
to the poor may not be the 
most important channel
More than just the poor face 
fi nancial exclusion
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Reaching out to low-income households and microentrepreneurs is 
quite challenging however, since issues of risk management, monitor-
ing, and transaction costs tend to increase break-even interest rates and 
often lead to credit rationing. Here, innovative techniques and products 
developed by MFIs have helped overcome these information barriers. 
Nevertheless, microfi nance services are costly to deliver, and they typi-
cally require extensive subsidies. While a focus on improving access to 
the excluded does not need to involve subsidies, reaching out to the 
very poor does. Should such access be subsidized? Encouraging and 
taking advantage of technological advances, which are becoming more 
widespread and fast-paced due to globalization, may be more promising 
in broadening access for the poor than providing subsidies, as well as 
shifting the focus of policy to establishing an environment conducive to 
the adaptation of the new technologies and to the entry of providers that 
bring them in. These issues are discussed more fully in the next chapter, 
which concerns governments’ role in broadening access.
Notes
1. Introducing fi xed transaction costs into a general equilibrium model and 
thus endogenizing the size of the intermediated sector, Townsend and Ueda 
(2006) conclude that restrictive fi nancial sector policies in Thailand might have 
slowed the growth of fi nancial intermediation below the endogenous growth 
rate that would have resulted from increasing per capita income, as predicted 
by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). 
2. General equilibrium models have limited power to mimic the real world, 
as shown by Jeong and Townsend (2003). They compare the fi t of the two 
models with exogenous and endogenous fi nancial intermediation, the two 
models later used by Giné and Townsend (2004) and Townsend and Ueda 
(2006), respectively, and fi nd that while both models fi t the data well, they 
both exaggerate the movement between low- and high-income groups and 
underestimate the movements within different income groups. While general 
equilibrium models fi t the long-term trends in the data reasonably well, Jeong 
and Townsend conclude that they cannot account for business cycle effects.
3. Reanalyzing the same data with a different econometric technique, 
Morduch (1998) failed to fi nd any signifi cant impact of microcredit on bor-
rowers’ income, though he did fi nd an effect on consumption smoothing. 
4. This technique was later named “pipeline matching” (Goldberg and 
Karlan 2005)
Innovative techniques 
and products can improve 
fi nancial access
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5. It is worth noting that such a design picks up the effect of credit for the 
marginal borrower. Assuming heterogeneity across agents, the effect might be 
lower or zero for those borrowers who easily got credit, since they may have 
plenty of close substitutes, while the effect could be even bigger for those who 
were denied credit by a bigger margin. 
6. In particular, it is not only the sceptics who fi nd much of the less rigorous 
literature unconvincing. Coleman (1999) notes: “Most existing impact studies 
are nonacademic project evaluations that are of a descriptive nature or suffer 
from the selection bias problem.” In a useful survey of microfi nance impact 
studies confi ned to those that tried “to select control groups whose observed 
characteristics were comparable except for their participation in microfi nance,” 
Littlefi eld, Morduch, and Hashemi (2003, p. 2) conclude that while “the general 
pattern of results sheds valid light on the question of impact, . . . few studies 
include fully rigorous controls for selection biases.” Armendáriz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005, p. 199–200) write that the differences between anecdotes 
and statistical evidence “should not be surprising: the anecdotes are culled to 
show the potential of microfi nance, while the statistical analyses are designed 
to show typical impact across the board.” 
7. For evidence on the relation between durable-asset holding, education, and 
child labor, see Jacoby (1994); Guarcello, Mealli, and Rosati (2003); Jacoby and 
Skoufi as (1997); and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2007). Several cross-country 
studies also assess the relationship between fi nancial development, education, 
and incidence of child labor; see Flug, Spilimbergo, and Wachtenheim (1998) 
and Beegle, Dehejia, and Gatti (2007). For evidence on access to credit and 
upward mobility, see Wydick (1999). For evidence on geographic proximity to 
bank branches and health, see Gertler, Levine, and Moretti (2003).
8. For a detailed discussion, see Ravallion (2004).
9. Cross-country regressions using other poverty-related measures also 
point to a favorable impact. For example, Claessens and Feijen (2007) fi nd a 
signifi cant impact of fi nancial sector development on the incidence of under-
nourishment. One of the channels through which this relationship works seems 
to be fi nancial development enhancing the level and growth rate of agricultural 
productivity, which in turn leads to higher output and lower prices, which helps 
reduce the incidence of undernourishment. However, as is the case with many 
cross-country studies, identifi cation issues remain. 
10. The distribution data are notoriously diffi cult to compare across coun-
tries for several reasons, including the fact that they are based on different 
welfare measures (consumption versus income), different measures of income 
(gross versus net), and different units of observation (households versus indi-
viduals), and adjustments for these differences are imperfect (Dollar and Kraay 
2002; Deaton 2005). While these differences in measurement introduce an 
error into the regressions run by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2007), 
this error should bias their estimations against fi nding a signifi cant relationship 
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between fi nance and changes in income distribution. Further, the regressions 
of changes in headcount on fi nance are less subject to this concern as the 
headcount measures are based on a set of consistent household surveys (Chen 
and Ravallion 2004).
11. Using Thai data and testing a structural model with moral hazard 
and limited liability due to high enforcement costs, Paulson, Townsend, and 
Karaivanov (2006) confi rm that moral hazard is the dominant source of fi nanc-
ing constraints. In the case of poorer households, however, they cannot reject 
the hypothesis that limited liability also plays a role. Giné (2005) distinguishes 
between transaction costs incurred by borrowers and enforcement costs incurred 
by lenders and shows that enforcement costs limit outreach more than transac-
tion costs do in the context of rural fi nance in Thailand. 
12. To tease out the trade-off in group-based lending in comparison with 
individual lending, Giné and others (2006) created an experimental economics 
laboratory in a large, urban market in Lima, Peru, and conducted difference 
games with microentrepreneurs and potential microfi nance clients.
13. Undertaking experimental games with a group of microfi nance clients 
in Peru, Karlan (2005) fi nds that cultural similarity and geographic proximity 
predict trust and trustworthiness.
14. This could also refl ect that a disproportionate number of those MFIs 
that concentrate on the very poor are charitable concerns willing to channel 
subsidies to the poor rather than aiming at profi tability.
15. However, because of imperfections in the labor market, the poor women 
borrowers in the model of Emran, Morshed, and Stiglitz (2006) will not be 
interested in expanding their operation beyond a certain scale.
16. See Roth, McCord, and Liber (2007) for an overview of microinsurance 
products and delivery mechanisms.
17. Offi cial data on remittance fl ows—mostly from balance-of-payment 
statistics—underestimate their true extent because a large proportion of 
remittances is sent through informal channels. In addition, in many cases, 
remittances sent through money transfer providers that do not settle through 
banks are not recorded in offi cial data either (de Luna Martinez 2005). A 
large share of remittances is thus misclassifi ed as net errors and omission in 
balance-of-payment statistics. Using cost data on sending remittances through 
formal channels and assuming that use of these channels, but not the amount 
of remittances, is elastic to the cost of sending the remittances. Freund and 
Spatafora (2005) estimate that informal remittance fl ows equal 35–75 percent 
of formal remittance fl ows.
18. See Firpo (2005) for a discussion on the role of technology in reducing 
costs in microfi nance. 
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19. Recent research also shows that remittance fl ows can affect fi nancial 
development in the recipient countries, increasing access indirectly. For 
example, Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2006) fi nd that 
formal remittance fl ows, as captured by balance-of-payments statistics, have a 
positive impact on fi nancial intermediary development. 
20. Microfinance institutions face another challenge as the industry 
matures—competition. During the initial stages of microfi nance, most institu-
tions compete only against informal moneylenders; their monopoly position 
allows them to use dynamic incentives such as repeat and progressive lending, 
as borrowers do not have any alternatives. However, as MFI sectors mature, as 
in Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Uganda, MFIs start competing directly against 
each other in certain regions of the country, with negative implications for 
borrowers, who may become overindebted and receive less favorable loan terms, 
but also for lenders who encounter worse repayment performance. Effective 
information sharing among lenders is one way of overcoming these diffi culties. 
For example, in the already-discussed Guatemalan case, Luoto, McIntosh, and 
Wydick (2007) calculated that the introduction of a credit information system 
allowed MFIs to improve their loan appraisal to the extent of lowering their 
break-even interest rate by more than 2.5 percentage points. 
21. Rajan (2006b) argues “let’s not kill the microfi nance movement with 
kindness. If we want it to become more than a fad . . . it has to follow the clear 
and unsentimental path of adding value and making money. On that path lies 
the possibility of a true and large-scale escape from poverty.” 
22. See also the discussion in Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005, 
chapter 9), focusing on subsidies for MFIs.
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Government’s Role 
in Facilitating Access
GIVEN THE EVIDENCE THAT FINANCIAL ACCESS VARIES WIDELY 
around the world, and that expanding access remains an important 
challenge even in advanced economies, it is clear that there is much 
for policy to do. It is not enough to say that the market will provide. 
Market failures related to information gaps, the need for coordination 
on collective action, and concentrations of power mean that govern-
ments everywhere have an extensive role in supporting, regulating, and 
sometimes directly intervening in the provision of fi nancial services.
Not all government action is equally effective, however, and some 
policies can be counterproductive. Complex system responses can make 
well-intentioned policies misfi re, so successful policy design must be 
context specifi c. Governance issues are important: policy success can 
depend on institutional quality. Measures that are effective in environ-
ments that already enjoy strong institutions may fail elsewhere. At the 
same time, a well-functioning fi nancial system itself is likely to contribute 
to strengthening national governance.
Previous chapters have already mentioned some individual policy 
issues. This chapter takes a broad view of the role of policy in improving 
access. It draws as much as possible on fi ndings from formal quantitative 
research to throw light on a few of the more diffi cult choices that arise. 
Implementation of policy requires complementing the results of research 
analysis with practitioner experience, which this study does not attempt 
to summarize. Nontheless, the analysis presented in this chapter provides 
a base for sound policy advice. The treatment is necessarily selective but 
illustrates how other issues can be approached. 
Government action is 
necessary to correct market 
failures, but some policies 
can be ineffective or 
counterproductive
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Policies to improve fi nancial 
access and fi nancial 
development are not always 
the same
It is important to set 
realistic goals
Many of the policies often recommended to enhance overall devel-
opment of the fi nancial sector—including the legal and information 
underpinnings needed to lower the cost of services for large enterprises, 
governmental entities, and wealthy individuals, and to improve the inno-
vative capacity of the fi nancial sector—will also help increase access to 
those now excluded from, or poorly served by, the fi nancial sector. That 
reduces the number of diffi cult trade-offs that have to be made. But the 
overlap and alignment of the goals are not perfect. A policy reform pack-
age for the fi nancial sector that does not explicitly prioritize access will 
tend to make different choices from one that does. For example, certain 
regulatory prudential measures aimed at fi nancial stability can restrict 
the degree to which banks can serve small borrowers. Concentrating 
institution-building efforts on developing an offshore fi nancial center 
to export effi cient wholesale fi nancial services could result in the neglect 
of the infrastructures needed to help onshore fi nancial intermediaries 
reach small, local producers. A reform approach to fi nancial sector policy 
that explicitly recognizes the importance of access can help ensure that 
fi nancial development also makes fi nancial systems more inclusive.
In prioritizing access policy, it is important to recognize the limita-
tions of even a very effi cient fi nancial system supported by a strong 
contractual and information infrastructure. Not all would-be borrowers 
are creditworthy, and there are numerous examples of overly relaxed 
credit policies that have reduced national welfare. Indeed, prudential 
regulation of banks in developing countries is largely concerned with 
ensuring that loss-making credit decisions are, on average, avoided. It is 
also important not to undermine market discipline by adopting rules or 
regulations (such as mispriced deposit insurance) that may distort the 
risk-taking or monitoring incentives of market participants. Access to 
other formal fi nancial services can approach universality as economies 
develop—indeed the presumption that everyone should be entitled to 
some form of account at a fi nancial intermediary has gained ground 
in advanced economies and is essentially a reality in several European 
countries. The fi xed costs of service provision, however, have made it 
very diffi cult for traditional fi nancial service providers to reach custom-
ers whose need is only for tiny payment and savings transactions or who 
are located in small and remote markets. Over time, technological and 
organizational innovations should begin to overcome these barriers, 
and entry and other regulatory policies should be designed so that such 
innovation is not inadvertently blocked. More generally, the challenge 
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This chapter starts with an 
examination of institutions 
and infrastructure—
for policy is to help build the necessary infrastructures and to ensure that 
the fi nancial system is one in which service providers are delivering as 
widely as is possible, given existing infrastructures, and are not hampered 
by inappropriate regulatory or other policies or by coordination failures 
(Beck and de la Torre 2007).
This chapter begins by discussing some overall market development 
issues concerning general measures for improving the contractual, infor-
mation, and other infrastructures needed to support an effective fi nancial 
system with good outreach. It highlights recent fi ndings that address 
the question of which institutional reforms should be prioritized. For 
example, in low-income countries, improving information infrastructures 
seems to yield more immediate access benefi ts than undertaking legal 
reforms. But legal reforms are also important, and among those, there 
is evidence that other aspects of contract enforcement may be more 
important for access than protection of property rights against the state. 
It also notes that intermediaries can be helped to work around hard-to-
remedy institutional defi ciencies.
The chapter then turns to specifi c enabling policy actions to boost 
the capacity of market intermediaries to deliver fi nancial access. It 
reviews the many supportive measures that need to be addressed. 
These range from specifi c legislation to underpin payments tech-
nologies that use the Internet and mobile phones, to ensuring that 
anti-money-laundering regulations do not choke household access, to 
securities markets regulation that is not so costly as to prevent listings 
by medium-size fi rms. 
The chapter then moves to a discussion of regulatory structure. Much 
of the needed regulatory structure for fi nance is designed to improve 
competition and effi ciency while restraining excesses, including impru-
dent or exploitative behavior. The chapter focuses in particular on the 
potential for positive policy action to mandate access-enhancing product 
development, contrasting this with the usually counterproductive effect 
of unrealistic usury ceilings. It also describes recent evidence showing 
that market discipline can complement offi cial prudential regulation but 
needs an appropriate policy environment to be effective. 
Next the chapter addresses the controversial question of whether gov-
ernment should enter directly into the access business through ownership 
or subsidy of fi nancial service providers. Here it looks in some detail at 
state-sponsored credit guarantee schemes (showing how some of these 
appear to be as costly as many old-fashioned state-lending programs, 
—and then turns to 
intermediaries—
—and the tricky issues of 
government ownership—
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with little clear benefi t, while potential improvements in scheme design 
have often been ignored).
Before concluding, the chapter turns to the links between politics 
and access. Financial sector reform delivering outreach is not politically 
unproblematic. Elites in closed-access societies may lose in the short run 
by policies that open access to fi nance and thereby to wider economic 
opportunities. 
Expanding Access: Importance of Long-Term 
Institution Building
There is little disagreement that the ability of fi nancial service provid-
ers to reach a broad clientele is highly dependent on macroeconomic 
environment and on the overall state of the contractual and information 
infrastructure. 
Theoretical and empirical research has confi rmed that macroeconomic 
instability is an important obstacle to effective intertemporal contract-
ing.1 Fiscal imbalances in particular generate high and variable infl ation, 
often making the future value of money so uncertain (and diffi cult 
to hedge) for both suppliers and demanders that long-term fi nancial 
contracts simply do not exist. Households will not give up control over 
their savings for longer time-periods in unstable macroeconomic envi-
ronments, and fi nancial institutions will not commit beyond short-term 
contracts given funding uncertainties. Unsustainable macroeconomic 
and fi scal policies have often been the prelude to fi nancial instability and 
crises; the fear of macroeconomic and fi nancial instability also inhibits 
fi nancial innovation that can promote access. In addition, the scale of 
borrowing by free-spending governments tends to crowd out other bor-
rowers, including (perhaps especially) small fi rms.
There is thus clear scope for positive government action in the areas of 
macroeconomic stability and general institution building that supports 
greater fi nancial access. Policies not specifi cally addressed to fi nancial 
sector needs but designed to improve the general business environment 
(communication, transportation, and energy infrastructure) in which 
fi nancial institutions operate, as well as the general security situation, 
are also of evident importance. 
The emphasis in recent literature on the importance of institutions—
the “rules of the game”—for economic development, and on the parallel 
—and political economy
Macroeconomic stability 
can foster fi nancial sector 
development—
—as can a positive business 
environment—
—supported by well 
functioning institutions
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role these institutions are thought to play in fi nancial development, 
suggests that the mechanisms of fi nance are at the heart of the complex 
processes that lead to accelerated economic growth in a way that is still 
far from being fully understood (Beinhocker 2006). As such, adjusting 
institutions in directions that clearly help improve the functioning of 
fi nance is likely to be a highly effective pro-growth strategy. Even if 
the claims that fi nance plays the chief causal role in economic growth 
were to be proved false, and instead all of the causality came from the 
underlying institutional framework, emphasis on ensuring fi nancial 
performance is likely to select growth-effective institutions.
Building these institutions is typically a long-term and diffuse 
endeavor, and it necessarily involves a key role for government. 
Government is the natural—in many cases the only—provider of some 
of the key organizations that support good institutions, such as effi cient, 
speedy, and fair courts. Government may also need to provide some or 
all of the needed registries of credit information, liens, and property 
ownership. Legislation that defi nes the rights and responsibilities of 
companies, fi nancial entities, and other fi nancial market participants, 
avoiding uncertainty or ambiguity in contracts, is also a valuable part of 
the fi nancial infrastructure provided by government. First and foremost, 
then, governments can broaden access by making and encouraging 
infrastructure improvements needed for market development.2
For the policy maker, or the adviser on policy matters, the range of 
institutional reforms demanded can seem overwhelming, as can the 
diffi culty of implementing even a subset of them. What then are the 
priorities and how best can the obstacles to implementation be over-
come? These are questions to which researchers are only beginning to 
fi nd solutions.
This is not the place for a handbook of good practice in institution 
building. For one thing, much of what is held to be good practice in this 
regard still amounts to a transplant of models that have been successful 
in advanced economies and otherwise lacks systematic evidential founda-
tions from across the world.3 Yet, there are some interesting lessons from 
recent research fi ndings that speak to the priorities and likely successes 
in institutional reform.
The fi rst wave of cross-country empirical literature on law and fi nance 
(La Porta and others 1997, 1998) established the strong role of institu-
tions in boosting fi nancial market depth and economic growth, including 
fi nancial access.4 To take one dimension of this, although most will agree 
Institution building requires a 
long-term commitment
Evidence that legal institutions 
matter
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that enforcement of investor and creditor rights is important for access, 
there has been less agreement on the nature of the legal systems that are 
best adapted to fi nancial development. As with fi nancial depth and other 
aggregate measures of fi nancial development, there appear to be fewer 
barriers to fi nancial access in countries with a common law legal tradition 
than in those whose legal origins spring from civil codes.5 But perhaps it 
is not so much legal origin per se, but rather a degree of adaptability in 
legal institutions that is essential to ensure that contract enforcement can 
keep pace with changing fi nancial technologies. In analyzing the World 
Business Environment Survey data, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 
(2005) also use measures of judicial independence and adaptability to 
look more closely at whether the style of law in effect has an impact on 
access as reported in these surveys. Their regressions suggest that fi rms 
in civil code countries face larger obstacles to accessing external fi nance 
than do fi rms in common law countries, especially in the dimensions 
of collateral requirements, long-term loans, and paperwork and bureau-
cracy. Based on the performance of the other legal variables in the study, 
the authors suggest that these obstacles are more likely to result from the 
lack of adaptability in many civil code legal systems rather than from a 
lack of judicial independence from political pressures.6
Arguably the most important institutions to put into place to achieve 
economic growth are those that reliably constrain the state from com-
promising private property rights. North, Wallis, and Weingast (2006) 
argue persuasively—in their ambitious, albeit not fully elaborated or 
proved, thesis—that the most fundamental distinction between types 
of organized societies is that between open access societies and those 
that limit access to economic resources. The course of history suggests 
that the former have proved to be far and away the more successful, 
especially in recent times. According to the authors, social order in an 
open access society is maintained by competition, not rent creation, and 
competition requires a political system that does not depend on creating 
and capturing rents for a limited elite. 
This proposition fi nds some confi rmation in econometric analysis of 
the cross-country data that is available on various aspects of national 
institutions relevant to fi nancial sector performance. In particular, 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have looked carefully at the different 
types of institutional variables found in cross-country studies to infl uence 
fi nancial sector development and economic growth. They distinguish 
between those legal and political institutions that mainly underpin the 
The risk of expropriation can 
be a major threat to fi nancial 
sector development
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security of contracting between economic agents on the one hand and 
those that ensure the security of private property rights vis-à-vis the 
state on the other. Security of contracting includes measures of legal 
complexity and formalism in debt recovery; security of property rights 
includes measures of the constitutional constraints on the political 
executive and the degree of protection against risk of expropriation. All 
of these variables are strongly correlated with fi nancial development and 
economic growth (and with each other). 
To eliminate the likely feedback or reverse causality from growth to 
institutional performance, Acemoglu and Johnson employ as instru-
ments not only legal origin, but also the mortality of colonial settlers,7 
with the interesting twist that legal origin proves to be a predictor only 
of the contracting institutions and settler mortality to be a predictor of 
the institutions related to private property rights. Indeed, they show that 
legal origin is also strongly correlated with enterprise survey responses 
on the quality of the courts and the functioning of the judicial system, 
but not with survey responses on offi cial corruption and predictability 
of regulation, whereas exactly the opposite is true of settler mortality. 
Using these instruments, it is the private property rights institutions, 
rather than the contracting institutions, that prove to be most strongly 
associated with banking depth and GDP per capita.8 
If the econometric fi ndings of Acemoglu and Johnson are to be taken 
at face value, they have some clear implications: a “grabbing state” is 
a major threat to fi nancial sector development (and thus to economic 
growth); without institutions that restrain the state from preying on 
private property, the fi nancial route to economic prosperity is severely 
constrained. 
A conjectural synthesis of these results with those of Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine (2005) on judicial adaptability would say that protec-
tion of private property against the state is key for the depth of fi nancial 
sector development, but that more specifi c protections of contracts 
between private agents are important for determining access.9
The nature of the 19th century European colonial engagement is of 
course not the only determinant of modern institutions in countries that 
were formerly colonized, but the long-lasting infl uence of that engage-
ment has far-reaching implications for the needed institutional reforms 
along this dimension. Whether a country has been a settler colony 
(with the settlers ensuring that they would be relatively free of arbitrary 
exactions by the state) or an extractive colony (seen by the colonizing 
A potentially diffi cult 
transition to open societies
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country as merely a source of rent through primary production) seems 
to have had an enduring effect. As North, Wallis, and Weingast (2006) 
have stressed, only a few countries have successfully made the transition 
from a rent-creating, limited-access society to an open society where 
private property accumulation is relatively secure against expropriation 
by government. And researchers are a long way from understanding how, 
when, and why countries are transformed from closed to open access. 
Yet this transformation is what is called for.
Pending success in reforming these most important—but intrac-
table—institutions, it may be easier, and less politically contentious, to 
make progress on other dimensions. For example, within the category 
of legal institutions that support private contracting, Haselmann, Pistor, 
and Vig (2006) have distinguished between those that chiefl y enable the 
individual lender to recover on a debt (for example, institutions relating 
to collateral) and those that are mainly concerned with resolving confl icts 
between different claimants (for example, bankruptcy codes). Basing 
their analysis on evidence from the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe—which adopted relevant legal reforms at different times 
after the collapse of the planned economy system—these authors are 
able to show that bank lending is more sensitive to the institutions that 
govern individual claims than to those that resolve confl icts between 
multiple claimants.10 Given the relative complexity of bankruptcy codes 
compared with laws and procedures related to collateral, this fi nding—
which matches practitioner experience—is good news for governments 
overwhelmed with institutional reform challenges.11 
While it is well accepted that, in addition to legal infrastructures, 
information infrastructures are also key for both fi nancial depth and 
access, it is not so clear which of the two classes of infrastructure matter 
most for developing countries. 
A recent contribution by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) in this 
area has uncovered systematic differences in the relative importance of 
these two dimensions of fi nancial infrastructure to the growth of private 
credit. Based on a panel of aggregate data for 129 countries over 25 years, 
they confi rm that creditor rights and the existence of credit registries, 
whether public or private, are both associated with a higher ratio of private 
credit depth to GDP, whether measured in levels or in terms of change. 
Interestingly, creditor rights (especially strong in countries that inherited 
the common law system) prove to be particularly important for private 
credit in the richer countries, whereas the information infrastructure (in 
What should the institutional 
priorities be?
Information infrastructure 
appears to be especially 
important for poorer countries
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the form of credit registries) seems to matter more in the poorer countries. 
Given that it is arguably easier to build credit registries and other elements 
of the credit information infrastructure in low-income countries than to 
make lasting improvements in the enforcement of creditor rights, this is 
a fi nding of considerable importance and practical value.
The private sector does, of course, have a number of ways of working 
around dysfunctional institutions. De la Torre and Schmukler (2004) 
discuss how U.S. dollar contracts (rather than local currency contracts), 
short maturities with rollover clauses, and contracting under foreign 
jurisdiction are mechanisms that cope with systemic risk arising from 
institutional defi ciencies in developing countries. Using a remarkably 
detailed data set on the interest rate, collateral, and maturity of some 
60,000 large bank loans in 21 countries, Qian and Strahan (2007) show 
how banks adapt to an environment of offi cial corruption and defec-
tive property rights by shortening maturities and increasing collateral 
(thereby facilitating timely action to intervene and recover on debts that 
begin to look doubtful). These fi ndings reinforce the point that even if 
protection of property rights is the key institution to get right, the col-
lateral regime does act as a kind of substitute. If so, an improvement in 
the security of contracts can help the fi nancial system work around the 
other defi ciencies. Qian and Strahan note two other interesting points. 
Where the procedural costs of enforcing collateral are high, local banks 
hold a higher share of lending to unrated fi rms (including SMEs); foreign 
banks, which have to rely more on collateral, stay away. In addition, only 
the interest rate on secured loans to rated fi rms varies with the cost of 
enforcement—lenders have little intention of pursuing their claims on 
unrated fi rms through the courts. 
Differences in the effi ciency of legal systems can also affect the sectoral 
structure of lending. Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) show that banks 
in transition economies whose managers have more trust in the country’s 
legal system also provide more SME and mortgage lending and less lend-
ing to consumers, large enterprises, and government. In Brazil banks 
provided payroll loans—loans whose repayment is deducted directly from 
the borrower’s payroll check—at signifi cantly lower rates than regular 
consumer loans, which were subject to the slow and ineffi cient recovery 
procedures of the Brazilian legal system (Costa and de Mello 2006). 
These fi ndings well illustrate the ability of fi nancial intermediaries 
to adapt and work around some of the constraints and environmental 
defi ciencies that they face.12 This may explain why some reforms have 
The private sector can adapt 
to weak institutions 
Some reforms may require 
others to affect access 
signifi cantly
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disappointing results. For example, especially since the work of Hernando 
de Soto, it is commonly observed in the literature that, given the impor-
tance of collateral, and the fact that secure land titles can often be the 
best collateral available to a borrower, effective land titling programs 
should be a good way of enhancing access to credit. Yet, when indi-
vidual land titling experiments in specifi c countries are examined—as 
reviewed, for example, in a recent paper by Pande and Udry (2006)—the 
estimated impact on credit has often been negligible and statistically 
insignifi cant. Evidently, in these cases lenders had already substantially 
worked around the lack of land as collateral, or repossessing the land was 
not possible despite the title, or the cumulative effect of other obstacles 
to the functioning of the credit market remained severe. In any event, 
the single reform of titling has in these documented cases not had the 
impact anticipated in the literature. Sometimes a comprehensive set of 
policy reforms is needed.13 
One example of the kind of shortcut that governments can take 
to improve the functioning of the credit market is illustrated by the 
introduction in India in the 1990s of a new expedited mechanism for 
loan contract enforcement. As Visaria (2006) has shown, this new 
procedure bypassed dysfunctional court procedures and resulted in a 
considerable increase in loan recoveries. Furthermore, interest rates on 
new loans contracted after the introduction of the new mechanism were 
1–2 percentage points lower because of compositional changes in banks’ 
portfolios. Visaria is able to establish this from an econometric study 
exploiting the facts that only loan contracts above 1 million rupees fall 
under this new procedure (thus generating cross-fi rm variation for the 
analysis) and that political resistance and a court injunction had pre-
vented simultaneous introduction of the new institution across all Indian 
states (thus allowing cross-time and cross-state variation and the use of 
the difference-in-differences estimator discussed in box 2.1).14
Specifi c Policies to Facilitate Financial Access
While indispensable for long-term sustainable broadening and deepening 
of fi nancial systems, broad institution building is a long-term process. 
The government can achieve additional impact in the short to medium 
term by taking action specifi cally directed at facilitating fi nancial market 
activity that helps access. Beyond the overall legal structure and its pro-
Policies to complement 
the long-term process of 
institution building
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tections, an important practical question is the extent to which contract 
enforcement in fi nance needs to be supplemented by specifi c laws restrict-
ing and clarifying, and thereby offering more reliable protection to, 
certain types of fi nancial contracts or fi nancial business more generally. 
The trend worldwide has been to expand greatly the degree to which the 
law is tightly defi ned by statute rather than relying on judicial precedent 
in areas such as accountancy, banking, securities markets, unit trusts, 
leasing, payments, and so on. Indeed, the experience of practitioners in 
developing countries has been that many fi nancial contracts simply do 
not happen without the presence of an adequate explicit law to clarify 
that the contract will have the protection of the courts. But it is possible 
that law and regulation can become too intrusive, to the point where they 
are counterproductive for access; two such areas—prudential regulation 
and anti-money-laundering—are touched on later.
Some of these measures for facilitating fi nancial market activity are 
generally unproblematic from a policy point of view, and their imple-
mentation is constrained only by government capacity. These measures 
include putting in place the legislation, taxation, and other rules needed 
for specifi c fi nancing tools and institutions such as leasing and factoring 
that are particularly suited to small and medium enterprises. So long as 
the tax arrangements are not unduly generous, these improvements will 
be uncontroversial.15 Improved fi nancial literacy might also help if it can 
be provided at a low cost. The capacity of individuals and entrepreneurs 
to take advantage of available fi nancial services (and to avoid pitfalls) 
depends to some degree on adequate fi nancial education. Other policies 
can be more controversial, either because they involve trade-offs between 
the goal of achieving enhanced access and other accepted goals of public 
policy, or because the improvement in access is ambiguous. 
As discussed in previous chapters, credit registries—through which 
lenders share information about their clients’ repayment records—are 
an established way of enhancing the ability of borrowers to signal a 
good credit record. Such registries have emerged in the private sector 
in numerous countries, but the public sector has also taken a leading 
or complementary role in many others (Miller 2003). Even where the 
operation and ownership of registries is left to the private sector, govern-
ment action strongly infl uences the ability of registries to function. For 
example, given that privacy laws may severely constrain information 
sharing, the design of credit registries is highly relevant. Sharing of 
credit information strengthens the competitive environment in the credit 
Credit registries can increase 
access by establishing a good 
credit record for some— 
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market. Incumbent banks, however, might not be interested in sharing 
positive information, as that increases competitive pressure from possible 
entrants. So the government may have to consider making information 
sharing mandatory, either through legislation or by regulation of licensed 
intermediaries. At a more prosaic level, measures such as giving every 
individual a national identifi cation number can dramatically improve the 
ease and effectiveness of the operation of the credit information industry 
with regard to individual or microfi nance borrowers.
Some have argued that credit registries have drawbacks. While better 
credit information gives lenders the confi dence to expand their customer 
base, it also enables them to identify and screen out some high-risk bor-
rowers who might have received credit in a low-information environment. 
If so the improvement in access may not be uniform and may result in 
some groups being left even further behind. Evidence for this kind of 
effect comes from the so-called “home credit” market in the United 
Kingdom, where more refi ned information and credit scoring systems 
have resulted in the main mortgage lenders withdrawing from some 
geographical segments.16 On balance, though, the indications are that 
the number of losers is small compared with the number of winners, and 
besides the losers are likely to be the least creditworthy and most prone 
to overindebtedness (U.K. Competition Commission 2006). 
Some observers have also questioned the degree to which compulsory 
sharing of credit information undermines the profi tability of relationship 
lending, thereby discouraging lenders from investing in such relation-
ships and possibly reducing access in some market conditions (Semenova 
2006). Errors and abuses in the maintenance of credit records can be 
damaging for individuals; regulations need to guard against such errors 
and to ensure that the collection and sharing of credit information does 
not in practice represent an unwarranted invasion of borrowers’ privacy. 
Even the establishment of national identity numbers has been contro-
versial from a civil liberties perspective in some countries.
Reducing costs and increasing the certainty of registering and repos-
sessing collateral in the event of a default is also crucial. In Brazil, for 
example, legal and enforcement obstacles facing lenders trying to repos-
sess property have kept mortgage rates too high to be affordable for the 
poor (Kumar 2005). Residential mortgage lending remains small in 
scale and accessible mainly to upper-income groups, although there are 
a growing number of experiments in microlending for housing. Some 
specifi c legislation and other policy measures are typically called for to 
—but also exclude high-risk 
borrowers
Diffi culties in repossessing 
collateral may lead to higher 
interest rates and 
reduced access
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support developments here. For example, practitioners discuss the ques-
tion of special policies to promote a market in mortgage securities that 
would help expand the supply and lengthen the maturity of housing loans 
(Chiquier, Hassler, and Lea 2004). Of course policy efforts to improve 
housing for a wider group go well beyond issues of housing fi nance.17
The rapidly evolving technologies based on the Internet (e-fi nance) 
and cell phones (mobile phones, or m-fi nance) can be powerful engines 
of access (Porteous 2006).18 But a lack of legal clarity may impede the 
adaptation of these technologies. Government needs to keep legislation 
up to date not only to ensure contracting parties that what they intend 
will be unambiguously enforceable but also to prevent legislation from 
blocking new innovations. Even though most of the technical problems 
seem to have been readily soluble, and despite the huge potential mar-
ket—probably more individuals have mobile phones than are connected 
to the electricity power grid in many low-income countries—m-fi nance 
has been slow to take off. A major early success was in the Philippines, 
where two companies signed up a total of 4 million customers. South 
Africa was also an early adopter of m-fi nance, and it has been followed 
in Africa by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Zambia, 
illustrating the potential for this technology (with its low marginal costs) 
to overcome the problem of high unit costs that shut out low-income 
customers in countries with relatively weak infrastructures. 
But when it comes to policy design as it relates to m-fi nance, some 
unresolved problems have emerged. Defi ning and updating the legisla-
tion that gives participants in the market (especially providers) full legal 
protection for the diverse electronic transactions that are involved is a 
costly and diffi cult undertaking for low-income countries. From this 
point of view, providers have had to take a leap of faith to enter this 
market. There is also the question of regulatory barriers to entry. From 
a technical and fi nancial point of view, telephone companies can provide 
small-scale payments services without having to draw on the services of a 
licensed bank. But regulation may insist that such services are provided 
only by a bank (as is the case in South Africa), and if so the compliance 
costs can be a major barrier to entry (Porteous 2006).19 A contrasting 
example is Kenya, where the regulatory regime has been more open to 
initiatives of the phone companies, and innovation is beginning to be 
rewarded by relatively rapid consumer take-up. 
Any payments system can entail risks of money laundering and ter-
rorism fi nancing, potentially justifying the imposition of AML-CFT 
Legislation must adapt to new 
technologies—
—including m-fi nance
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(anti-money-laundering and combating of fi nancial terrorism) regula-
tions. This too can become a barrier to the establishment of m-fi nance 
facilities, even though a risk-based approach would show that almost all 
of the m-fi nance customers pose negligible risks of this type.20
Even more controversial is the design of regulation for securities mar-
kets. While general principles have been agreed under the auspices of 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions, these can be 
implemented with varying degrees of formality. More formality means 
higher fi xed costs of establishing and maintaining a stock market listing, 
and the result can be a crowding out of smaller issuers. Low-formality 
models, such as London’s innovative Alternative Investment Market, rely 
heavily on the reputation of intermediaries known as “nominated advisers” 
to ensure that the issuer complies with the relevant principles. Because 
of its lower cost, this model has attracted a large number of issuers. This 
system has been criticized for not doing enough to protect investors. 
There is little systematic empirical evidence on this topic; however, some 
practitioners argue that by lowering entry costs, this kind of approach 
could yield substantial benefi ts of greater access for medium-sized issuers, 
especially in low-income countries (Grose and Friedman 2006).21
Policies to Promote Competition and Stability
The literature on the functioning of policies for fi nancial intermediary 
competition, prudential regulation and supervision, and protection of the 
poor against abusive lending is vast; here we can only mention a small 
selection of relevant research fi ndings. The reader also should bear in 
mind that the applicability to developing countries of lessons learned in 
advanced economies is not always clear. For instance, numerous deposit 
insurance schemes have been transplanted from advanced economy mod-
els and proved poorly adapted to the circumstances of their developing 
country hosts, resulting in excessive risk taking by banks and subse-
quent widespread fragility and crisis (Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane 2002). 
Regulatory institutions that have evolved in advanced country settings 
should not be unthinkingly transplanted to the very different political 
and institutional settings that prevail in most developing countries.22
The role of competition in enhancing access has already been 
discussed in chapter 2. Policy makers who seek to stimulate greater 
competition often have only a limited range of effective tools they can 
Balancing access against 
formality of investor protection 
in the regulation 
of securities markets
A limited range of effective 
tools for competition policy—
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use, especially in small, low-income markets. A liberal entry policy vis-
à-vis reputable fi nancial service providers can help, but it may not be 
enough. Transparency of product pricing and the compulsory sharing 
of credit information can also help, as can rules about network access 
and interoperability of networks in the retail payments system, but these 
may not be fully effective either.
Because of their traditionally high unit costs, the main banks in most 
countries have been slow to provide products adapted to the needs of 
low-income households, even though they could be in a better position 
to do so than others because of the advantages of incumbency. More 
and more advanced economies have been adopting affi rmative regula-
tory policies that require fi nancial intermediaries to make appropriate 
products available to disadvantaged groups.23 The features needed in such 
products can be deduced from the reasons given in surveys of those who 
do not use banking services, including the cost of banking and the risk of 
a costly loss of control of their fi nances. Among the products that could 
help are basic bank accounts that allow low-cost, simple transactions of 
modest size and that have mechanisms to protect low-income users from 
inadvertently triggering unauthorized overdrafts.24 Where low-income 
customers represent only a fraction of a profi table banking market, the 
authorities can insist on such facilities being introduced without fear 
that the banks will exit. This might not be the case in many develop-
ing countries. But recently in South Africa, fi nancial service providers 
introduced voluntarily (albeit under an implicit threat of legislation) a 
fi nancial sector charter that included a basic bank account scheme.
More generally, as discussed in chapter 2, policies to promote competi-
tion in the banking system can also help restrain the exercise of market 
power that could be damaging to access. With their traditional lines of 
business coming under competitive pressures, incumbent institutions 
have an incentive to reach the underserved segments and increase the 
speed with which access-improving technologies are adopted.25
The same competition that can help foster access to fi nancial services 
can also result in imprudent lending binges if it is not accompanied by a 
proper regulatory and supervisory framework. The fi nancial market rules 
with the highest profi le are the increasingly complex battery of prudential 
regulations imposed on banks to help minimize the risk of disruptive 
and costly bank failures. The contraction of credit often associated with 
systemic banking crises hits the poor as well as the rich—sometimes more 
so—and the poor are less able to bear losses (Honohan 2005a; Halac 
—such as affi rmative 
regulatory policies
Prudential regulation and 
supervision can reduce the 
risks of banking crises—
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and Schmukler 2004). The goal of fi nancial stability is thus generally 
aligned with that of access, although some stability-oriented measures 
have the potential to restrict access (box 4.1).26
Indeed, an important current debate among scholars centers on what 
style of prudential regulation works best, both in ensuring stability and 
avoiding potential side effects such as hindering fi nancial sector develop-
ment and facilitating corruption. 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) have addressed this issue with regard 
to banking. They collected detailed information about the powers and 
conduct of bank supervisors in over 150 countries in 1997 and in 2001, 
searching for causal links between regulatory style and the performance 
of banking systems across the world. Based on regression analysis linking 
measures of national regulatory style to fi nancial access and other eco-
nomic outcomes at the individual fi rm level, the authors concluded that 
FOLLOWING AGREEMENT AMONG THE REGULATORS 
of the largest industrial countries on a revised frame-
work establishing minimum capital requirements 
for international trading banks and new supervisory 
practices, bank regulators all over the world have 
been taking steps to make comparable revisions in 
their bank regulation. The new framework, known 
as Basel II, is intended to avoid regulatory arbitrage 
by sophisticated banks by making required capital 
more sensitive to measurable differences in credit and 
other risks faced by banks. Although it is recognized 
as embodying technical compromises and could in 
certain circumstances amplify risk, Basel II’s more 
elaborate approach to capital requirements has trig-
gered technological advances in risk measurement 
by banks. There is much to be said for the drive to a 
more scientifi c approach to risk management, which 
has been encouraged by the Basel II process and which 
has the potential to improve access for creditworthy 
borrowers. 
But Basel II also has the potential to limit fi rm 
access to fi nance in developing countries. For one 
thing, the risk weight attached to international bank 
lending to some developing countries is likely to 
increase, especially at times of economic diffi culty, 
and this could contribute to an onshore credit 
crunch affecting fi rm borrowers (Ferri, Liu, and 
Majnoni 2001). 
Concerns have also been raised that foreign-
owned banks, reluctant to incur the costs of 
multiple regulatory reporting, might pressure 
regulatory authorities to adopt the new system even 
in developing countries where the advanced risk 
measurement techniques of Basel II are impracti-
cal or premature (Honohan 2001). If that occurs 
and results in higher compliance costs for local 
banks and inappropriate risk rating of borrowers, 
access could be damaged. In addition, by failing 
to make full allowance for the potential for a 
portfolio of SME loans to achieve risk pooling, 
the Basel II rules miss an opportunity for banks 
to use improved information on the distribution 
of risks to make SME loans at more competitive 
rates (Adasme, Majnoni, and Uribe 2006).
Box 4.1 Basel II and access 
—but too much discretionary 
powers for bank regulators 
can be harmful
FFA_143-188_ch04.indd   158 10/26/07   12:45:46 PM
159
G O V E R N M E N T ’ S  R O L E  I N  F A C I L I T A T I N G  A C C E S S
relying too much on discretionary powers given to government offi cials 
to keep the banking system safe, sound, and effi cient may be misguided. 
Using the same data, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006, fi gure 4.1) 
found that fi rms in countries that grant the largest discretionary powers 
to their bank supervisors tend to complain more that the corruption of 
bank offi cials is an obstacle to their fi rm’s growth.27
Barth, Caprio, and Levine argue that for banks to promote social 
welfare, a country needs political and other institutions that induce 
its offi cials to develop policies that maximize social welfare, not the 
private welfare of offi cials or bankers. From this analysis, it seems that 
empowering and inducing large private market participants to conduct 
their own due diligence or monitoring of banks (for example, ensuring 
good disclosure of information) can be a powerful and often-neglected 
way of strengthening the stability of banking while at the same time 
improving the reach of the system. And this is not just a message for 
Figure 4.1 Supervisory approaches and corruption in lending
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006).
Note: This fi gure shows the correlation between the average fi nancing obstacles due to cor-
ruption reported by fi rms and (a) the degree of private monitoring across countries and (b) the 
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advanced economies. On the contrary, the potential for market discipline 
to be relatively effective even in low-income countries is often under-
estimated (Caprio and Honohan 2004). Similarly, ensuring that bank 
supervisors are independent of the political sphere and of the supervised 
entities themselves, while at the same time accountable to the general 
public is important, though often diffi cult to achieve given political and 
institutional traditions. In many countries, especially those whose law 
is based on civil code, supervisors are still liable for their actions, even 
if undertaken in good faith, making them subject to frivolous law suits. 
Similarly, many countries seem reluctant to give the same degree of politi-
cal independence cum accountability to bank regulatory entities as they 
have given to central banks (Quintyn, Ramirez, and Taylor 2007).
Prudential policies, however, are important not only at the bank or 
system level but also at the borrower level. As discussed in chapter 3, 
when it comes to borrowing by the poor, more is not always better. Very 
poor people, especially those hit by adverse shocks, such as ill health 
or natural disaster, and those with chaotic lifestyles, can easily fi nd 
themselves in an overborrowed situation where their inability to service 
accumulated debt has severe effects on their wellbeing. Most often this 
occurs by accident, but in some cases it can be attributable to predatory 
behavior by lenders deliberately exploiting the gullibility and ignorance 
of the borrowers to trap them in spiraling charges. 
The approach of caveat emptor, which assumes that borrowers have 
a clear picture of the costs and benefi ts of entering a borrowing rela-
tionship and the capacity to make rational choices, is certainly not true 
for marginal groups—and the margin can be quite large in developing 
countries.28 These borrowers need to be protected against abusive, 
deceptive, extortionate, or predatory behavior, but doing so is not easy. 
Although protecting the vulnerable from unwise borrowing and dealing 
with the overborrowed poor has long been considered an appropriate 
matter for public policy, as yet no generally agreed policy approach has 
emerged, even in the advanced economies. Policy measures to deal well 
with these kinds of situation may be beyond the technical capacity of 
many developing country governments.29
One traditional approach, a ceiling on interest rates (usury laws), is 
still widely used, although it is increasingly considered rather ineffec-
tive as a measure, not least because opaque cost structures can result in 
total costs of credit greatly exceeding stated interest rates. Using what 
is known as “behavioral pricing,” unscrupulous lenders advertise low 
Policies restraining abusive 
lending to the poor
Interest rate ceilings are rarely 
effective—
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interest rates knowing that they will attract naïve and disorganized bor-
rowers who do not realize that their predictable behavior is sure to result 
in a very high overall cost of credit when penalties for late payments 
and other charges are factored in. At the same time, to the extent that 
regulators can detect and limit these extra charges, low ceilings on inter-
est rates are clearly counterproductive if they exclude many low-income 
households that could be creditworthy even at the high rates needed 
by lenders to cover the costs of processing the borrowings. As a result, 
although most advanced countries still have usury ceilings, these have 
been relaxed or qualifi ed by exemptions (Policis 2004; Helms and Reille 
2004; Goodwin-Groen 2007). Constraints on interest ceilings do exist 
in numerous developing countries, and it is widely accepted that they 
inhibit the expansion of credit by formal and semiformal intermediaries. 
For some Muslims, prohibition of riba entails avoidance of all interest-
based fi nance, although there are practical alternatives (box 4.2).
Allowing a category of licensed or supervised lenders to exceed the 
basic usury level is one device that many advanced jurisdictions have used 
to bring high-interest lending into the light of day, rather than consigning 
it to the shadows in illegality.30 This licensing needs to be accompanied 
by enforceable consumer protection rules to ensure that charges are 
R ELIGIOUS SCRUPLES CAN R ESULT IN SOME 
self-exclusion. To meet the fi nancing and invest-
ment needs of Muslims whose beliefs and ethical 
frameworks may preclude them from using some 
conventional fi nancial instruments, a large indus-
try of sharia-compliant fi nancial instruments has 
emerged in recent years and is being constantly 
refined. These instruments are scrutinized and 
authorized by legal scholars for their compliance 
with Islamic precepts. Financial instruments are pro-
hibited if they allow forbidden forms of exploitation 
by charging riskless interest (riba); entail radically 
uncertain fi nancial transactions (gharar) or zero-
sum games of pure chance (maysir), especially those 
that involve actual or potential deception; or fi nance 
forbidden (haram) activities. Experts have found 
ways of meeting the core fi nancing requirements of 
modern economies (including insurance through 
takaful) without violating these precepts. Indeed, 
innovation in sharia-compliant fi nancial engineering 
continues with the goal—shared with conventional 
fi nance—of providing for the needs of enterprise 
while pooling risk and assigning risk to where it can 
best be borne (Jaumdally 1999; Obaidullah 2005). 
For example, the global demand for sukuk, a type 
of Islamic bond that Malaysia helped popularize, 
has been growing very rapidly. In addition, many 
Muslims advance charitable funds (qard al-hasan) 
at a zero rate of return to help meet the fi nancing 
needs of poor people.
Box 4.2 Sharia-compliant instruments for fi rm fi nance 
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transparent and that lenders do not make loans to those who cannot bear 
the service charges.31 This approach is also used in South Africa, and it 
could be applied more widely in developing countries, though its effec-
tiveness depends on the capacity of the licensing authority to enforce the 
accompanying rules of good lender practice. But even advanced countries 
have had diffi culty enforcing the transparency requirements, and in an 
environment of widespread illiteracy, establishing what information has 
been provided to the borrower is not obvious. As a result, this approach 
is not practicable in many low-income countries. 
A recent comparison of consumer credit in the three largest EU 
economies displays the wide variation in regulatory philosophy and 
suggests the very considerable consequences that this variation may have 
for the scale and nature of the consumer credit market for middle- and 
low-income people. Although thorough econometric analysis is still lack-
ing, the tighter interest ceilings (and other rules for lenders) in France 
and Germany may have had quite signifi cant effects on restricting the 
range and availability of legally provided credit, compared with credit 
in the United Kingdom, and seem to have been associated with a higher 
incidence of overborrowing (Policis 2006). The fraction of borrowers 
who have defaulted on high-cost, subprime credit cards is much higher 
in U.S. states with binding usury laws than in states without such laws, 
pointing to the lack of other more suitable sources of credit for low-
income borrowers (Policis 2004). 
Even in the United Kingdom, which no longer has usury laws, a 
small minority of individuals in diffi cult circumstances has no access 
to legally provided credit. But when these individuals have recourse to 
illegal lenders, they pay on average about three times the prevailing cost 
of legal credit and are typically subjected to aggressive debt collection and 
predatory lending abuses. Usury laws in France and Germany are likely 
at the root of the fi nding that more of the destitute in those countries 
borrow in the illegal market than do the poor in the United Kingdom; 
if so, the usury ceilings effectively remove protection from them rather 
than giving it (Policis 2006).
Overborrowing can result from misfortune as much as from abusive 
behavior of lenders. In that case, the primary need may be for assistance 
to the overborrower in fi nding a viable workout plan with the creditors. 
Some countries have formalized personal bankruptcy or administration 
schemes. The likely impact on credit market functioning should be borne 
in mind in designing public policy regarding overborrowing, respecting 
—and may even be 
counterproductive
Bankruptcy laws should take 
moral hazard into account
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the danger of moral hazard behavior, the limited capacity of courts or 
bankruptcy tribunals, and the impracticality of having costly procedures 
to deal with debts of poor people that are small in absolute terms.
Public policy around the supply of credit for low-income households 
thus needs to ensure contract and pricing transparency, lender respon-
sibility, and measures to facilitate workouts for the overborrowed. Many 
administrative resources must be used to implement and enforce these 
policies, and those costs must be factored into the policy design. 
Government Interventions in the Market
If access to fi nancial services is a powerful tool for reducing poverty, as many 
economists and policy makers argue, an a priori case might be made for 
subsidization. Subsidization of these fi xed costs, however, would have to 
be justifi ed in relation to competing demands for public funds. As chapter 
3 discussed, the case for subsidization of fi nancial services in this context 
is hotly contested in discussions of microfi nance. The deadweight cost of 
diverting subsidies to intramarginal clients, especially when the target group 
cannot be well defi ned, and the risk of undercutting market innovation that 
could enhance access on a sustainable basis are but two of the problems 
cited. The fi scal costs of de facto credit subsidies can be high—often much 
higher than predicted ex ante (see, for example, Adams, Graham, and von 
Pischke 1984; and Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 200732). 
The effectiveness of numerous offi cial attempts to improve the reach 
of SME lending and the maturity structure of SME loans is doubtful 
(Caprio and Demirgüç-Kunt 1997; Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 2006). 
Political subversion of directed credit programs has been a signifi cant 
problem. Sometimes such schemes have ended up channeling sizable 
loans to political cronies, but politicization of small-scale lending has 
also been observed. It is easy to see why: extending small loans is an ideal 
political lever, with evident benefi ts and opaque costs. That is especially 
evident when the lenders are state-owned banks, as discussed below. Even 
where politicization is not a problem, attempts to redirect credit toward 
disadvantaged groups often seem to be ineffective.33 
Perhaps the most widely discussed policy intervention of this type 
was the restrictive branching law adopted in India in 1977; under this 
law banks wishing to open additional urban branches were fi rst obliged 
to open additional rural branches. The rural locations benefi ted from 
Interventions through taxes 
and subsidies— 
—can be politicized 
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additional banking services, although the process was not costless (box 
4.3). This intriguing scheme can be considered an implicit self-fi nancing 
combination of tax and subsidy, but it would be hard to judge whether 
the tax fell more heavily on the banks or the urban dwellers. 
Ease of raising revenue from the sector has resulted in numerous other 
forms of tax or quasi-tax being imposed on the fi nancial sector in most 
countries; not least are large and underremunerated reserve requirements 
and—a recent fashion—fi nancial transactions taxes. The distortions 
created by these taxes have sometimes been very severe, especially when 
infl ation is high. The potential negative impact on the outreach of the 
fi nancial system from the introduction of such taxes needs to be borne 
carefully in mind (Honohan 2003). 
Despite a few success stories, substituting government provision of 
fi nancial services for that of the market is generally considered problem-
atic. The poor record of government development banks in delivering 
broad access or lowering poverty weakens the case for using this tool 
Between 1977 and 1990, the Reserve Bank of 
India mandated that a commercial bank could open 
a new branch in a location that already had bank 
branches only if it opened four in locations with no 
branches. This regulation was part of a social bank-
ing program that tried to expand access to fi nancial 
services in rural areas. An ex post evaluation of this 
policy (Burgess and Pande 2005) shows that it had 
sizable effects. The 1:4 rule was a binding constraint 
on banks and together with a regulated branch-level 
loan-deposit ratio of 60 percent led to an increase 
in bank branches and in rural credit in less densely 
banked states, even after controlling for other state 
characteristics that might have driven branch and 
credit expansion. One interesting fi nding: whereas 
the presence of more bank branches in a state was 
associated with more rapid poverty reduction in 
that state in the period before and after the policy 
was in effect, this correlation was absent between 
1977 and 1990. This fi nding, which is robust to 
other policies introduced over the period and to 
controlling for endogeneity, suggests that avail-
ability of a bank branch is poverty reducing, even 
where the branch has been opened only as a result 
of the policy. The regression results imply that rural 
branch expansion during the policy period may have 
accounted for 60 percent of all rural poverty reduc-
tion during the period, largely through an increase 
in nonagricultural activities, which experienced 
higher returns than in agriculture, and especially 
through an increase in unregistered or informal 
manufacturing activities. But there was a signifi -
cant downside: commercial banks incurred large 
losses attributable to subsidized interest rates and 
high loan losses—suggesting potential longer-term 
damage to the credit culture. Furthermore, many 
governments do not have the carrot of licensing 
branches in markets as dynamic as those of some of 
the largest Indian cities to compensate for the stick 
of compulsory rural branches.
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on the credit side. Instead the evidence is that state-owned banks tend 
to lend to cronies, especially around the time of elections, as vividly 
displayed by recent detailed analysis of statistics on bank credit by Cole 
(2004), Dinç (2005), and Khwaja and Mian (2005), whose fi ndings 
confi rm numerous anecdotes. 
For example, Cole has shown that government-owned banks in Indian 
states ramped up agricultural lending in tightly contested districts in 
election years. Given a history in which state governments cancelled 
banking debts in the past, borrowers might not only have been glad of 
the loan, but likely assumed that it might not have to be repaid if times 
became hard.34 Dinç showed that increased lending by government-
owned banks right before elections is not specifi c to India but can be 
observed in data from 22 developing countries.35
Drilling down to the individual loan level, Khwaja and Mian found 
evidence from Pakistan that politically active borrowers were able to 
secure larger and cheaper loans from state-owned banks and defaulted 
on these loans much more than other business borrowers (fi gure 4.2).36 
Even though not all state-owned banks performed poorly (Levy Yeyati, 
Micco, and Panizza 2006), this and a large body of other evidence make 
—including the use of political 
criteria to grant loans
Figure 4.2 Size of loans by Pakistani banks 
Source: Based on Khwaja and Mian (2005). 
Note: Larger, politically connected loans default more than nonpolitical loans and are more 
likely to be from government-owned banks. There was no signifi cant correlation between political 
connections and size of loan from nongovernment banks.
Index
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Defaulted political loans from
government banks
Defaulted nonpolitical loans from
government banks
Performing political loans from
government banks
Performing nonpolitical loans from
government banks
Loans from nongovernment banks
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it easy to see why many countries have preferred to sell large state-owned 
banks, even to foreign-owned entities.37
In the case of depository services, experience has been more mixed. 
The postal banking service and state-supported savings banks have tra-
ditionally been seen as the providers of depository services to low-income 
groups. The wide geographic network of post offi ces and agencies makes 
it the tool of choice for offering basic payment and savings products in 
more remote areas. Japan Post Bank and the Russian Sberbank (formerly 
a savings bank) are among the largest retail fi nancial institutions in the 
world. Indeed, in France, the right to a banking account is essentially 
ensured through the postal savings system. Given the sunk cost nature 
of the post offi ce infrastructure, banking services can be offered at 
marginal costs, a fact that implies signifi cantly lower costs in the case 
of low-income clients with the need for small transactions (World Bank 
2006b). At the same time, examples abound of postal banks with weak 
fi nancial structures because they lack a clear legal and accounting separa-
tion from the post offi ce. Preliminary cross-country evidence on access 
barriers suggests that, despite explicit mandates for government banks 
to expand outreach, in banking systems dominated by state banks, there 
are fewer bank branches and automated teller machines. Customers in 
such systems do face lower fees, but they also experience poorer service 
quality (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria, 2007a, b). 
Some state-owned banks, designated as development fi nance institu-
tions (DFIs) or development banks, have a specifi c public policy mandate 
to make long-term credit available to promote economic development in 
particular regions or sectors. While these banks have typically been urged 
to operate in as commercial a manner as is consistent with fulfi lling their 
mandate, the diffi culty of doing that has led many to reconsider their 
business model. A handful of more sophisticated government-owned DFIs 
have moved away from credit and evolved into providers of more complex 
fi nancial services. Their know-how, willingness, and capacity to take 
initiatives that are consistent with their social remit—even at the cost of 
a lengthy initial period of loss-making—has allowed them to introduce 
into developing countries fi nancial products and markets that have been 
proven elsewhere but that entail heavy setup costs without certainty of 
high fi nancial return. Involving few if any credit risks, these services are 
less subject to political subversion. Moreover, employing public-private 
partnerships, the DFIs can help overcome coordination failures, fi rst-
mover disincentives, and obstacles to risk sharing and distribution.
The record is better for 
state-supported savings and 
payment services
DFIs could become more 
effective as providers of know-
how than of credit
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Three examples from Mexico illustrate. One is the electronic broker-
age of reverse factoring, developed by Nafi n, a government development 
bank, which allows many small suppliers to use their receivables from 
large creditworthy buyers to obtain working capital fi nancing (Klapper 
2006). Another example is the electronic platform implemented by 
BANSEFI, another government-owned institution, to help semiformal 
and informal fi nancial intermediaries reduce their operating costs 
by centralizing back-offi ce operations. Finally, a government-owned 
DFI, turned investment bank, FIRA, has brokered quite complicated 
structured fi nancial products to realign credit risks with the pattern of 
information between fi nancial intermediaries and the different par-
ticipants in the supply chains for several industries, including shrimp 
and other agrifi sh products (De la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler 2007). 
Given patient capital, the private sector could have undertaken each of 
these successful initiatives. Indeed, the Mexican government explicitly 
envisages privatization of at least some of these initiatives. But they 
have had a useful catalytic function in “kick-starting” certain fi nancial 
services in Mexico.
Evaluation of interventions
It is increasingly recognized that direct interventions to support access 
need careful evaluation. There are at least three potentially important 
dimensions to the needed evaluations. 
• First, a management audit is necessary to try to ensure that 
delivery is cost effective and that decision and control structures 
are optimized against best practice, with, for example, clear and 
effective procedures for measuring intended outputs and desired 
outcomes.38
• Second, the impact of the scheme on the intended benefi ciaries 
must be assessed. Comparing benefi ciaries before and after the 
intervention is not suffi cient, as a recent example of a govern-
ment-sponsored scheme of poverty reduction loans in China 
shows (Chen, Mu, and Ravallion 2006). Once the research-
ers controlled for the selection bias of the program targeted to 
poor households and for potential spillover effects to villages 
that were not in the program, they did not fi nd any long-term 
effect on incomes, except for the poor who were relatively well 
educated. 
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 The best methodology is often randomized evaluation, as 
discussed in chapter 3.39 This methodology requires recording 
the experience both of program benefi ciaries and of a control 
group; the latter must be selected with care to ensure that they 
were not excluded from the program as a result of the program’s 
design. Unfortunately, most control groups are not selected until 
after the program has been started, complicating the subsequent 
evaluation.
• Third, general equilibrium, or “system,” effects, especially of large-
scale programs, must be taken into account. These are especially 
diffi cult to assess, given that they affect nonparticipants as well 
as participants and may be subtle. Thus, for example, it is often 
argued that direct provision of services below cost can undermine 
the capacity or motivation of private service providers to incur 
setup costs for competing services. This is especially important 
in cases where there is no clear provision that the government 
intervention or subsidy will end after a certain time period. Not 
only can governance problems undermine the effectiveness of the 
program but they also can have negative spillover effects on the 
economy at large. This is where it is important to have a good 
conceptual understanding of the potential processes at work and 
the honest and skilled use of econometric techniques to deal with 
endogeneity, selection bias, and errors in variables.
Overall, whereas better nutrition or education for the poor may be 
uncontroversial as overarching goals, the immediate goals of policy 
interventions to improve fi nancial access need careful defi nition. Direct 
policy intervention has a chance of working only if attention is paid to 
getting four things right: 
• Clarity and logical coherence of the objectives of intervention
• Governance structures that inhibit subversion of these objectives
• Control over agency costs, especially credit risk related to 
adverse selection and moral hazard
• Adequate technical and administrative arrangements.
A canonical example of direct intervention: the credit guarantee scheme
In the following pages we take a close look at one type of direct inter-
vention—government-backed credit guarantees. Most of the issues that 
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arise in designing credit guarantee schemes have their counterparts in 
other types of direct intervention. The details described here for credit 
guarantees thus carry lessons for a wide range of policy initiatives.40
With direct and directed lending programs somewhat in eclipse in 
recent years, the direct intervention mechanism of choice for SME credit 
activists in recent years has been the government-backed partial credit 
guarantee. According to Green (2003), well over 2,000 such schemes 
exist in almost 100 countries.41 Thus more than half of all countries—
and all but a handful of the developed countries—have some form of 
credit guarantee scheme, usually targeted at some sector or category of 
fi rm that is thought to be underserved by the private fi nancial sector. 
Typically, these guarantee programs seek to expand availability of credit 
to SMEs and are sometimes focused on specifi c sectors, regions, or own-
ership groups, or on young or new technology fi rms (or even on fi rms 
that have been hit by an adverse shock and risk failure). Often there is a 
subsidiary employment, innovation, or productivity growth objective.
But these trends refl ect more the disappointing experience of other 
forms of intervention than any substantial body of evidence that publicly 
funded credit guarantee schemes work well. Indeed, while new guarantee 
schemes are contemplated in several countries, some of the countries 
with the largest and longest-established guarantee schemes have been 
downsizing or drastically redesigning their programs. 
Of course, credit guarantees are observed in private fi nancial markets 
without explicit government support. They emerge typically for one of 
three main reasons: fi rst, because of differential information, as where the 
borrower’s creditworthiness is better known by a well-capitalized guarantor 
than by the lender; second, as a means of spreading and diversifying risk; 
and third, as a regulatory arbitrage, as when an unregulated fi rm provides 
a guarantee allowing the lender to bring an otherwise insuffi ciently secured 
loan into compliance with regulatory requirements or other government 
programs or fi nancial industry risk-rating practices and conventions.
Government involvement in creating a credit guarantee company is 
often rationalized by the observation that SMEs commonly do not have 
the kinds of collateral that bankers require. Given that fi nancial markets 
are not perfectly effi cient, a decision by the government to step in where 
private fi nanciers have not found it profi table to do so need not necessar-
ily involve subsidy and fi scal outlay—although typically it does.42 With 
many competing pressures for public funds, an economically coherent 
argument in favor of a subsidized credit guarantee system needs to go 
Weighing the welfare benefi ts 
against the costs of subsidies
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a lot further than the observation that such a scheme would increase 
the availability of credit. The government needs to be sure that such a 
scheme will increase overall welfare by enough to justify the subsidy 
cost, and not simply result in a costly distortion. A welfare economics 
perspective suggests three possible sources from which a net welfare 
improvement could come: 
• Market failure related to adverse selection. Lending may be 
rationed and undersupplied relative to the social optimum (see 
box 1.2); in such circumstances a credit subsidy might improve 
overall welfare.43
• Correcting for unequally distributed endowments. Lack of col-
lateral is most acute for low-wealth individuals and groups of 
people and for poorer geographical areas. However, it is far from 
clear that credit allocation is the best or even a good instrument 
to correct for unequal initial endowments.
• Kick-starting SME lending. SME lending is not well developed in 
part because lenders have not accumulated the needed practical 
experience and the stock of credit information, and therefore 
face a lengthy loss-making startup period. Credit appraisal and 
management can build on experience, including systemwide 
credit history data and credit scoring.
Reading between the lines of the diverse and often rather vaguely stated 
goals of publicly sponsored credit guarantee schemes, one can usually detect 
hints of one or more of these economists’ arguments, perhaps most often 
the last one mentioned.44 Whether these goals are fully achieved and at 
what cost is something that has never been evaluated in a fully satisfac-
tory way even after the event, much less in advance. The evaluations that 
have been carried out focus on operational aspects such as ensuring that 
suffi cient take-up or keeping the cost of the scheme within bounds.
The cost issue sometimes attracts less attention in the early days of the 
scheme. After all, one obvious but superfi cial attraction for promoters 
of credit guarantee schemes is that the upfront cash commitment by the 
government is small in relation to the total volume of credit supported 
by such schemes. The liabilities are contingent and in the future, while 
operating costs can be covered by fees and premiums paid by benefi -
ciaries. The endowment of capital may be a small fraction—often 5 
percent—of the allowed total sum guaranteed and need not be paid 
in cash. In due course, loan losses do emerge, and the adequacy of the 
It can be diffi cult to evaluate 
the total costs of a scheme at 
its inception—
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fees and premiums becomes evident only over time as the contingent 
liabilities inherent in this soft budget constraint crystallize. 
Estimating likely future underwriting losses is not as easy as it might 
seem, especially at start-up.45 If the target group has not been borrowing, 
there is little experience on which to project defaults and the consequent 
losses. Furthermore, default experience is highly dependent on the 
state of the business cycle, so that it is unwise to extrapolate from the 
experience of a few years. If there is a major economic downturn, then 
default rates and resulting losses can soar, as was seen in several East 
Asian countries in recent years. 
In practice the range of experience regarding cost has been enormous 
(fi gure 4.3).46 While numerous schemes have experienced much higher-
than-expected losses, heavy and unanticipated underwriting costs are by 
no means a universal experience of credit guarantee schemes (Doran and 
Levitsky 1997; Bennett, Doran, and Billington 2005). This fi nding is 
consistent with the belief of many bankers that loan losses can be held to 
acceptable levels through good credit appraisal and monitoring practices, 
but that it is the cost per loan of appraisal and monitoring that under-
Figure 4.3 Estimated annual subsidy cost of selected credit guarantee 
schemes
Source: Approximate fi gures based on data in Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza 2006; 
Bennett, Doran, and Billington 2005; Benavides and Huidobro 2005; Zechinni and Ventura 
2006; Shim 2006; and Graham 2004. The U.S. fi gure assumes average maturity of 13 years 
(U.S. General Accounting Offi ce 1996). The U.K. fi gure is the 2003–4 outlay divided by that 
year’s fl ow of new guarantees (Graham 2004, para 1.12); using the average of the previous 10 
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mines the profi tability of SME lending. If so, a well-run credit guarantee 
scheme may not need to be very expensive, but it may also not be enough 
to attract bankers into the market for loans to the target group.
If it is diffi cult to estimate the likely future cost of a credit guaran-
tee scheme, it is even more diffi cult to evaluate the social benefi t that 
results. Evidently the volume of loans guaranteed is a wholly inadequate 
measure of social benefi t. On one hand, there might be no additionality 
involved—the loans might have been forthcoming anyway even in the 
absence of the guarantee. On the other hand, additionality might be 
greater than the loan amount guaranteed, as receipt of the guarantee 
might leverage a much more substantial, unguaranteed fi nancing pack-
age. Most evaluations of guarantee schemes rely on the qualitative assess-
ment of bankers and SME insiders to determine whether availability of 
credit to SMEs has eased. Depending on the design of the scheme and in 
particular on the nature of eligibility rules, formal econometric methods 
can sometimes be used to throw light on this question, but only a few 
systematic attempts to do so have been made.47 A specifi c policy change 
in Pakistan allowed Zia (2007) to uncover credible evidence of very 
substantial deadweight (lack of additionality) in the subsidized export 
credit scheme in Pakistan.48 By distinguishing between the experience 
of Chilean fi rms whose main bank began using the FOGAPE scheme 
at different times, Larraín and Quiroz (2006) estimated that micro-
fi rms whose bank used the FOGAPE scheme had a 14 percent higher 
probability of getting a loan. At the same time, Benavente, Galetovic 
and Sanhueza (2006) note evidence of sizable displacement in the 
scheme—for example, a large and growing share of successive guarantees 
being granted to the same fi rms.
Second, even if there is additionality, it might involve such heavy 
loan losses or transaction costs as to result in net welfare losses for the 
economy as a whole. And even if fi scal costs are low, the economic costs 
of misallocated resources can be high. In the Pakistan case, Zia calculated 
that diversion of unneeded credit to benefi ciary fi rms could have held 
GDP below its potential by 0.75 percent.
The operating expenses and underwriting experience of a credit 
guarantee scheme depend on the design of the scheme (as well as on 
the effectiveness of its administration). These will also clearly affect the 
success of the scheme in improving the availability of credit and achiev-
ing any other goals of the scheme. The fi rst issue is pricing: systematic 
underpricing clearly adds to the fi scal cost of any such scheme. Three 
other design dimensions are worth noting. 
—and even harder to calculate 
the benefi ts
Operational design is 
important
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• First is the question of whether the guarantee scheme should 
carry out its own credit appraisal of each fi nal borrower who is 
being guaranteed. Some of the best-regarded schemes do not con-
duct such retail assessments but instead rely on an assessment of 
the intermediary whose portfolio of loans is being guaranteed.49 
• Second is the rate of guarantee, that is, the proportion of the 
total loan that is guaranteed (along with related aspects, such as 
whether the losses are shared proportionately between lender and 
guarantor, or if the guarantor covers the fi rst or last portions). 
Many practitioners argue that the lender should retain a signifi -
cant part of the risk (at least 20 percent and preferably 30–40 
percent, according to Levitzky 1997 and Green 2003), so that 
there will be an incentive to conduct credit appraisal. In practice, 
most schemes offer slightly higher rates of guarantee—70 to 80 
percent being about the norm—and up to 85 percent in the case 
of the U.S. Small Business Administration and 100 percent in 
some other cases (for example, Japan). Guarantee rates signifi -
cantly under 50 percent fail to attract lenders. Scaling guarantee 
rates according to the claims experience from each lender can 
improve lender incentives without the adverse distributional 
impact that would result from requiring fi nal borrower guaran-
tees. Chile’s FOGAPE has started to auction available guarantee 
amounts, with the lenders bidding on the rate of guarantee.50 
Bankers who bid for lower guarantee rates than the maximum 
allowable have their requests fi lled; others are rationed. In prac-
tice, the auctions have resulted in the primary lender retaining 
between 20 and 30 percent of the risk (Benavente, Galetovic, and 
Sanhueza 2006; Bennett, Doran, and Billington 2005).
• Third is the nature of the lending criteria, such as the catego-
ries of eligible borrowers and the terms of the lending. Some 
schemes have relatively broad eligibility rules (for example, a 
ceiling on borrower size as measured by turnover, and a ceil-
ing on the guarantee fund’s overall exposure to the borrower). 
The more complex the criteria, the more likely opaque political 
interference with the granting of guarantees. At the same time, 
a broad set of criteria leaves the door open to deadweight in 
the allocation of subsidy to borrowers that have no need of it. 
Restrictions on the lending terms, such as interest ceilings, seek 
to limit the degree to which the lenders in an uncompetitive 
FFA_143-188_ch04.indd   173 10/26/07   12:45:55 PM
F I N A N C E  F O R  A L L ?  P O L I C I E S  A N D  P I T F A L L S  I N  E X P A N D I N G  A C C E S S
174
market capture rent from the scheme, but if these restrictions 
are set at unrealistic levels, they can open the door to corrupt 
side-payments. In practice the trend has been to move toward 
less complicated eligibility criteria over time. 
Although Japan and Korea have had very extensive credit guarantee 
schemes, with the stock of guarantees exceeding 7 percent of GDP in 
2001, and still in excess of 5 percent of GDP at the time of writing,51 
guarantee schemes in most countries have typically covered only a small 
fraction of total SME lending, and guarantees amount to a fraction of 
1 percent of GDP. Sometimes this is due to capacity constraints (as in 
the well-regarded Chilean scheme, which covers only about one-sixth 
of micro-, small-, and medium-enterprise lending). In other cases it is 
attributable to lack of demand, which in turn can be traced to such 
features as excessive procedural costs, lack of lender confi dence, delays 
in claims payments, or narrow eligibility criteria. 
Systematic economic evaluations do not yet offer enough evidence 
to form an impression of which schemes, if any, truly represent value 
for money. But as this brief review suggests, the lessons of operational 
experience are that government-sponsored credit guarantee schemes have 
the most to show for their efforts where they have effectively and cred-
ibly delivered an attractive package of services to lenders, with a view 
to enhancing their capacity to lend to the underserved sector, thereby 
propelling them to a sustainably higher level of lending. Innovative 
pricing can induce improved results (for example, better loan appraisal 
by lenders); even without subsidy, demand from lenders may be high 
where the scheme operator can add value, for example, by disseminat-
ing industry information on SME loan performance. More and more 
guarantee schemes are likely to move to broad eligibility and other cri-
teria, reduced subsidies, and more use of the portfolio and wholesaling 
approach in preference to case-by-case evaluation by the guarantor of 
retail loans.
Government-sponsored credit guarantee schemes will never substitute 
for reform of the underlying institutional requirements of an effective 
credit system. The best of them can probably survive and add value even 
without ongoing government subsidies.
Given the checkered record of such schemes in the advanced econo-
mies, and this is true of many other types of direct government inter-
vention in the fi nancial market, the question is not just one of avoiding 
Subsidies are not an 
ingredient for success
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unthinking transplantation of success stories; it is more a matter of paus-
ing to consider whether, if success is unlikely in a favorable governance 
and general institutional environment, an adaptation can work in the 
more diffi cult environment of the developing world?
THE NET FISCAL COST INCURRED BY PUBLICLY 
funded credit guarantee schemes is just one example 
of a variety of access-related subsidies. As in other 
areas of development, the use of public funds is easy 
to justify in the interest of improving access and 
thereby promoting pro-poor growth. Such subsidies 
of course need to be evaluated against the many 
alternative uses of the donor or scarce public funds 
involved, not least of which are alternative subsidies 
to meet education, health, and other priority needs 
for the poor themselves. In practice, such a cost-
benefi t calculation is rarely made. Indeed, the scale 
of subsidy is often unmeasured.
Furthermore, as with fi nancial sector taxation, 
subsidies in fi nance can be more liable to dead-
weight costs than is the case for many other sectors 
(Honohan 2003). It is often especially hard to ensure 
that fi nance-related subsidies reach the target group 
or that they have the hoped-for effect. 
But an even more serious problem is the possible 
chilling effect of subsidies on the commercial provi-
sion of competing and potentially better services to 
the poor. Subsidizing fi nance is likely to undermine 
the motivation and incentive for market-driven 
fi nancial fi rms to innovate and deliver. It is this 
danger—that subsidies will inhibit the viability of 
sustainable fi nancial innovation—that can be the 
decisive argument against some forms of subsidy. 
Note that it is not subsidization of the poor that 
should be questioned: the poor need help and sub-
sidies in many dimensions. Subsidies to cover fi xed 
costs (for example, in payments systems, especially 
when these generate network externalities) may be 
less subject to this chilling effect than those that 
operate to subsidize marginal costs. But every case 
must be assessed on its own merits.
Microfinance is the area of financial access 
where subsidies have been most debated. Many 
well-intentioned people have sought by means of 
subsidy to make credit affordable for the poor. As a 
result, a majority of microfi nance institutions (MFIs) 
today—though fewer of the largest ones—oper-
ate on a subsidized basis (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Morduch 2007). Some of these subsidies are 
for overhead, and the MFIs do not think of them 
as subsidizing the interest rates. Many currently 
subsidized MFIs aspire to reach a break-even point 
and ultimately become fully profi table. Others, 
including the famous Grameen Bank, consciously 
apply subsidies to keep interest rates down. MFIs 
that operate group-lending schemes and that in 
practice are more focused on the poor rely on the 
highest subsidies.
While many borrowers are able and willing to 
service interest rates at levels that allow effi cient 
MFIs to be fully profi table, there is no doubt that 
demand and borrower surplus would be even higher 
if interest rates were lower. Many would agree with 
Morduch (1999) that the prospects of reaching many 
of the very poor with unsubsidized credit are low. 
But even with a subsidy, credit will rarely be the 
fi rst fi nancial service need of the very poor. Also, 
apart from ensuring that the subsidy does reach its 
target group, the question, as always, is whether 
introduction of subsidy undermines the emergence 
of a sustainable industry with extensive—albeit 
incomplete—outreach. 
Box 4.4 Subsidy and access
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Political Economy of Access
Politics and fi nance are the keys to economic access. If North, Wallis, 
and Weingast (2006) are correct in their view that the decisive transition 
in economic history is that between limited and open-access societies, to 
understand this transition is, as they point out, to understand modern 
development. 
It is one thing to identify a policy measure that will achieve a net 
improvement in fi nancial access at reasonable cost and limited overall 
side-effects. It is quite another to suppose that such a policy will auto-
matically be implemented by an enthusiastic government.52 Governments 
are, after all, operating in a political environment, and the package of 
policies that is implemented often owes more to the balance of political 
infl uence than to the state of knowledge about policy effectiveness.53 
Why should governments introduce reforms that might be at the expense 
of incumbent elites?
When the political and social structure of the state is predicated 
on limited access and the resulting rents, existing elites have limited 
enthusiasm for policies that would increase access to fi nancial services 
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). It may well be, as Rajan (2006a) argues, 
that in unequal societies the desire of each subgroup to preserve its 
economic rents against all others tends to reinforce the status quo. The 
policy reform agenda is therefore not a simple matter of adjusting a 
fl awed policy stance or adapting existing laws to changing market and 
technological realities. Instead the reforms must be far-reaching if the 
gain in economic performance is to be large enough to be attractive to 
existing elites, who will have a smaller share of the larger postreform 
cake. Vested interests must be convinced of the merits of transition. 
Making that argument is a more effective way of inducing change than 
direct attacks on privileges. And prioritizing fi nancial access generates 
a detailed policy agenda for converting the aspiration for transition into 
concrete measures. For, despite the far-reaching nature of the institutional 
changes involved in the transition to an open-access society, it seems 
clear that reforms that really do improve fi nancial access should also 
help drive the societal transformation. The fi nancial access agenda thus 
points back to the nature of the institutional changes that are needed in 
society and as such provides a touchstone for reform.
The reforms needed to improve fi nancial access as the decisive change 
mechanism in the economy are not only necessary but almost suffi cient 
Existing elites may benefi t 
from restricted access—
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to defi ne that wider policy agenda. This agenda ranges from matters of 
great generality down to questions of operational implementation and 
design. Delivering on this agenda calls on many different agencies of 
government and also typically needs support from external development 
partners. Engagement of civil society is essential to create the political 
environment within which governments will be induced to act. 
Numerous examples can be cited from research on policy adoption 
to illustrate the pressures that are involved. When and how do fi nancial 
sector reforms occur? What is the relative importance of private and 
public interest and ideology? In a classic paper, Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) argued that the sequence in which U.S. states liberalized banking 
was consistent with the view that resistance to such policy changes was 
driven by the well-organized private special interest of the bankers and 
not by an objective or ideologically driven view of the public interest.54 
Eventually, technological progress and a competitive political system 
overcame the special interests of small bankers who benefi ted from the 
constraints. In contrast, Haber (2005) argues that a less competitive 
political system in Mexico meant that the government limited entry 
into the banking sector in return for favors and for fi nancing for much 
longer than did the United States; as a result, by the early 20th century, 
Mexico was left with a much smaller, more concentrated, and more 
ineffi cient banking system.
The example of branch deregulation in the United States also shows 
the potential for exogenous events, such as technological innovation, 
to overcome political resistance to competition-enhancing reforms. 
As the introduction of ATMs, money market checking accounts, and 
improvements in communication technology have reduced the banks’ 
need to be physically close to their clients, the monopoly power of 
small local banks declined and with it political resistance to change. 
The prospect of accession to the European Union helped many govern-
ments in transition economies to overcome political resistance against 
institutional reform (Beck and Laeven 2006). It is worth looking for 
such windows of opportunity when political resistance to reform may 
be weaker.
Once started, there seems to be an internal dynamic to the process 
of fi nancial sector reforms, though timing can be also be infl uenced by 
macroeconomic conditions. Based on the timing of fi nancial liberaliza-
tion in 35 countries over the period 1973–96, Abiad and Mody (2005) 
found that countries with highly repressed fi nancial sectors are unlikely 
—but vested interests can be 
overcome in a competitive 
political system—
—and through technological 
innovation
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to reform.55 Once reforms, even small ones, take place, however, the 
process builds momentum and further reforms become more likely. A 
balance-of-payments crisis typically triggers fi nancial sector reforms, 
but a banking crisis is often associated with an interruption or reversal 
of liberalization. 
Many other examples of political infl uence on fi nancial sector policy 
are reported in the literature. For example, seeking to explain the fre-
quency with which underpriced privatizations are observed, Biais and 
Perotti (2002) discuss how a strategic privatization program allocating 
left-leaning voters enough underpriced shares can induce a voting shift 
away from left-wing parties whose policy would reduce the values of 
shareholdings. Perotti and Volpin (2004) argue, with some supporting 
evidence, that in countries with low political accountability, incumbent 
fi rms succeed in persuading politicians not to strengthen effective inves-
tor protection in order to prevent potential entrants from raising capital.56 
Along similar lines, Feijen and Perotti (2005) suggest that, following 
fi nancial liberalization (which typically results in improved access to 
fi nance by new entrants), elites successfully lobby politicians to ensure 
weak contract enforcement with the result that their highly leveraged 
recent entrant competitors are unable to refi nance in downturns, and 
have to exit the market. And lobbying can be effective even at the micro 
level. Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven (2007) discovered, using data on 
every political donation made by Brazilian fi rms in the runup to the 
1998 elections, that political contributions are somehow rewarded by 
subsequent excess returns in the stock market. 
How to help align reform-making process with public interest? This 
is another area where much more research is needed. Greater public 
awareness of the potential benefi ts of policies to broaden access will 
also be important to shift the political equilibrium in the direction of 
reforms that promote the public good. In this context, the challenges of 
fi nancial access and fi nancial inclusion clearly go well beyond ensuring 
fi nancial services for the poor. The middle classes too have insuffi cient 
access to fi nance. Advertising the access agenda as a broad one that 
includes the middle class helps mobilize a powerful supporter in the 
struggle to broaden access (Rajan 2006b). The same mechanisms that 
expand access for middle-class households and SME entrepreneurs will 
often help expand the access for the very poor as well. This process will 
also help strengthen the links between formal and informal fi nancial 
systems and allow the poor to migrate upward.
The middle classes can be 
powerful allies for the poor
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Conclusions
This chapter has highlighted the complexity of the policy challenge in 
improving access. The discussion has been necessarily selective, setting 
out principles for effective government policy by drawing on and gen-
eralizing lessons from specifi c examples. 
Deep institutional reform that above all ensures security of prop-
erty rights against expropriation by the state is an underlying, albeit 
often long-term, goal. Meanwhile legal and especially informational 
infrastructures can be strengthened to help fi nancial institutions work 
around a diffi cult environment, thereby making the provision of wider 
access privately profi table. 
Ensuring competition is an essential part of broadening access as com-
petition encourages incumbent institutions to seek out profi table ways 
of providing services to previously excluded segments of the population 
and increases the speed with which new, access-improving technologies 
are adopted. In this process, providing the private sector with the right 
incentives is key, hence the importance of good prudential regulations. A 
variety of regulatory measures is needed to support wider access. Taking 
consumer protection against abusive lending as an example, we have 
shown that interest ceilings fail to address the problem adequately and 
can even be counterproductive; increased transparency and formalization 
and enforcement of lender responsibility are a more coherent approach, 
along with support for the overborrowed. However, delivering all of this 
is administratively demanding. 
The scope for direct government interventions in improving access 
is more limited than often believed. Here, we have used credit guaran-
tee schemes as an example of direct government intervention aimed at 
increasing access for SMEs. These programs can be more costly in bud-
getary terms than anticipated, and their performance can be improved 
by careful scheme design. In the absence of thorough economic evalu-
ations of most schemes, their net effect in cost-benefi t terms remains 
unclear.
If the interest of powerful incumbents is threatened by the potential 
emergence of new entrants fi nanced by a system that has improved 
access and outreach, lobbying by those incumbents can block the needed 
reforms. A comprehensive approach to fi nancial sector reform aiming at 
better access must take these political realities into account. Given that 
the challenges of fi nancial inclusion and benefi ts from broader access go 
Institutional reform and 
building infrastructure are key 
long-term priorities
Ensure competition and 
provide the private sector with 
the right incentives
A limited role for direct 
government interventions
The middle class may have the 
power to overcome the vested 
interests of the elites
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well beyond ensuring fi nancial services for the poor, defi ning the access 
agenda more broadly to include the middle class will help mobilize greater 
political support for advancing the access agenda around the world. 
Notes
1. For a theoretical analysis, see Huybens and Smith (1998, 1999), among 
others, and for empirical analysis of the cross-country relationship between 
finance and inf lation, see Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001); Honohan 
(2003).
2. This infrastructure can also be seen as a public good that private provid-
ers are not willing to provide.
3. Recently more country-specifi c evidence has been accumulated through 
two programs conducted by the World Bank, in the latter case jointly with 
the International Monetary Fund. The Reports on Observance of Standards 
and Codes on insolvency and creditor rights, corporate governance, auditing 
and accounting standards, and other areas are detailed assessments of the 
contractual, information, and regulatory frameworks of countries and provide 
detailed reform suggestions. The Financial Sector Assessment Program provides 
a detailed assessment of the stability and development of countries’ fi nancial 
systems as well as road maps to short-, medium- and long-term deepening 
and broadening. 
4. LaPorta and others (1997, 1998) (and the literature that ensued) showed 
that, compared with French legal origin countries, the English common law 
countries have deeper banking systems and securities markets, more initial 
public offerings, more diffuse ownership of public equity, a higher ratio of 
market to book value of shares (Tobin’s Q), and higher dividend payouts that 
are more closely tied to profi ts. The interpretation of these fi ndings remains 
quite controversial. LaPorta and others relate these outcomes to cross-legal 
system variation in the protection of minority shareholders and creditors and 
enforcement of law. Thus, to oversimplify, the common law system tends to 
offer stronger legal protection of shareholders and creditors, together with more 
effi cient courts and judicial systems. 
5. While most scholars believe that effi cient protection of creditor and 
investor rights is an important determinant of fi nancial development, there 
has been considerable debate as to whether the legal origin variable proposed 
by La Porta and others (1997, 1998) is at the root of international differences 
in these rights, let alone their enforcement. This variable is correlated across 
countries with other predetermined variables such as geographical endowments, 
political structures, and ethnic diversity (Beck and Levine 2005; Ayyagari, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic 2006b, 2007c). 
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6. However, related work shows that the distinction between legal systems 
according to adaptability is not completely aligned with the difference between 
civil and common law (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2003). German 
civil code legal systems are found to be as adaptable as common law systems, 
suggesting reform possibilities to policy makers within the civil code legal 
tradition.
7. A proxy indicator for the quality of institutions that colonizers established 
during the 18th and 19th centuries, introduced by Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson (2001, 2002).
8. That is not to say that contracting institutions are of no importance. 
Far from it, as is shown, for example, in Cull and Xu’s (2005) analysis of the 
contrasting experience on both of these dimensions in Chinese provinces. They 
fi nd that both property rights protection and contract enforcement matter for 
fi rms’ reinvestment decisions.
9. This conjecture is not inconsistent with Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) 
fi nding that it is the private contracting institutions that remain signifi cant in 
explaining stock market capitalization.
10. Given their heavier reliance on secured lending, it is not surprising that 
foreign bank lending increases by even more.
11. This is not to say that reform of bankruptcy code cannot have an impor-
tant impact, as Gine and Love (2006) show for the case of Colombia. Once 
it was reformed, the country’s insolvency system managed to separate viable 
from nonviable enterprises, allowing the former to restructure and liquidating 
the latter. Further, systems with effective collateral systems and ineffective 
insolvency systems can result in severe imbalances in the long term. In practice, 
designing the needed reforms requires great attention to detail if they are to 
work effectively. For example, practitioners may have to scrutinize such aspects 
as the relative priority of secured and unsecured creditors in an insolvency, the 
availability of corporate workout solutions, the remuneration of insolvency 
professionals, personal liability for offi cers and directors, discrimination 
between local and foreign creditors, stays on the premature dismemberment 
of a debtor’s assets, and so on.
12. It is not only intermediaries that can perform the work-around. Fisman 
and Love (2003) found evidence that trade credit partly offsets national 
weaknesses in fi nancial sector defi ciencies; industries with higher dependence 
on trade credit fi nancing (measured by the ratio of accounts payable to total 
assets) exhibit higher rates of growth in countries with relatively weak fi nancial 
institutions.
13. Field and Torero (2006) and Galiani and Schargrodsky (2005) fi nd 
similar results for land titling in the cases of Peru and Argentina, respectively. 
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In both cases the effect of land titling programs on access to fi nance was low 
or zero. In Peru, Field and Torero explain their fi nding with the political 
economy observation that freshly titled landowners feared less expropriation 
from lenders than before.
14. The Brazilian authorities have introduced several shortcuts to allow con-
tracting parties to work around the painfully slow process of enforcing contracts 
through the court system, which can take several years. Apart from allowing 
payroll deduction of consumer loans, certain contract forms allow for expedited 
court procedures or even out-of-court enforcement (Kumar 2005). 
15. Tax concessions to boost specifi c fi nancial markets risk misfi ring, because 
of the considerable potential for arbitrage. For a discussion and some overall 
principles, see Honohan (2003).
16. In this market, licensed lenders visit the borrowers in their homes on a 
weekly basis to collect the repayments, typically 3 percent of the initial amount 
borrowed over 55 weeks. (Ellison, Collard, and Forster 2006).
17. Pensions represent another area where details of legislative and regula-
tory design can be crucial. Practitioners have been studying the performance 
of innovative regimes such as the one in Chile, and much research still needs 
to be done on ensuring that pensioners get value for money and a reasonable 
risk-return balance (both in the accumulation and the payout phases) and that 
pension funds contribute to the availability of long-term and risk fi nance to the 
private sector (Rocha and Impavido 2006; Rocha and Thorburn 2007).
18. Regulatory design should ensure suffi cient certainty around electronic 
contracting, protecting customers adequately against fraud and abuse and 
aiming for interoperability between the technical platforms of different suppli-
ers. In addition, Porteous (2006) proposes three principles of good regulatory 
design if m-fi nance is to transform the payments environment for low-income 
customers in developing countries. First, customer due diligence procedures 
for account opening should be risk based and should not unduly prejudice 
remote account openings by small customers. Second, customers should be 
able at least to make deposits and withdraw cash through agents and remote 
points outside of bank branches. Third, adequate provision must be made for 
the issuance of e-money by appropriately capitalized and supervised entities, 
which are not necessarily banks. 
19. A regulatory decision in Brazil to allow limited banking services to be 
operated on an agency basis by lottery offi ces and other bank correspondents 
raised similar issues, but in practice this initiative has worked effectively and 
has greatly improved access. By 2004 all municipalities in Brazil had some 
form of banking service, whereas only 29 percent had access to these services 
in 2000; half of the increase was exclusively attributable to correspondents 
(Kumar 2005). 
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20. More generally, the need to make AML-CFT regulations as access-
friendly as possible is recognized by specialists in the fi eld (Hernández-Coss 
and others 2005). To do so requires ensuring that these requirements are risk 
based and that they therefore do not impose documentation and verifi cation 
requirements for low-income customers accessing services that have limited 
scope for abuse. Regulatory authorities need to engage with fi nancial service 
providers to design services needed by the poor, such as basic bank accounts, 
in such a way that they can be safely offered without triggering AML-CFT 
concerns.
21. Early evidence with these separate boards suggests a higher entry and 
exit rate of listed companies (potentially refl ecting the dynamism of the SME 
sector), but also lower liquidity, as most of the trading is done by institutional 
investors (Yoo 2007). 
22. This is the case not least where regulation is in fl ux in the advanced 
economies, as with recent rules on corporate fi nancial information. Low-income 
countries in particular should not be made guinea pigs for novel and untested 
regulatory ideas that could impose costs. Assessments being carried out by 
the World Bank—often in the context of the already mentioned joint World 
Bank-IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program, and the wider Reports on 
the Observance of Standards and Codes—of the compliance of individual 
fi nancial systems with international fi nancial regulations have sought to bear 
this potential problem in mind.
23. In the United States, there are no such requirements, but the U.S. 
Treasury has negotiated with a wide range of deposit-taking institutions for 
the establishment of limited service, low-cost accounts known as electronic 
transfer accounts (ETAs), into which federal payments such as Social Security 
can be electronically deposited, even for benefi ciaries with poor credit histories 
(Caskey, Ruiz Duran, and Solo 2006; Claessens 2006). So far, however, only 
a tiny fraction of the unbanked benefi ciaries of federal payments have opened 
such accounts. 
24. For example, arranging for money entering the account to trigger auto-
mated, direct debit, bill-payment instructions so that payments cannot be made 
without money to cover them, a feature still lacking in the basic bank accounts 
recently introduced in several countries (Collard and Kempson 2005). 
25. Competition policy for payments systems is an especially complex issue: 
new technology for retail payments requires novel theoretical analysis of the 
resulting two-sided markets involving both merchants and consumers (for an 
accessible survey, see Evans and Schmalensee 2005). There can be a tension 
between the desirability of achieving scale and network economies (through 
cooperation) and keen pricing (through competition). Specialists are still debat-
ing optimal competition policy for advanced economies, with practitioners only 
beginning to look at the issues for developing countries (Guadamillas 2007).
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26. While protection of small depositors is important, the design of the 
fi nancial safety net should minimize moral hazard, thereby reducing risk-shift-
ing behavior from bankers to society at large.
27. Once again these are the responses to the WBES survey. Numerous 
fi rm- and country-level controls were included in the regressions, which used a 
sample of about 2,500 fi rms in 37 countries, and the likely correlation of errors 
across fi rms within countries was carefully taken into account using a cluster-
ing technique. The authors also control for each fi rm’s response to fi nancing 
obstacles generally to ensure that what is being measured as corruption is not 
just a generalized complaint about lack of access.
28. Indeed, the notion that consumer borrowing decisions are rationally 
made is undermined by clear evidence from an interesting experiment con-
ducted recently in South Africa by a large consumer lender. Loan offers with 
randomized interest rates were mailed to some 50,000 customers, along with 
numerous variants of advertising material. The researchers (Bertrand and 
others 2005) found that loan demand was sensitive not only to the quoted 
interest rates but to several of the advertising devices. For example, including a 
photograph of a woman in the accompanying literature (as opposed to a man) 
was, in terms of its infl uence on loan take-up, equivalent to lowering the rate 
of interest by over 4 percentage points a month. 
29. Extortionate or predatory behavior is particularly hard to defi ne. In more 
than 30 years of operation, the U.K. legislation against “extortionate lending” 
led to only 10 successful claims by borrowers. New legislation enacted in 2006 
broadens the criteria by which lending may be found “unfair” and thus illegal 
(U.K. Department of Trade and Industry 2003). 
30. This could happen either by removing the ceiling altogether or by retain-
ing it at a fairly high rate for licensed lenders. In Ireland the annual percentage 
rate of 200 percent still applies to licensed money lenders (compared with the 
traditional ceiling of 23 percent for unlicensed lenders). The 200 percent ceil-
ing appears to be constraining at very short maturities for the main lenders in 
the high-risk market but not for maturities of several months or more (U.K. 
Competition Commission 2006). Of course much higher interest rates (in the 
millions of percent per year) have been documented all over the world in illegal 
or unregulated lending to unfortunate individuals.
31. Such requirements should not be too draconian, as where unfavorable 
registration on the national credit registry is enough to exclude a borrower 
from future loans.
32. Using an eight-year bank-level dataset for over 100 countries Micco, 
Panizza, and Yañez (2007) confi rm that state-owned banks in developing coun-
tries are less profi table than privately owned banks because of lower margins and 
higher overhead costs, even after controlling for the dynamics of ownership over 
time, most notably regarding privatization. The relationship is much weaker in 
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developed countries. Of special interest is the fi nding that state-owned banks 
report higher profi ts in years of economic expansion compared to privately-
owned banks, but they are much less profi table in election years, a result which, 
because it is driven by differences in net interest margins rather than overhead 
costs, points to loan losses (or debt forgiveness) in those years. 
33. Even the U.S. Community Reinvestment Act may have had little effect, 
at least in its early years. Introduced in 1977, this law is sometimes pointed to 
as an example of a well-functioning directed credit program. Banks are rated 
on their “efforts in determining community credit needs, marketing credit, 
participating in community development, maintaining branch offi ces and 
avoiding discriminatory credit policies” in low-income neighborhoods. But, 
at least before 1997–98, they were not assessed on whether they actually lent 
more to target groups. Indeed, Dahl, Evanoff, and Spivey (2000) found that 
banks whose performance under the law was downgraded did not respond by 
increasing the share of their lending to target groups.
34. Cole analyzed the allocation of agricultural credit from government-
owned banks in India and found a strong suggestion of political infl uence. 
Across a sample of 412 districts in 19 Indian states in each year 1992–99 , and 
including 32 elections, he fi nds that not only did credit increase in election 
years but the election-year credit surge was greatest in the districts most closely 
contested. Given that it is state-level governments that appoint members of the 
coordinating committee for lending practices and policies, political pressure 
can be coming from different parties in different states even in the same year, 
a feature of the data that helped pinpoint likely political effects. 
35. Using a sample of 22 developing countries with 10 banks from each 
country over the period 1993–2000, Dinç found that in the months before 
elections, government-owned banks increase their lending—and the amount 
of loans restructured or overdue—relative to privately owned banks. This sug-
gests not only politically motivated lending at government-owned banks but 
also loan forgiveness before elections.
36. Khwaja and Mian analyzed all 112,685 business loan accounts at banks 
in Pakistan during 1996–2002 and uncovered strong circumstantial evidence 
of corruption at state-owned banks. The loan fi les contained the names of the 
borrowing companies’ directors, which allowed the authors to link them with 
the names of all of the candidates in the 1993 and 1997 general elections. 
Fully one-quarter of the candidates were directors of borrowing fi rms. More 
important, their fi rms borrowed more, paid lower interest rates, and defaulted 
more often (a 24 percent default rate, compared with a 6 percent for others, 
even after inclusion of fi rm-level control variables). These effects proved to be 
entirely attributable to borrowing from state-owned banks—implying sizable 
fi scal costs as well as the costs from misallocation of investable funds—and 
they were larger, the more electorally successful the politician. The effects are 
smaller in districts with a healthier democratic process, as measured by voter 
turnout. 
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37. See World Bank (2001) and Hanson (2004) for other reviews of the 
experience with state-owned banks.
38. For some examples related to fi nancial access, see http://www.ifc.org/
ifcext/sme.nsf/Content/Publications.
39. Also see Dufl o and Kremer (2005) for a discussion of the relative merits 
of randomized evaluation and competitors such as propensity score testing and 
the difference-in-difference methods for estimating the partial equilibrium 
effects on benefi ciaries of direct policy interventions.
40. The analysis of credit guarantee schemes displays some similarities 
and some contrasts with that of deposit insurance schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Kane 2002). In both types of schemes, the benefi ts of expanding access 
have to be balanced with the moral hazard risk. Perhaps the main difference 
is that coverage of a credit guarantee scheme can be credibly limited, whereas 
deposit insurance guarantees tend to be extended to all depositors, especially 
in a crisis. In addition, pricing and other features of credit guarantees can 
more easily be made realistically risk-related. For example a sizable degree of 
coinsurance is the norm with credit guarantees, and coverage can vary. But, 
as is argued in the text, just as with deposit insurance, success is less likely in 
poor institutional environments.
41. Curiously, the large, publicly funded SHG-bank linkage program in 
India, which provides subsidized refi nancing (by NABARD) of bank loans 
to self-help groups, directly benefi ting about 14 million households, offers no 
loan-loss guarantee to the bank. 
42. For example, government interventions in every one of the 25 EU 
member states involve subsidies or fi scal outlays, according to Dorn (2005); 
47 EU schemes are reviewed by Gracey (2001).
43. Note, however, that this line of reasoning is more specifi c than is often 
portrayed. Depending on the exact nature of project risks and of the informa-
tion asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, there might even be more 
lending than is socially optimal (DeMeza and Webb 1987; Besley 1994). The 
successful operation of MFIs that charge high interest rates shows that this 
problem is not decisive in all markets. 
44. Even in the United Kingdom, the stated purpose of the government’s 
Small Firms’ Loan Guarantee (SFLG) scheme has been simply the limited, 
instrumental one of assisting “SMEs who have a viable business plan but lack 
the collateral necessary to secure the loan that they seek.” 
45. Even the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) long-established SME 
guarantee scheme (the so-called section 7a scheme) has been criticized for poor 
underwriting loss estimates (U.S. General Accounting Offi ce 2001). Curiously, 
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though, the SBA erred on the conservative side in this matter; its actual underwrit-
ing losses turned out to be considerably lower than had been budgeted.
46. The highly regarded Chilean FOGAPE scheme has increased its 
annual charge to between 1 and 2 percent of the loan amount depending 
on the claims performance of participating banks; to date, the charges have 
been suffi cient to cover the administrative expenses of the scheme as well as 
claims (Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza 2006; De la Torre, Gozzi, and 
Schmukler 2007). Schemes in Malaysia and Thailand have also required very 
little subsidy over the years. The long-running SBA section 7a program in the 
United States entails a one-time subsidy of only about 1.3 percent of the value 
of the guaranteed loans, including provision for calls on the guarantee and 
operating expenses. The annual subsidy for the Italian SGS system grew to 
about 1 percent by 2004. Other programs have had higher costs. The charges 
of between 0.5 and 4 percent of the sum guaranteed by Mexican schemes cover 
only about half of the operating costs and underwriting losses (Benavides and 
Huidobro 2005). The very large Korean KCGF charges between 0.5 percent 
and 2 percent depending on the borrower’s credit rating, with an average of 
just over 1 percent, but this revenue covers only a fi fth of the scheme’s outlays. 
Indeed the two major Korean schemes operated at a loss of almost 4 percent 
a year of the stock of outstanding guarantees in 2001–5 (Shim 2006). Over 
the years, the (much smaller) U.K. SFLG scheme—which charges an annual 
2 percent fee—had experienced defaults on more than one in three of its guar-
anteed loans, requiring a subsidy amounting in a recent year to 15 percent of 
gross new guarantees in that year (Graham 2004).
47. One recent attempt to use quantitative information to estimate addi-
tionality is Zecchini and Ventura (2006), who compare data on some 4,000 
Italian fi rms eligible for the SGS guarantee scheme and 6,000 controls—fi rms 
that were not eligible because of their sector. Estimating a regression equation 
explaining the level of bank borrowing by fi rm in terms of the fi rm’s number of 
employees, sales, tangible and intangible assets, nonbank debt, net worth, and 
net earnings, they fi nd that, even after taking account of eligibility (using an 
instrumental variables technique), a fi rm’s use of SGS guarantees is associated 
with a modestly higher level of bank borrowing (about 10–13 percent). Another 
econometric effort was made by KPMG Management Consulting (1999), but 
it looked only at assisted borrowers and did not include a control group.
48. The key natural experiment allowing identifi cation of the effect of subsi-
dized export credit was the removal of one important sector, cotton yarn, from 
eligibility for subsidy. Apparently the authorities wanted to concentrate available 
funds on export sectors with higher value added. The cotton yarn sector, which 
had accounted for over half of the 100,000 individual loans made in the scheme 
between 1998 and 2003, survived this removal with output and exports almost 
unaffected. While some smaller, unlisted fi rms without multiple banking rela-
tionships were hit by the change, the larger fi rms just saw a reduction in their 
profi ts. An estimated one-half of the subsidized funds had gone to fi nancially 
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unconstrained fi rms that did not need it. Interestingly, it was not systematically 
the less-productive fi rms that were hit by the removal of the subsidy. 
49. A third form is the wholesale guarantee of, for example, a bond issue by 
a specialized SME lender, a securitization of the underlying loans, or a block 
loan to a specialized lender by another intermediary. The Italian SGS provides 
counterguarantees on a wholesale basis to mutual guarantee associations for 
bank loans of their members. Accion International has had many years of expe-
rience on a cross-country basis in wholesale guarantees of facilities provided 
to its local affi liates. 
50. This can be seen as an application of the increasingly fashionable idea of 
auctioning a block of subsidy funds to the highest bidder. In fi nance, the risk 
that the benefi ciary will ultimately default, thereby eventually paying much 
less than she promised, makes auctioning of rather limited application. It can 
work in the case at hand, where the block of funds and the subsidy involved is 
only a small part of the bidder’s business. 
51. Chinese guarantee funds, some of which are publicly backed but result 
from regulatory arbitrage, were estimated to cover loans amounting to 2.6 
percent of GDP in 2005 (Shim 2006).
52. Sometimes such measures can also be undermined by judicial decisions, 
as is illustrated by the case of payroll loans in Brazil, which were declared 
unconstitutional by a court, leading to higher borrowing costs (Costa and de 
Mello 2006). 
53. The study of Braun and Raddatz (2007) provides an excellent example 
of this. Distinguishing between economic sectors that are more or less likely 
to favor fi nancial liberalization, the authors were able to show that in countries 
in which the economic power of the former grew (as a result of trade liberaliza-
tion), subsequent fi nancial deepening was faster. 
54. Specifi cally, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) examined the removal of 
restrictions on branch banking. They trace the origin of these restrictions to 
the interest that 19th century state governments had in creating local banking 
monopolies that could be taxed. Resistance in the 20th century to deregulation 
came from the incumbent small banks, and indeed it was the states with many 
small banks that deregulated last.
55. They constructed an indicator of fi nancial liberalization encompassing 
credit and interest rate controls, entry barriers, restrictive regulations, govern-
ment ownership, and restrictions on international fi nancial transactions.
56. From cross-country evidence from 38 countries they fi nd that greater 
political accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more 
dependent on external capital and have greater growth opportunities.
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Data Appendix
TABLES A.1 TO A.7 PRESENT DATA COLLECTED FOR AND USED IN THIS
book and its background papers on indicators of use of, access to, and 
bariers to fi nancial services. The data are also available at http://econ
.worldbank.org/programs/fi nance.
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Albania 34 Gambia, The 21 Panama 46
Algeria 31 Georgia 15 Papua New Guinea 8
Angola 25 Germany s 97 Paraguay 30
Antigua and Barbuda 48 Ghana 16 Peru 26
Argentina 28 Greece s 83 Philippines 26
Armenia s 9 Grenada 37 Poland s 66
Austria s 96 Guatemala 32 Portugal s 84
Azerbaijan 17 Guinea 20 Romania s 23
Bahamas, The 53 Guyana 20 Russian Federation 69
Bangladesh 32 Haiti 15 Rwanda 23
Barbados 56 Honduras 25 Samoa 19
Belarus 16 Hungary s 66 Saudi Arabia 62
Belgium s 97 India s 48 São Tomé and Principe 15
Belize 46 Indonesia 40 Senegal 27
Benin 32 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 31 Seychelles 41
Bermuda 48 Iraq 17 Sierra Leone 13
Bhutan 16 Ireland s 88 Singapore 98
Bolivia 30 Italy s 75 Slovak Republic s 83
Bosnia and Herzegovina 17 Jamaica s 59 Slovenia s 97
Botswana s 47 Jordan 37 Solomon Islands 15
Brazil s 43 Kazakhstan 48 South Africa s 46
Bulgaria s 56 Kenya s 10 Spain s 95
Burkina Faso 26 Korea, Rep. of 63 Sri Lanka 59
Burundi 17 Kyrgyz Republic 14 St. Kitts and Nevis 49
Cambodia 20 Latvia s 64 St. Lucia 40
Cameroon 24 Lesotho s 17 St. Vincent 45
Canada s 96 Liberia 11 Sudan 15
Cape Verde 40 Libya 27 Suriname 32
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Table A.1 Composite measure of access to fi nancial services
Central African Republic 19 Lithuania s 70 Swaziland s 35
Chile 60 Luxembourg s 99 Sweden s 99
China s 42 Macedonia, FYR 20 Switzerland 88
Colombia s 41 Madagascar 21 Syrian Arab Rep. 17
Comoros 20 Malawi 21 Tajikistan 16
Congo, Rep. Of 27 Malaysia 60 Tanzania s 5
Costa Rica 29 Mali 22 Thailand 59
Cote d’Ivoire s 25 Malta s 90 Togo 28
Croatia 42 Mauritius 54 Trinidad andTobago 53
Cuba 45 Mexico s 25 Tunisia 42
Cyprus s 85 Moldova 13 Turkey 49
Czech Republic s 85 Mongolia 25 Uganda 20
Denmark s 99 Morocco 28 Ukraine 24
Dominica 66 Mozambique 12 United Kingdom s 91
Dominican Republic 29 Myanmar 19 United States s 91
Ecuador s 35 Namibia s 28 Uruguay 42
Egypt, Arab. Rep. of 41 Nepal 20 Uzbekistan 16
El Salvador 26 Netherlands 100 Venezuela, R. B. de 28
Eritrea 12 Nicaragua s 5 Vietnam 29
Estonia s 86 Niger 31 West Bank and Gaza 14
Ethiopia 14 Nigeria 15 Yemen, Republic of 14
Fiji 39 Norway 84 Yugoslavia, former 21
Finland s 99 Oman 33 Zambia 15
France s 96 Pakistan s 12 Zimbabwe 34
Gabon 39
Note: The composite indicator measures the percentage of the adult population with access to an account with a fi nancial intermediary. 
The indicator is constructed as follows: for any country with data on access from a household survey, the surveyed percentage is given 
and designated by an s. For other countries, the percentage is constructed as a function of the estimated number and average size of bank 
accounts, as discussed in box 1.4 and Honohan (2007). These numbers are subject to estimation error. This is a “live” data set, and fi gures 
will be replaced as survey data become available for each country. See http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/fi nance for updates.
(continued)
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Albania 4.42 15.41 161.25 2.75  — 1,933
Argentina 154.19 1.77 368.73 0.58 0.205 3,381
Armenia 41.23 1.93 111.38 1.00 0.076 915
Austria 647.64 1.84 3,119.95 0.26 1.025 31,202
Bangladesh 54.73 5.22 228.75 1.60 0.245 376
Belgium 59.47 21.09 3,080.31 0.38 0.773 29,205
Bolivia 9.53 27.89 40.63 5.81 0.558 894
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
114.09 3.19 429.40 1.87  — 1,682
Brazil 49.59 6.18 630.86 0.40 0.346 2,788
Bulgaria 73.85 4.24 1,351.37 0.26 0.149 2,538
Chile 417.74 1.6 1,044.82 0.46 0.694 4,591
Colombia  —  — 612.21 0.42 0.262 1,747
Czech Republic  —  — 1,922.83 0.42 0.424 8,375
Denmark 450.99 2.09 2,706.07 0.22 1.100 39,429
Dominican 
Republic
50.10 6.71 719.52 0.10 0.335 1,821
Ecuador 77.09 2.63 419.54 0.63 0.353 2,066
El Salvador 126.89 0.39 456.69 0.12 0.047 2,204
Fiji 67.09 4.75 444.42 1.13 0.322 2,696
France  —  — 1,800.84 0.40 0.857 29,267
Greece 776.48 0.83 2,417.64 0.29 0.546 16,203
Guatemala 45.79 3.19 403.54 0.55 0.189 2,009
Guyana  —  — 571.03 1.37  — 965
Honduras 67.27 6.13 287.27 0.74 0.388 1,001
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 48.19 2.91 2,249.28 0.04 0.281 2,061
Israel 709.90 1.58  —  — 0.859 16,686
Italy 328.15 2.35 975.64 0.47 0.750 25,429
Jordan 80.39 8.2 465.48 1.41 0.721 1,858
Kenya  —  — 69.98 6.26 0.258 434
Lebanon 93.42 9.13 382.53 6.65  — 4,224
Lithuania 58.86 3.65 1,166.45 0.21 0.128 5,273
Madagascar 4.38 18.35 14.46 9.31 0.081 323
Malaysia 328.97 2.95 1,250.10 0.92 1.352 4,164
Malta 407.21 6.24 2,495.81 1.22 1.083 9,699
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Mauritius 207.13 2.75 1,585.99 0.53 0.559 4,265
Mexico  —  — 309.57 0.46 0.181 6,121
Namibia 80.74 5.16 422.96 1.27 0.438 2,312
Nicaragua 95.61 2.49 96.12 4.70 0.424 748
Norway  —  — 1,610.78 0.23 0.870 48,592
Pakistan 21.93 14.26 191.84 2.63 0.260 464
Panama 297.84 5.32  —  — 0.922 4,328
Papua New Guinea  —  — 119.77 2.48 0.147 617
Peru 77.92 2.45 316.19 0.74 0.248 2,247
Philippines  —  — 302.05 1.77 0.405 989
Poland 773.87 0.33  —  — 0.265 5,487
Romania  —  — 1,207.88 0.25 0.073 2,719
Russian Federation 54.11 4.23 1,892.28 0.07  — 3,022
Saudi Arabia 47.45 7.73 214.13 2.28 0.554 8,366
Singapore 513.23 3.84 1,670.88 1.62 1.159 21,492
Spain 556.48 1.91 2,075.96 0.44 0.992 20,343
Switzerland  —  — 1,985.84 0.29 1.589 42,138
Thailand 247.87 4.56 1,423.12 0.83 1.044 2,309
Trinidad and 
Tobago
 —  — 1,073.48 0.35 0.404 7,769
Turkey 264.51 0.65 1,114.23 0.68 0.171 3,365
Uganda 5.79 10.74 46.64 3.93 0.051 245
Venezuela, R. B. de 93.04 1.02 486.74 0.48 0.110 3,319
West Bank and Gaza 50.15 8.25 253.99 4.91  — 1,026
Zimbabwe  —  — 173.56 7.98 0.235 634
Note: Reported indicators are based on data collected through a survey of bank regulators, as discussed in box 1.4 and Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007b). Loan (deposit) accounts per capita refer to the number of loans (deposits) per 1,000 people. Loan 
(deposit)-income ratio refers to the average size of loans (deposits) per GDP per capita. The survey questions asked are: “How many loans 
are there in your country right now that have been issued by deposit money banks? (Please include loans from deposit money banks to 
individuals, businesses and others, including home mortgages, consumer loans, business loans, trade loans, student loans, emergency 
loans, agricultural loans, etc.)” “What is the total value of these loans? (Please specify currency and units.)” “How many deposit accounts 
are there at deposit money banks in your country right now? (Please include all current (checking) accounts, savings accounts, and time 
deposits for businesses, individuals, and others.)” “What is the total value of these deposits? (Please specify currency and units).” Private 
credit to GDP is the ratio of claims of fi nancial institutions on the private sector to GDP and is obtained from the World Bank Financial 
Structure and Economic Development Database. GDP per capita is in US$ and is taken from World Development Indicators. Data are 
available at http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/fi nance. — = data not available.
(continued)
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Albania 2.45 2.11 2.74 2.37  — 1,933
Argentina 1.40 10.01 2.09 14.91 0.205 3,381
Armenia 8.23 7.59 1.49 1.37 0.076 915
Australia 0.77 29.86 1.66 64.18 0.879 26,062
Austria 52.47 53.87 84.95 87.21 1.025 31,202
Azerbaijan 3.90 4.11  —  —  — 865
Bahrain 135.21 13.48 269.01 26.83 0.576 10,791
Bangladesh 47.46 4.47 0.61 0.06 0.245 376
Belarus 2.28 4.79 2.41 5.06 0.070 1,770
Belgium 181.65 53.15 229.28 67.09 0.773 29,205
Belize 1.67 14.67  —  — 0.543 3,583
Bolivia 0.13 1.53 0.40 4.80 0.558 894
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
3.15 3.86 4.38 5.36  — 1,682
Botswana 0.11 3.77 0.27 9.00 0.163 4,290
Brazil 3.05 14.59 3.72 17.82 0.346 2,788
Bulgaria 9.81 13.87 21.09 29.79 0.149 2,538
Canada 1.56 45.60 4.64 135.23 0.967 26,380
Chile 1.98 9.39 5.06 24.03 0.694 4,591
China 1.83 1.33 5.25 3.80 1.236 1,094
Colombia 3.74 8.74 4.10 9.60 0.262 1,747
Costa Rica 7.52 9.59 10.07 12.83 0.240 4,365
Croatia 18.62 23.36 31.96 40.10 0.416 6,356
Czech Republic 14.73 11.15 25.84 19.57 0.424 8,375
Denmark 47.77 37.63 66.51 52.39 1.100 39,429
Dominican Republic 10.83 6.00 27.24 15.08 0.335 1,821
Ecuador 4.38 9.30 2.97 6.32 0.353 2,066
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 2.45 3.62 1.21 1.78 0.579 1,220
El Salvador 14.58 4.62 34.89 11.07 0.047 2,204
Estonia 4.85 15.19 18.43 57.7 0.248 6,210
Ethiopia 0.28 0.41  —  — 0.294 97
Fiji 2.52 5.51 5.69 12.46 0.322 2,696
Finland 3.26 19.06 13.55 79.21 0.558 31,007
France 46.94 43.23 76.33 70.30 0.857 29,267
Georgia 2.32 3.14 0.86 1.17  — 768
Germany 116.90 49.41 144.68 61.16 1.178 29,081
Ghana 1.43 1.60  —  —  — 375
Greece 25.53 30.81 39.39 47.55 0.546 16,203
Guatemala 11.49 10.12 22.93 20.20 0.189 2,009
Guyana 0.12 3.12 0.25 6.50  — 965
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Honduras 0.46 0.73 2.22 3.56 0.388 1,001
Hungary 31.04 28.25 32.30 29.40 0.309 8,182
India 22.57 6.30  —  — 0.277 563
Indonesia 10.00 8.44 5.73 4.84 0.236 971
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 3.40 8.39 0.51 1.25 0.281 2,061
Ireland 13.41 23.41 27.78 48.49 1.020 37,637
Israel 47.82 14.74 61.01 18.81 0.859 16,686
Italy 102.05 52.07 131.71 67.20 0.750 25,429
Japan 34.82 9.98 396.98 113.75 1.115 34,010
Jordan 5.98 10.02 5.60 9.38 0.721 1,858
Kazakhstan 0.14 2.47 0.39 7.01 0.125 1,995
Korea, Rep. of 65.02 13.40 436.88 90.03 1.197 12,634
Kuwait 11.05 8.27 26.32 19.69 0.644 14,848
Kyrgyz Republic 0.82 3.11  —  — 0.041 344
Lebanon 79.18 18.01 73.90 16.81  — 4,224
Lithuania 1.81 3.39 15.34 28.78 0.128 5,273
Madagascar 0.19 0.66 0.07 0.22 0.081 323
Malaysia 7.39 9.80 12.40 16.44 1.352 4,164
Malta 375.00 30.08 462.50 37.09 1.083 9,699
Mauritius 71.92 11.92 133.00 22.04 0.559 4,265
Mexico 4.09 7.63 8.91 16.63 0.181 6,121
Namibia 0.11 4.47 0.30 12.11 0.438 2,312
Nepal 2.96 1.72 0.15 0.09 0.272 237
Netherlands 163.81 34.23 223.02 46.60 1.407 31,548
New Zealand 4.19 28.04 7.53 50.36 1.101 19,021
Nicaragua 1.29 2.85 1.18 2.61 0.424 748
Nigeria 2.41 1.62  —  — 0.136 370
Norway 3.41 22.92  —  — 0.870 48,592
Pakistan 9.10 4.73 1.02 0.53 0.260 464
Panama 5.16 12.87 6.49 16.19 0.922 4,328
Papua New Guinea 0.20 1.64  —  — 0.147 617
Peru 0.89 4.17 1.24 5.85 0.248 2,247
Philippines 21.40 7.83 14.52 5.31 0.405 989
Poland 10.25 8.17 21.72 17.31 0.265 5,487
Portugal 57.45 51.58 121.50 109.09 1.318 14,665
Romania 13.26 13.76 12.02 12.47 0.073 2,719
Russian Federation 0.19 2.24 0.53 6.28  — 3,022
Saudi Arabia 0.56 5.36 1.54 14.70 0.554 8,366
Singapore 636.07 9.13 2,642.62 37.93 1.159 21,492
Slovak Republic 11.33 10.28 32.21 29.21 0.441 5,922
(continued)
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Slovenia 2.14 2.19 64.56 66.14 0.352 13,383
South Africa 2.22 5.99 6.49 17.50 0.689 3,530
Spain 78.90 95.87 104.18 126.60 0.992 20,343
Sri Lanka 20.41 6.87 10.91 3.67 0.274 965
Sweden 4.74 21.80 6.43 29.56 0.830 33,586
Switzerland 70.54 37.99 131.10 70.60 1.589 42,138
Tanzania 0.23 0.57 0.07 0.17  — 275
Thailand 8.71 7.18 20.69 17.05 1.044 2,309
Trinidad and Tobago 23.59 9.22 52.44 20.49 0.404 7,769
Turkey 7.81 8.50 16.54 18.00 0.171 3,365
Uganda 0.67 0.53 0.90 0.70 0.051 245
Ukraine  —  — 0.78 0.93  — 1,024
United Kingdom 45.16 18.35 104.46 42.45 1.301 30,278
United States 9.81 30.86 38.43 120.94 1.628 37,388
Uruguay 1.23 6.39  —  — 0.517 3,308
Venezuela, R. B. de 1.28 4.41 4.81 16.60 0.110 3,319
West Bank and Gaza 18.33 3.27 18.17 3.24  — 1,026
Zambia 0.21 1.52 0.09 0.65  — 413
Zimbabwe 1.11 3.27 1.15 3.38 0.235 634
Note: Reported indicators are based on data collected through a survey of bank regulators, as discussed in box 1.4 and Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2007b). Geographic branch (ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 1,000 square 
kilometers. Demographic branch (ATM) penetration refers to the number of branches (ATMs) per 100,000 people. The questions 
asked were: “How many bank branches do deposit money banks have (combined for all banks) in your country?” “How many ATMs 
(automated cash withdrawal machines) are there in your country?” Private credit to GDP is the ratio of claims of fi nancial institutions 
on the private sector to GDP and is obtained from the World Bank Financial Structure and Economic Development Database. GDP per 
capita is in US$ and is taken from World Development Indicators. Data are available at http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/fi nance. 
— = data not available.
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A P P E N D I X
Table A.7 Barriers to payment services
Country
Number of 










Amount of fee for 
using ATM cards (% 
of $100)
Albania 5 91.42 7.70 0.0003
Algeria 1 91.00  — 0.21
Argentina 2 17.90 0.75 0.00
Armenia 4 59.63 6.14 0.07
Australia 2 32.59 8.05 0.00
Austria 1 11.46 3.45 0.00
Bangladesh 5 56.98 1.93 0.00
Belarus 3 74.58 1.27 0.00
Belgium 3 72.56 0.12 0.00
Bolivia 4 58.04 13.47 0.26
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4 64.04 3.79 0.01
Brazil 4 64.35 14.85 0.11
Bulgaria 3 34.87 5.24 0.13
Cameroon 5 83.83 9.15 0.00
Chile 2 35.50 20.00 0.00
China 2 23.33 2.67 0.12
Colombia 5 50.48 11.67 0.19
Croatia 4 63.42 3.57 0.00
Czech Republic 2 43.00 3.99 0.19
Denmark 2 72.71 4.09 0.00
Dominican Republic 2 39.27 20.00 5.70
Egypt, Arab Rep. of 2 32.05 0.76 0.00
El Salvador 1 24.74 1.23 0.06
Estonia 1 6.51 11.26 0.00
Ethiopia 4 93.73 1.87 0.00
France 2 26.23 5.12 0.00
Gabon 3  — 4.85 0.00
Georgia 5 85.71 7.03 0.13
Germany 3 31.91 1.12 0.00
Ghana 4 69.49 14.70 0.19
Greece 3 56.92 7.42 0.00
Hungary 3 53.09 3.60  —
India 4 36.87 6.49 0.00
Indonesia 4 44.73 2.83 0.00
Iran, Islamic Rep. of 2 29.86  — 0.00
Israel 2 36.17 8.15 0.23
Italy 4 22.79 7.39 0.00
Japan 4 29.63 13.24 0.00
(continued)
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Table A.7 Barriers to payment services
Country
Number of 










Amount of fee for 
using ATM cards (% 
of $100)
Jordan 3 83.61 5.37 0.00
Kenya 3 43.82 8.43 0.15
Korea 6 68.95 7.05 0.22
Lebanon 3 38.00 9.76 0.00
Lithuania 5 88.87 8.72 0.00
Madagascar 5 72.44 4.30 0.00
Malawi 3 82.36 6.42 0.08
Malaysia 1 10.38  — 0.13
Malta 4 44.56 5.59 0.03
Mauritius 1 4.63  — —
Mexico 3 48.95 8.66 0.40
Moldova 3 40.16 11.19 0.00
Mozambique 2 48.78 4.25 0.22
Nepal 5 37.86 7.10 0.00
New Zealand 1 16.75 6.63 0.33
Nigeria 3 32.22 6.17 0.50
Norway 1 19.30 3.56 0.00
Pakistan 3 47.50 2.10 0.60
Peru 4 81.88 6.68 0.24
Philippines 4 41.84 2.27 0.00
Poland 2 28.65 7.10 0.00
Portugal 1 13.93  — 0.00
Romania 4 35.01 17.43 0.00
Sierra Leone 4 100.00 6.86 0.00
Slovak Republic 3 58.12 4.38 0.19
Slovenia 5 67.48 2.88 0.00
South Africa 3 70.09 9.53 0.34
Spain 4 63.75 6.39 0.00
Sri Lanka 3 52.19 7.14 0.03
Swaziland 1 43.40 14.40 .
Sweden 2 39.47 8.16 0.00
Switzerland 2 79.57 3.17 0.00
Thailand 3 38.36 4.97 0.00
Trinidad and Tobago 3 40.15 3.74 0.05
Tunisia 2 29.65 5.19 0.00
Turkey 3 50.14 6.34 0.00
Uganda 3 59.27 0.55 0.19
United Kingdom 2 17.46 9.56 0.00
(continued)
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Table A.7 Barriers to payment services
Country
Number of 










Amount of fee for 
using ATM cards (% 
of $100)
Uruguay 4 48.52 7.18 0.14
Venezuela, R. B. de 2 27.47 12.00 0.10
Zambia 3 46.28 3.24 0.13
Zimbabwe 4 28.24 3.77 1.04
Minimum 1 4.63 0.12 0.00
5th percentile 1 13.68 1.01 0.00
Median 3 44.56 6.34 0.00
Average 3 48.25 6.63 0.17
Maximum 6 100.00 20.00 5.70
95th percentile 5 89.08 14.75 0.42
Note: Indicators are obtained from a bank-level survey, as discussed in box 1.5 and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria 
(2007a), and are weighted country-level averages. The fi rst column gives the number of banks from each country that responded to 
the survey. Deposit market share is the total deposits of all the banks in the sample divided by total deposits of the banking system 
of a country. The data on bank deposits is taken from Bankscope. Cost to transfer funds internationally is the amount of fees banks 
charge to transfer funds internationally. The fee is expressed as percentage of $250. Amount of fee for using ATM cards is the fee banks 
charge consumers for using an ATM card. The fee is expressed as percentage of $100. Data are available at http://econ.worldbank
.org/programs/fi nance. — = data are not available.
(continued)
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